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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Shu-Ling Wu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王姿螢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Zih-Ying Wang | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-22T16:38:32Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-09-22 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-07-24 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, & Tahbaz-Salehi. (2012). The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica, 80(5), 1977-2016.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/89910 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 隨氣候變遷加劇，氣候風險對公司營運及績效的負面影響，逐漸受到股東重視，由於所有權與經營權分離產生之代理問題，使股東無法取得經理人管理行為的完整資訊，相較於被動的監督手法，根據代理理論，有效的薪酬合約應被設計為減緩代理問題之工具，透過經理人薪酬與公司績效的連結，增加經理人對氣候風險管理的誘因，但同時代理理論也強調，激勵效果須與經理人的薪酬保障取得平衡，因此當公司面臨較大氣候風險時，經理人承受的薪酬風險增加，此時增加薪酬績效敏感度(Pay Performance Sensitivity, PPS)可能非最適作法。此外，低績效公司對於氣候風險管理的需求相對迫切，除了因為氣候風險可能使財務績效惡化，並且在2008年金融海嘯後，經理人薪酬與公司績效連結性再次掀起討論，股東對於公司給予低績效經理人的保護機制，引發肥貓爭議。因此，本研究以1994至2021年美國公司為樣本，採用美國各州年度的帕默爾乾旱指數(Palmer Drought Index, PDSI)衡量公司面臨之氣候風險，實證結果發現，氣候風險會使低績效公司增加薪酬績效敏感度，符合代理理論預期之激勵效果，但此正向反應只集中在公司面臨輕度(Mild)乾旱風險時，隨氣候風險增加至嚴重(Severe)或極端(Extreme)程度時，經理人面臨的薪酬風險將削弱激勵效果，使公司面臨較大氣候風險時，並不會顯著提升薪酬績效敏感度，同樣符合代理理論之預期。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | As climate change intensifies, the negative impact of climate risks on corporate operations and performance has gained substantial concerns from stakeholders. Due to the agency problem, shareholders cannot obtain complete information about managerial behavior. According to agency theory, compensation contracts should be designed as a tool to mitigate agency problems. When executive compensation is tied to performance, managers’ incentives to manage climate risk can increase. However, agency theory also emphasizes the balance between incentive effects and compensation protection. Therefore, when a company faces greater climate risks, increasing pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) may not be optimal as it increases the compensation risk for executives. Furthermore, companies with worse performance have a relatively urgent need for climate risk management, as climate risks may worsen their financial performance. Also, after the 2008 financial crisis, discussions on the link between executive compensation and performance were reignited, and protection mechanisms for low-performing executives sparked "fat cat" controversies. This study uses US companies from 1994 to 2021 as a sample and uses the Palmer Drought Index (PDSI) to measure climate risks. The empirical results show that climate risks increase PPS for low-performing companies, consistent with the incentive effect predicted by agency theory. However, the positive relation between drought risk and PPS in firms with weaker performance only concentrates on companies facing mild drought risks. When climate risks increase to severe or extreme levels, the compensation risk faced by executives will weaken the incentive effect. Therefore, when a company with worse performance faces severe or extreme climate risks, it may not significantly increase PPS, which is also in line with the expectations of agency theory. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-09-22T16:38:32Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-09-22T16:38:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 I
ABSTRACT II 目錄 III 表目錄 IV 第一章 前言 1 第二章 文獻回顧及假說推論 4 第一節 氣候風險對總體經濟的影響 4 第二節 氣候風險對公司個體的影響 5 第三節 由薪酬政策著手之氣候風險管理 6 第四節 薪酬績效敏感度的雙面效果 8 第五節 氣候風險的衡量 10 第六節 建立假說 10 第三章 研究設計及變數說明 12 第四章 實證結果 17 第一節 樣本篩選 17 第二節 敘述性統計分析 18 第三節 相關係數分析 23 第四節 多元迴歸分析 24 第五章 其他測試 31 第一節 敏感性測試 31 第二節 分組測試 35 第六章 結論及建議 45 第一節 研究結論 45 第二節 研究限制與建議 45 第七章 參考文獻 46 附錄 變數定義 52 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 帕默爾乾旱風險指數 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 氣候風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 薪酬績效敏感度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | climate risks | en |
| dc.subject | pay-performance sensitivity | en |
| dc.subject | PDSI | en |
| dc.subject | agency theory | en |
| dc.title | 乾旱風險對低績效公司薪酬績效敏感度的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Impact of Drought Risk on Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Companies with Weak Performance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻;洪聖閔 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chih-Hsien Liao;Sheng-Min Hung | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 氣候風險,帕默爾乾旱風險指數,薪酬績效敏感度,代理理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | climate risks,PDSI,pay-performance sensitivity,agency theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 52 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202301817 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-07-25 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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