論我國有限公司監察權之改進－以日本法為借鏡

Abstract

我國有限公司不執行業務股東擁有監察權，在制度上針對監察權之行使，法並未設有任何的限制，從而導致出惡意股東不當行使監察權查閱公司之帳簿，造成公司及董事之不便，甚至有竊取營業秘密之情事發生。在另一方面，真心欲對公司進行監督之股東，卻往往遭到董事拖延阻撓而無法及時查閱帳簿，顯然現行之監察權無法同時滿足受監督者及被監督者之需求。而在監察權以外，股東尚得聲請法院選派檢查人以調查公司有無弊端，然其功能上與監察權中之帳簿查閱權近似，為何在法條規範中卻不將之劃分在監察權內？其能否發揮與帳簿查閱權不同的功能？此外，有限公司監察權全權交給股東行使，權利內容則單單只有股東資訊權，如此是否能符合實際運作之需要？種種疑問，為本文所欲探究之重點。 在比較法上，本文主要以過去日本存在之有限會社制度作為參考之對象。有限會社之監察權與我國不同，交由屬於自由設置性質之監察人所行使，就其監察範圍僅限縮在會計監察，而不及於業務監察，至股東所享有監督公司之權利，日本法上稱作「股東監督是正權」。帳簿查閱權為股東監督是正權其中之一種權利，由於設有查閱理由之限制，可有效避免竊取公司機密或是惡意滋擾之情事發生。對於股東無法及時查閱帳簿，日本法廣泛使用定暫時狀態假處分以避免時間延宕。在帳簿查閱權以外，股東監督是正權亦包含檢查人選任聲請權，但與我國法同樣存在有功能近似之疑慮，此外股東監督是正權尚包含有股東代表訴訟、董事行為制止請求權、解任董事之訴、股東會召集請求權等制度，不單以股東資訊權作為監督之唯一手段。 本文建議仿照日本法，使公司得自由設置之監察人，監察人之監察權限則包含帳簿查閱權、業務財產調查權、代表公司與董事為法律行為之義務，以及代表公司對董事提起訴訟之義務。至現行之監察權，則改劃分為股東監督權，內容包含帳簿查閱權、質詢權、檢查人選派聲請權，並加入股東資訊權以外之股東代表訴訟、董事行為制止請求權、解任董事之訴制度。針對現行實務面臨之問題，在帳簿查閱權部分引入日本法之規範，針對股東請求查閱設下查閱理由之限制，而對於股東無法及時查閱之問題，則建議新設立專門處理查閱帳簿之程序以提升效率。就聲請法院選派檢查人制度，其與帳簿查閱權難以做出明確功能上之差別，未來可思考是否賦予檢查人新的功能，或是將之與帳簿查閱權合併成同一制度，一元化股東資訊權之制度。

In Taiwan, shareholders of a limited company have the power of audit to supervise the company, and there are no restrictions on it, which has led to malicious shareholders abusing the power to inspect the company's books and documents, causing inconvenience to the company and the directors(“inspection right”), or even stealing trade secrets. On the other hand, shareholders who genuinely want to supervise the company are often delayed or obstructed by the directors, and are unable to inspect the books and documents timely. Obviously, the power of audit cannot meet the needs of both the supervisors and the supervised. In addition to the power of audit, shareholders may also request the court to appoint an inspector to investigate the company for irregularities. However, the function of the inspector is similar to the inspection right under the power of audit. Why are the right to request the appointment of inspections not classified as part of the power of audit in the law? Can it play a different role from the inspection right? Furthermore, the power of audit of limited company is fully vested in shareholders, with only the shareholders information right. Is this sufficient for practical operations? These questions are the focus of this paper. On the study on comparative law, the past Japanese limited company system are used as reference in this paper. The power of audit in a Japanese limited liability company is different from that in Taiwan, vested in supervisors, who are freely appointed by the company. It can only supervise accounting; business supervision is not included. The shareholders' right to supervise the company is known as the "shareholder supervisory rights." These rights also include the inspection right, limited by the need to justify the inspection, effectively preventing the theft of trade secrets or malicious disturbances. To address shareholders' inability to inspect books promptly, Japanese law widely uses provisional dispositions to avoid delays. Apart from the inspection right, shareholder supervisory rights also include the right to request the appointment of inspectors. However, like Taiwanese law, there is a concern over the similarity in function. Additionally, shareholder supervisory rights include shareholder derivative suits, requests to stop directors' actions, lawsuits for the removal of directors, and the right to call shareholder meetings, not just relying on the shareholder information right. The paper suggests adopting the Japanese law, allowing Taiwanese limited companies to freely appoint supervisor whose power of audit would include the inspection right, the right to investigate business and assets, the duty to represent the company in legal actions with directors, and the duty to sue directors. For the current power of audit which vested in shareholders, should be reclassified as shareholder supervisory rights, including the inspection right, inquiry rights, the right to request the appointment of inspectors, and adding systems beyond the shareholder information right, such as shareholder derivative suits, requests to stop directors' actions, and lawsuits for the removal of directors. To deal with practical problems nowadays, the paper suggests introducing Japanese legal norms in the inspection right, setting restrictions on the reasons for shareholders' requests for inspection, and proposing a specialized process for inspection right to improve efficiency. The system for requesting the court to appoint inspectors may not be distinctly different from the inspection right. In the future, it is worth considering whether to grant new functions to inspectors or to merge this with the inspection right into a unified shareholder information rights system.