Say-on-Pay制度對薪酬比率之影響

Abstract

2011年起，美國Dodd-Frank法案要求上市公司實施Say-on-Pay投票制度，使股東得以就公司高階經理人之薪酬政策表達意見。為提供股東更多公司薪酬結構之資訊，美國證券交易委員會(SEC)又進一步要求上市公司自2018年開始揭露執行長(CEO)薪酬與員工薪酬中位數之比，謂之薪酬比率(Pay Ratio)。本研究以標準普爾1500指數(S&P 1500)之公司為樣本，觀察股東對公司薪酬比率之看法以及Say-on-Pay制度下之股東意見對公司後續年度薪酬比率之影響。 研究結果顯示薪酬比率和Say-on-Pay投票股東反對率有正向的關連性，代表股東在投票時會參考公司所揭露之薪酬比率。而較高之股東反對率將使公司降低其次年度之薪酬比率以回應股東，且薪酬比率之降低主要源於CEO薪酬之減少而非中位數員工薪酬之增加。此外，額外測試之結果顯示即使較佳之社會責任表現及員工福利會使公司調降CEO薪酬，但在股東反對率較高之情況下，公司於該等方面之表現會緩和CEO薪酬下降之幅度，說明公司之社會責任表現及對員工福祉之重視得以緩解股東及員工對於內部薪酬不公的擔憂。

Since 2011, the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act has required listed companies to implement Say-on-Pay votes, allowing shareholders to express their opinions on executive compensation policies. To provide shareholders with more information about the company’s compensation structure, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has further required listed companies to disclose the ratio of CEO compensation to the median of employee pay, which is called the pay ratio, starting from 2018. Using data consisting of S&P 1500 firms, this study observes shareholders’ perceptions of the company’s pay ratio and the impact of shareholder opinions under the Say-on-Pay voting on the pay ratio in subsequent years. The result shows that a higher pay ratio is associated with a greater shareholder opposition rate in the Say-on-Pay voting, indicating that the magnitude of the pay ratio affects shareholders’ Say-on-Pay voting decisions. Furthermore, higher shareholder opposition rates cause firms to reduce their pay ratios in the following year, suggesting that Say-on-Pay voting is effective in monitoring firms’ unfair pay practices. This study also finds that the reduction in pay ratios primarily results from the decrease in CEO compensation rather than the increase in median employee pay. Besides, the results from additional tests suggest that even if better social responsibility performances and employee welfare cause firms to reduce the CEO compensation, firms’ performances in these aspects moderate the reduction in CEO compensation resulting from high shareholder opposition rates, suggesting that firms’ social responsibility performances and attention to employee welfare mitigate shareholders’ and employees’ concerns about the unfairness of firms’ internal compensation structure.