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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 林明昕 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Ming-Hsin Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林彥廷 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Yen-Ting Eddy Lin | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-05T16:19:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-06 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2024-03-05 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2024-02-17 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 壹、中文部分
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H. (2011). The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations. In Mares, R. (Ed.), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Lewis, A. (2007). Freedom for the thought that we hate: a biography of the First Amendment. Basic Books. 二、期刊論文 Arun, C. (2021). Facebook''s Faces. Harvard Law Review Forum, 135, 236-264. https://harvardlawreview.org/forum Chander, A. (2022). Section 230 and the International Law of Facebook. Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 24, 393-420. Cowls, J., Darius, P., Santistevan, D., & Schramm, M. (2022). Constitutional metaphors: Facebook’s “supreme court” and the legitimation of platform governance. New Media & Society, 0(0), 1-25. Douek, E. (2020). "What Kind of Oversight Board Have You Given Us?". University of Chicago Law Review Online, 2020, 1-11. https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu Feister, D. (2010). How Clear is the "Clear and Present Danger" Test. 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Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets. World Competition, 36(2), 195-221. Wong, D. & Floridi, L. (2023). Meta’s Oversight Board: A Review and Critical Assessment. Minds and Machines, 33, 261-284. 三、網路資料 BBC. (2018, March 13), UN: Facebook has turned into a beast in Myanmar. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43385677 BBC. (2019, November 2). General Election 2019: Facebook takes down ''political'' advertising. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50270727 BBC. (2023, November 9). Meta requires political advertisers to mark when deepfakes used. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-67366311 Bubna, V. (2022, April 10). How Instagram has played a role in accelerating the Russia-Ukraine war. Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/04/10/how-instagram-has-played-a-role-in-accelerating-the-russia-ukraine-war Carville, O. (2022, November 11). TikTok’s Viral Challenges Keep Luring Young Kids to Their Deaths. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-11-30/is-tiktok-responsible-if-kids-die-doing-dangerous-viral-challenges Clegg, N. (2023). How Meta Is Planning for Elections in 2024. Meta. https://about.fb.com/news/2023/11/how-meta-is-planning-for-elections-in-2024/ Clegg, N. (2023). Ending Suspension of Trump’s Accounts With New Guardrails to Deter Repeat Offenses. Meta. https://about.fb.com/news/2023/01/trump-facebook-instagram-account-suspension/ CNN. (2021, January 7). Trump tells rioters to ''go home'' while repeating election lies. YouTube. https://youtu.be/3_JxN9CwIMU Delkic, M. (2022, May 10). Trump’s banishment from Facebook and Twitter: A timeline. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/technology/trump-social-media-ban-timeline.html Dixon, S. (2023, October 11). Most popular social networks worldwide as of July 2023, ranked by number of monthly active users. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ Fung, B. (2020, October 22). Facebook''s Oversight Board is finally hearing cases, two years after it was first announced. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/22/tech/facebook-oversight-board/index.html Gilbert, B. (2020, February 16). Facebook is spending $130 million to create a ''Supreme Court'' that can overrule Mark Zuckerberg — here''s everything we know about it. Insiders. https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-moderation-independent-oversight-board-supreme-court-mark-zuckerberg-explained-2020-2 Haggin, P. (2022, December 12). Elon Musk’s Twitter Disbands Trust and Safety Council. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-twitter-disbands-trust-and-safety-council-11670898329 Hovland, K. & Seetharaman, D. (2016, September 9). Facebook Backs Down on Censoring ‘Napalm Girl’ Photo. 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Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. A/74/486. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/308/13/PDF/N1930813.pdf United Nations, Human Rights Council. (2020). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. A/HRC/44/49/Add.2. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/190/89/PDF/G2019089.pdf United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2011). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. HR/PUB/11/04, at 13. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf Vargas, J. A. (2012, February 17). Spring Awakening. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-began-on-facebook.html Wells, G., Horwitz, J., & Seetharaman, D. (2021, September 14). 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United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S. Ct. 17, 22, 63 L. Ed. 1173 (1919) Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. At Columbia Univ., 209 L. Ed. 2d 519, 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1227 (2021) Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969) Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942) Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2019) Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919) Vargas v. Facebook, Inc., No. 21-16499, 2023 WL 6784359 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2023) Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927) | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/92108 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 言論自由作為人民基本權利,也是民主體制的根基所在,但若目的為追求重要公共利益且手段符合比例原則時,國家仍得以法律限制之。然而,對於社群媒體而言,決定內容是否能顯示於平台之上,往往僅是根據私人科技公司自行制定的政策規範,卻儼然已形成國際間最廣泛、適用最多人的言論自由標準。
本文透過耙梳Meta公司為Facebook、Instagram制定的《社群守則》等內容管理政策、用於審查內容及執行政策的方式,及監督該公司對言論限制是否符合國際人權標準的「監察委員會」,來試圖建構、理解全球最大的社群媒體平台進行內容管理的體系。 此外,本文藉由分析至2023年10月,監察委員會所作成的53件案例裁決中涉及兩項不確定概念的「立即危害」及「容許差別」的案件,釐清前者作為社群媒體得移除、封鎖內容的主要原則之一,係源自聯合國《拉巴特行動計畫》的六項門檻測試。監察委員會並未著重於使用者的發佈意圖、言論與危險的時間差,而更關注與內容有關的危險是否在發佈時已發生或持續進行中,以及評估背景、環境影響下,危害風險實現的可能性。 本文進一步指出,「容許差別」為Meta公司創設出對於社群媒體言論自由界線的例外。監察委員會對於出現在政府專制、言論自由受壓迫的國家、地區,或與揭露侵害人權的行為相關的內容,傾向認定為具有新聞價值,在未達「立即危害」的情形下,縱然該內容違反《社群守則》,亦會例外允許繼續顯示於平台上;或雖不具新聞價值,但保留該則爭議內容有助於實現平台的核心價值時,也例外地不予移除,為「三段雙軌」的審查流程。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Freedom of speech, as a fundamental right of the people and a cornerstone of democratic systems, can still be legally restricted by states in pursuit of significant public interests, provided the means are proportionate. However, for social media, the decision to display content on platforms is usually based merely on policies set by private technology companies. Yet, these policies have seemingly become the most widely applied and universal standards for freedom of speech internationally.
This thesis analyzes the Community Standards and other content policies enacted by Meta for Facebook and Instagram, the measures used for content review and policy implementation, and the operation of the Oversight Board to oversee whether the company's content moderation decisions are aligned with international human rights standards. This study attempts to understand the content moderation system of the world's largest social media platforms. Additionally, this thesis analyzes 53 case decisions made by the Oversight Board up to October 2023, focusing on cases regarding the concepts of "imminent harm" and "allowance." The former, a key principle for social media to remove or block content, is derived from the six-part threshold test of The Rabat Plan of Action by the United Nations. The Oversight Board does not strictly require the clarification of users'' intent or the temporal gap between speech and danger. Instead, it places more emphasis on whether the related danger had already happened or was ongoing at the time of posting, and it considers the possibility of harm being realized in the context of the content's background and environment. This study further points out that "allowance" serves as an exception developed by Meta to the boundaries of freedom of speech on social media. The Oversight Board tends to recognize content related to autocratic regimes, suppressing freedom of speech, or unveiling human rights violations as newsworthy. If it does not pose "imminent harm," such content is allowed to remain on the platform even if it violates the Community Standards. Alternatively, if it lacks newsworthiness, but retaining the content adheres to Meta''s core values or if removing it would contradict them, it is also exceptionally retained, constituting a "three-level, two-track" review process. | en |
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dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-03-05T16:19:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
序言 ii 摘要 iv Abstract v 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究標的 6 壹、社群媒體平台 6 貳、研究文本 7 第三節 研究架構 15 第二章 社群媒體如何管理內容? 18 第一節 《社群守則》等內容政策 18 壹、《社群守則》 19 貳、《廣告刊登準則》與其他內容政策 21 第二節 政策執行 24 壹、被動或主動政策執行 24 貳、事前或事後政策執行 27 參、政策執行作法 27 第三節 監察委員會 28 壹、成立起源 28 貳、運作模式 30 參、審查標準 32 第四節 小結 36 第三章 社群媒體言論自由的重要界線:立即危害 38 第一節 與「立即危害」相關的案例裁決 38 第二節 初見「立即危害」作為審查標準 40 壹、〈案例裁決2020-006-FB-FBR〉 40 貳、〈案例裁決2020-007-FB-FBR〉 41 第三節 川普案與《拉巴特行動計劃》 42 壹、〈案例裁決2021-001-FB-FBR〉 43 貳、引用《拉巴特行動計劃》 44 第四節 延續《拉巴特行動計劃》六項門檻 48 第五節 與「立即而危險原則」比較 49 壹、如何認定「明顯而立即危險」? 50 貳、「明顯而立即危險」與「立即危害」之異同 53 第六節 小結 56 第四章 社群媒體言論自由界線例外:容許差別 58 第一節 「容許差別」起源 58 第二節 與「容許差別」相關的案例裁決 59 第三節 監察委員會如何適用「容許差別」 62 壹、適用「容許差別」的前提與情境 62 貳、考量政治環境與重大事件關鍵時刻 63 參、危害風險與公共利益的衡量 64 肆、目的為引起公眾關注、譴責 66 第四節 「容許差別」的侷限 68 壹、增設「政策精神容許差別」 68 貳、「容許差別」作為極少數案例的解方 69 第五節 小結 71 第五章 結論 73 壹、交互建構的內容管理體系 73 貳、社群媒體言論自由的原則與例外 75 參、對於社群媒體內容管理的未來展望 78 參考文獻 80 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 社群媒體時代的言論自由界線:以「監察委員會」對「立即危害」與「容許差別」之相關裁決為中心 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Boundaries of Freedom of Speech in the Social Media Era: Focusing on the Oversight Board’s Decisions Regarding “Imminent Harm” and “Allowance” | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 112-1 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林麗雲;林日璇 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Lih-Yun Lin;Jih-Hsuan Lin | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 社群媒體,言論自由,Facebook,監察委員會,立即危害,容許差別, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Social Media,Freedom of Speech,Facebook,Oversight Board,Imminent Harm,Allowance, | en |
dc.relation.page | 90 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202400262 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2024-02-17 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 新聞研究所 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 新聞研究所 |
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ntu-112-1.pdf | 4.11 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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