外債對國家發動衝突的影響（1970-2014年）

Abstract

一般認為一國若要發動對外衝突，需要充足的資金與資源，然而當國家身負重債時，則難有能力執行這種策略。而在研究外債和國家對外衝突行為關聯的文獻中，多是從概念討論其關聯，但未輔以經驗事實驗證；或是進行實證研究分析，但卻未能闡明清楚債務與衝突之間的機制，以及債務國與債權國之間的互動過程。 為釐清外債對一國的影響，以及債務國與債權國之間的互動關係，以便理解外債問題與對外發動衝突的相關性，本研究提出債務衝突假說，從債務國的角度出發，解釋外債與衝突之間的運作機制：當一國負擔過多外債，面臨的不僅只有還債的壓力，還可能成為債權國影響內政的工具，因此對該債務國來說，發動衝突帶來的效益可能比持續背債還多，也就是國家會透過衝突帶來的結果，向債權國或國際金融組織釋放訊號，增加自身在債務談判桌上的槓桿，得到債務融資或是債務減免等緩解外債問題的解方。對於這些身負重債的債務國而言，對外衝突的目的是為了提供在欠債的弱勢情況下翻盤的機會。因此，本研究假設當一國外債越大時，該國將會更偏向採取發動衝突、乃至於戰爭的行為，且軍事衝突規模也會隨之增加。 透過對192個國家從1970至2014年共45年的實證分析，統計結果顯示：外債負擔大小確實對發動衝突有正向的影響，亦即：外債的負擔越重，會增加越多衝突發生的機會。對於戰爭發動則沒有統計上的顯著關係。而國家對外債的負擔越重，對外衝突的規模也就越大。另外，中低收入的國家的外債數量大小對發動衝突有正向的影響，且在衝突發生的邊際效果上比全體國家更大。可以見得外債負擔確實有可能成為國家發動對外衝突的觸因。

Initiating conflict as a diplomatic strategy relies on a country having sufficient resources and funds in general. It is hard for a heavily indebted country to implement this kind of strategy. However, the existing research either focus on the connection between concepts without empirical evidence, or examine empirical tests but lack of explanation of the mechanism between debt and conflict, nor the interaction process between the debtor and creditor countries. This thesis explores the mechanism between external debt and conflict in indebted countries by clarifying the impact of external debt and the interaction between debtor and creditor countries. By proposing debt conflict hypotheses from the perspective of the debtor country, this thesis explains the mechanism between external debt and conflict. Specifically, debtor countries have to confront not only debt obligations, but also subsequent political pressures arising from heavy debt, which is likely to lead the debtor countries to initiate conflicts in order to deliver a signal to their creditor or international financial organizations the need for concessions on their debt issues. In other words, debtor countries are motivated to initiate conflicts because they believe conflicts can bring them benefits which outweigh the consequences that conflict might bring. Their goal is to increase leverage on debt negotiation for new finance and debt relief through conflict initiation. Hence, this thesis hypothesizes that the more debt a country has, it is more likely to initiate a conflict, and even a war. Also, as the heavier the debt is, the scale of conflict increases. The proposition of these hypotheses is examined through an empirical study on 192 countries from 1970-2014. The statistical analysis shows the positive correlation between external debt burden and conflict initiation. Namely, it is highly likely for a country to initiate a conflict as the debt burden increases. Also, the heavier the debt is, the scale of conflict increases. However, the relations between debt and war initiation is not statistically significant. In addition, the positive correlation between debt amount and conflict initiation is also significant, especially for middle-income and low-income countries. The marginal effect of debt on conflict initiation of middle-income and low-income countries is bigger than that of all countries. In sum, debt burden indeed has impacts on countries’ initiation of conflict .