我國內線交易規範行為主體與責任類型之研究

Abstract

本論文探討我國內線交易規範中，目前未能處理的不同行為主體之行為態樣的「責任程度」，並為課予內線交易行為不同之「責任類型」的正當性分析，最後結合兩者，作出「不同行為主體」應負擔的「責任」之結論。 本論文分成六章，第一章說明問題意識、研究範圍架構及研究發現；第二章則研究比較法制之內線交易行為主體規範方式與理論基礎，其中本論文發現不同法制皆有其特殊的規範方式及理論基礎，對於不同行為主體也有以不同的責任程度或責任類型規範之可能；第三章承襲第二章的研究結果，點出我國內線交易主體規範問題，本論文討論三種類型的責任程度，分別為消息傳遞模式、法人責任、以犯罪行為取得資訊之內線交易責任；第四章則為內線交易規範責任類型之比較法研究，介紹目前內線交易責任類型的世界潮流；第五章為將內線交易行為以不同責任類型規範的正當性分析，首先探討不同責任本身的功能角色之差異，並結合我國內線交易目前的規範情形，作出內線交易行為是否應課以刑事、行政、民事責任、以及如何課以該些責任的結論，最後並結合「責任類型」與本論文第三章之關於不同主體之「責任程度」的分析，以「我國內線交易規範中不同主體之責任類型」為小結；第六章為結論。 以法律解釋論分析下，本論文認為我國內線交易規範的禁止理論基礎乃為保護市場及投資人信心之「市場論」，而在市場論之前提下，界定內線交易規範主體的範圍時，仍有限縮消息傳遞模式之行為人的責任程度、責任類型之可能，所以本論文對於內線交易規範主體責任程度、類型之結論為：「消息傳遞模式中，將第二手以下消息受領人責任減輕，而不適用刑法之『共同正犯』評價，可能制裁之方式為減輕刑度、或僅以行政罰處罰、或不罰」，「單純傳遞消息行為雖違反內線交易保護法益，但無處罰必要，反之，可考慮處罰違法程度更嚴重的單純推介行為」；「法人內線交易應受規範，此種公司自己為內線交易的情形，與一般自然人為內線交易行為不應有不同評價，而可能制裁之方式為刑罰罰金刑及行政罰」；「以違法方式取得內線資訊的行為，如單純竊盜並交易者，應以內線交易規範制裁之」。 在內線交易「責任類型」之論述中，本論文從比較法制之研究出發，觀察到在其他國家有以各種不同責任類型、制裁不同內線交易行為人之情形。因此本論文分析各種責任本質後，就我國內線交易規範應在未來選擇何種責任類型，作出以下建議：「我國仍應保留刑事責任，刑事責任對內線交易有其特殊之嚇阻性，為制裁金融犯罪所必須，亦為國際規制內線交易之趨勢」；「我國應在有配套措施之前提下，增加內線交易行政責任之規定，以多元內容之行政制裁補足刑罰之不足。競合行政責任及刑事責任的方式，有程序競合、裁處金額競合等方法，行政及司法機關亦必須相為配合。本論文並建議將裁處之行政罰鍰，作多元利用，如告密者獎金、受害人補償基金等，使其可有效助達成防制內線交易之目的，並與本論文之『廢除民事責任』之結論互為配套」；「我國在引進行政責任後，應逐步廢除內線交易民事賠償制度，因為內線交易行為與投資人損害間，根本無因果關係，而以行政責任中所設計的『補償基金』的制度，可減低廢除民事責任的阻力。此外，目前我國民事責任中的三倍賠償規定亦仍有許多質疑的空間」。

This thesis focuses on the liability coverage of various subjects under Taiwanese insider trading law and the justification of different liabilities on insider trading. Ultimately, this thesis combines analysis of liability coverage and liability models, and suggests that different liabilities should be subject to more tailor-made scenarios in order to better specify what subject matters and acts should be dealt with which models of insider trading law. This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter highlights the issues, research scope and the findings. Chapter 2 aims at insider trading regulations with a comparative law approach. It shows that under different legal systems, the structures of insider trading regulations and their theoretical basis varies. From the studies above, Chapter 3 identifies the problems of regulated subjects under Taiwanese insider trading law. There are three types of regulated subjects that will be discussed in relation to their “liability coverage”. Chapter 4 includes the types of liabilities in insider trading law in six jurisdictions. Readers should get the big picture of the international trend regarding the types of liabilities under insider trading law through comparative law analysis. When looking into the nature of these liability types, the question of “whether the punishment can be justified” arises. First, the author differentiates between the natures and functions of the types of liabilities along with current Taiwanese insider trading regulations. This thesis proposes the ideal approach concerning criminal, administrative and civil liabilities under Taiwanese insider trading law. After incorporating the concluded liability types and liability coverage, this thesis make a brief conclusion about how to impose different types of liabilities on different subject matters. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. Interpreting insider trading law by the rule of law, the author finds that Taiwanese insider trading law is market-oriented and emphasizes on protecting the integrity of the securities market and confidence of investors. Adopting the above theoretical basis, there are still possibilities to limit tippers’ and tippees’ liability coverage and types thereof under Taiwanese insider trading law. Concerning the liability of the scenario of tipping inside information, this thesis suggests relieving the liability of tippees who indirectly receive inside information (hereinafter “remote tippee”) from tippers and abandoning the concept of “joint-perpetrator” when establishing their liabilities. The possible sanctions on remote tippees include reducing the years of sentence, punishment solely by administrative sanctions, or no punishment at all. It is also the author’s suggestion to impose insider trading liability on those who not only tip the inside information but also persuading others to trade. In other words, inducement and recommendation, on the basis of inside information, to acquire or dispose of securities to which that information relates, constitute insider trading violation, but mere inside information disclosure does not. This article also proposes that legal person shall be one of the regulated subject matters under Art. 157-1 of Taiwanese Securities Exchange Act (hereinafter TSEA) since it is unjustified to distinguish the liability of a legal person from a natural person. In addition, the reasonable sanctions on a legal person are criminal penalties and administrative liabilities. As to one who possesses inside information by virtue of his criminal activities for using that information by trading securities to which that information relates, for instance the behavior of “mere thief”, insider trading law shall be applied and the liabilities shall be imposed. Regarding the “types of insider trading liabilities”, through the observations of comparative law, the author concludes that criminal liability is necessary under insider trading law since its deterrent effect cannot be substituted by other kinds of liabilities. Moreover, criminal sanction is the international trend. Administrative liability shall be adopted into Taiwanese insider trading law since administrative measures provide various means of preventions and sanctions. The administrative penalty sometimes even possesses better deterrence than criminal fines. The characteristics of administrative measures, such as the requirement of evidence and flexibility etc., together with criminal liability provide an integral regulated system for fighting insider trading. As to the way administrative liabilities correspond to the current criminal liability system under TSEA, this thesis also proposes several methods. These methods include the adjustment of the litigation process, the amount of the criminal fine and administrative penalties. The cooperation between the competent authority and the prosecutors will also play an important role in the future. The author also indicates the possible arrangement of the administrative fine aimed at deterring insider trading, such as funds and the award for whistle-blower. After adopting administrative liabilities into Taiwanese insider trading law, the original civil liability contained in Art. 157-1 of TSEA shall be abolished since the causation between insider trading and investors’ trading, damage does not exist. The fund coming from offenders’ administrative penalty could be a substitution of civil indemnification. Besides, the three-time civil compensation designed by Art. 157-1 of TSEA is not an appropriate arrangement and the author suggests a revision.