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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王宏文 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Hong-Wung Wang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 江育誠 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Cheng Jiang | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-15T16:12:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-09-16 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-09-15 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2002-01-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 壹、中文部分
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Wiberg (Ed.), Parliamentary control in the Nordic countries (pp. 103-200). Tampere: Finnish Political Science Association. | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/89675 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究主要目的是探討地方政府首長面對議員總質詢的究責,是否發生責難規避?使用何種責難規避策略?以及影響的因素為何。
為了回答上述問題,本研究以第十八屆苗栗縣議會為個案,將總質詢議事錄轉換為文字檔,並經過人工校對、編碼後,共蒐集到1,360筆苗栗縣政府官員對議員究責之回應作為分析標的。透過卡方統計與迴歸分析,本研究發現:苗栗縣政府官員回應議員的究責的策略選擇,同時受議員黨派與質詢內容影響。官員回應和縣長屬不同黨派者、涉及嚴重責任事項、屬權責範圍內之事項會推卸較多責任,而議員的究責論述愈完整、愈具體,則愈有可能促使縣政府官員承認有責任,並提出改善問題的解決方案。 本研究結果在理論上與實務上,均具有重要性。在理論面,本研究結果勾勒出「立法監督」是「府會互動」的過程,並證明官員的回應同時受到議員的背景與質詢的內容影響,因此府會互動的過程既具有「因人調整回應」,也具有「因事調整回應」的特性;在責任政治與責難規避方面,本研究發現官員對於議員的究責並不是一昧地否認,也不是悉數承諾改進,而是兩者透過質詢、答詢的對話過程,檢證、釐清誰該負責、負起多少責任、如何負責。而在實務上,議員應思考如何提升問政的內容品質,以強化監督政府的效能。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This study examines the blame avoidance (BA) strategies that may be adopted by local government officials when being held accountable by councilors during interpellations. This study examines the case of 18th Miaoli County Council. With data from the minute books, I investigate the factors affecting BA strategies of local government officials.
Through chi-square test and regression analyses, I found that both councilors' party affiliation and question content would affect the BA strategic choices. When the councilor's party affiliation is not the same as that of the county mayor, government officials would pass the buck. When the councilors asked officials to take serious responsibility or pointed out the weakness of the government, the latter tended to shift blame. Meanwhile, the more complete and specific the councilors’ blaming statements were, the more likely the officials would admit their responsibility and propose solutions to the problems. The findings of this study are both theoretically and practically important. On the theoretical side, the results of this study showed that government officials' responses are influenced by both the background of councilors and the content of councilors’ questions. Rather, through questioning and answering, both the officials and councilors are more likely to come to an agreement regarding who should be responsible, how much responsibility should be taken, and how to deal with the problem. In practical terms, councilors should consider how to improve the content of the questioning process in order to strengthen their performance of monitoring the government. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-09-15T16:12:19Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-09-15T16:12:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書...............................I
謝辭..........................................II 摘要.........................................III Abstract......................................IV 表目錄......................................VIII 圖目錄........................................IX 第一章 緒論...................................1 第一節 研究背景與動機..........................1 第二節 研究問題................................3 第二章 苗栗縣地方政治生態簡介.................4 第一節 苗栗縣的地方派系........................4 第二節 苗栗縣的府會關係........................7 第三章 文獻整理與假設推論.....................9 第一節 立法監督................................9 第二節 責難規避...............................14 第三節 研究假設...............................19 第四章 研究方法..............................23 第一節 研究對象與範圍.........................23 第二節 資料分析方式...........................24 第三節 信度檢驗...............................27 第四節 統計方法...............................29 第五章 研究結果..............................30 第一節 描述性統計.............................30 第二節 卡方檢定結果...........................48 第三節 迴歸分析結果...........................51 第六章 結論..................................56 第一節 研究結論...............................56 第二節 研究限制...............................58 參考文獻......................................59 附錄..........................................67 附錄一:我國地方議會質詢制度簡介..............67 附錄二:編碼表................................70 附錄三:編碼須知..............................72 附錄四:苗栗縣議會第十八屆議員背景表..........75 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 官員於地方議會答詢時之避責策略分析:以苗栗縣為例 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Analysis of Blame Avoidance Strategy while Local Government Officials Answering Councilors' Questions – A Study on the Miaoli County | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-1 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 俞振華 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Da-Chi Liao;Chen-Hua Yu | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 質詢,答詢,責難規避策略,苗栗,地方府會關係, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | question,answer,blame avoidance strategy,Miaoli,local executive-legislature relations, | en |
dc.relation.page | 76 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202203936 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2022-09-28 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學系 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
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