上市公司董事與高階經理人薪酬規範之研究--以薪酬索回制度為核心

Abstract

近年薪酬給付不當之案例顯示，我國上市公司之公司治理未臻完善，則我國制度應如何發展，以改善代理成本之問題，頗值研究。現今普遍認為，促使董事與高階經理人之薪酬與公司發展連結，係解決代理問題之藥方之一。本文認同此觀點，並進一步認為，薪酬索回制度，得以強化董事、高階經理人與公司間利益連結之需求，得研究其應如何引入我國，協助解決管理團隊僅重視自身利益，忽略公司發展之公司治理問題。首先，所謂之薪酬索回，係指於特定條件下，公司有權向內部高階管理團隊，要求返還先前已給付之薪酬。然而，多數國人對於「薪酬索回」之概念，仍不甚熟稔，法學文獻上，亦少見討論該制度者。本文閱讀外國文獻上關於薪酬索回制度之安排後，乃思考，是否我國之薪酬規範已臻完善，故無必要引進之，抑或係應建構而漏未建構之。結論上並認為，我國或可考慮立法建構薪酬索回制度，將之作為解決代理成本之方法之一，並針對該制度得以發展之方向，提供具體之立法建議。

為了解我國薪酬索回制度之發展現狀，本文研究我國現制下，是否已有與薪酬索回制度相近或相關之法令、政策，並查閱我國上市公司之永續報告書，確認是否有上市公司已於立法前夕，自行設置薪酬索回機制者。其次，為瞭解我國董事與高階經理人之薪酬組成，以利日後索回制度之推行，本文遂以各公司之章程、年報為研究素材，統整上市公司董事與高階經理人之薪酬結構，作為法案建構之背景知識。再者，因本文結論上，主張我國或可引入薪酬索回制度，協助解決代理成本之問題，遂於第三章與第四章整理比較法上之索回法案，包含金融穩定委員會、經濟合作暨發展組織、國際公司治理網絡、歐洲聯盟、全球永續性報告協會、巴賽爾銀行監理委員等國際組織，所提出之薪酬索回制度建議，以及我國重要之比較法繼受對象，即美國、日本、德國等國對於薪酬索回制度之規劃，作為後續立法參考。

再者，本文既主張我國得於薪酬規範中，納入薪酬索回制度，乃於第五章研究薪酬索回制度設置之必要性。方向包含，薪酬索回制度在公司治理扮演之角色與貢獻，以及不推行該制度，可能面臨之潛在威脅，並說明我國現行制度有何不足，而薪酬索回制度，為何足以彌補該不足，亦說明相較於其他相近或相似制度，薪酬索回有何優點，作為制度引入之成本效益分析。最後，本文於第六章提出我國薪酬回制度之完整立法建議與立法理由，包含名詞定義、索回主體、索回要件、索回對象、索回期間、索回方式、決策單位、揭露機制等，針對制度推行之潛在疑慮，亦提出解釋，希能使相關單位明晰薪酬索回制度之價值，並運用該制度之優勢協助解決代理成本之問題。

Unsuitable remuneration giving cases show that, the corporate governance or agency costs issues in Taiwan aren’t perfect. Therefore, we should optimize our regulation systems to tackle the problem above. Most people are thinking, aligning the remuneration of directors and high-ranking executives with the interests of companies is one of the solutions. This paper agrees with this perspective. However, this paper argues that, the “clawback instrument” can help strengthening the connection between directors, high-ranking executive officers and companies. As a result, this paper does research on how to introduce the instrument into our country to help solving the problems of corporate governance or agency costs, including the managements only concentrate on their own interests though dismiss the best interests of the whole companies and the all shareholders. First of all, the “clawback” in this paper refers to the right of the companies, under some specific circumstances, to ask the management to return the remuneration previously paid. Most people in Taiwan, might be unfamiliar with the concept of clawback. Even more, there are less legal articles discussing the clawback instrument. Nevertheless, after reviewing the foreign literature about the clawback, this paper argues that, maybe the remuneration regulations in our country are not perfect and the clawback instrument should be inserted into our regulation systems to solve the problems. In sum, this paper argues, we can take establishing clawback instrument in our country into consideration, serving as one of measures that can deal with agency costs. Besides, this paper suggests some concrete and possible directions to implement clawback instrument here.

Based on the discussion above, in order to make sure the current developments of clawback instrument in Taiwan, this paper collects the laws and policies which are close or relevant to the clawback, and analyzes whether or not the listed companies have implemented the clawback instrument voluntarily without any requirements from the laws or policies by reviewing their Sustainability Reports. Secondly, in order to promote the clawback instrument in Taiwan, this paper examines the remuneration structures of listed companies via reading their Articles of Association and Annual Reports as the background knowledge for legislation in the future. And then, because this paper argues that, Taiwan could introduce clawback instrument, this paper collects and analyzes legal documents of clawback from FSB, OECD, ICGN, EU, GRI, BCBS, and the important comparative law resources of our country from US, Japan, and Germany, taking them as a reference to establish clawback instrument in our country in the future.

Subsequently, due to the fact that, the conclusion of this paper is, we could establish clawback instrument to help reducing agency costs, this paper does some research on the necessities of introducing that system, including the role that clawback would play in corporate governance, explains the potential risk of not implementing clawback in Taiwan, illustrates the reason why the clawback instrument can help remedying the deficiencies of current situation in Taiwan, and clarifies that advantages of clawback instrument, serving as the cost-benefit analysis of establishing clawback instrument in Taiwan. Eventually, this paper proposes the legislative recommendations and justifications of clawback instrument fully, including noun defining, clawback subjects, clawback elements, clawback objects, clawback period, clawback ways, competent authority, and disclosure requirements. This paper would also answer the potential questions that people may ask, hoping that everyone could pay more attention to the contributions clawback can make and that its positive feedbacks of solving agency costs.