原住民族與國家：王光祿案之康德哲學反思

Abstract

本文從一樁布農族族人獵捕保育類動物遭國家法律追訴的案件出發，試圖透過此一案件思索原住民族與國家之間的法權關係。一般認為此一案件乃原住民族傳統文化與國家法律規範之間的衝突，本文主張此一衝突應為原住民族傳統法規範與現代國家法規範之間的衝突。雖然原住民的狩獵活動已經由大法官釋字第803號解釋確認為受憲法保障的原住民族文化權之一環，且對於文化權的保障來自於人的自由與尊嚴。然而人的自由與尊嚴源自何處？在這裡我們碰到法學的極限。為了進一步澄清人是否具有自由與尊嚴，本文透過康德的道德哲學確認其來源，但自由屬於理性的理念，我們不能以理論去闡述它，只能以實踐去捍衛它，於是我們深入實踐的領域以尋求自由與道德法則、法權與國家的形而上學基礎，並以此確認原住民族與國家之間「應該」是什麼樣的法權關係。由於在土地的首次占有前便已預設了一切人共同占有但無人使用的法權狀態，原住民族作為土地的首次占有者，在現代國家進入台灣後為了獲取自然資源與統治原住民族掠奪了原住民族的傳統領域，國家既然作為一群人在法權之下的結合，應有義務對於原住民族此一法權遭受損害之情況做出賠償。再者，基於對自由與人性尊嚴的捍衛，原住民族理應享有自治權，但由於現實上對於原住民族傳統法規範與現代國家法律的競合仍面臨許多問題，故國家僅先以文化權作為消極的自治權加以保障。

This thesis starts from a case where an indigenous Bunun man was prosecuted un-der national law for hunting protected animals, aiming to contemplate the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state through this case. It is generally perceived as a conflict between indigenous traditional culture and national laws. However, this arti-cle argues that the conflict lies between indigenous customary law and modern national law. The hunting activities of indigenous peoples have been recognized as part of their cultural rights protected by the Constitution, which is affirmed by Judicial Yuan Consti-tutional Interpretation No. 803. The protection of cultural rights derives from human freedom and dignity, but where do freedom and dignity come from? This question reaches the limits of jurisprudence. To further clarify the existence of human freedom and dignity, this article turns to Kantian moral philosophy for its foundation. Freedom belongs to the realm of ideas of reason; it cannot be fully explained through theory but must be defended through prac-tice. Thus, we delve into the realm of practice to explore the metaphysical foundations of freedom, moral laws, legal rights, and the state, seeking to define what kind of rela-tionship "should" exist between indigenous peoples and the state. Since the original possession in common is established prior to any empirical pos-session, when indigenous people first occupied the land of Taiwan, they were already in a rightful condition. Nevertheless, their traditional territories were seized by the modern state upon its arrival in Taiwan for natural resources and control. As the state represents a union based on rights, it is obligated to compensate indigenous peoples for the viola-tion of this right. Furthermore, in defense of freedom and human dignity, indigenous peoples should rightfully be granted autonomy. However, due to ongoing conflicts be-tween indigenous customary laws and modern national laws, the state currently safe-guards autonomy primarily through the protection of cultural rights as a passive meas-ure. Keywords: Constitutional Interpretation No. 803, cultural rights, indigenous people’s autonomy, freedom, Kantian moral philosophy