從關懷倫理到平等關懷 --反思關懷倫理學與Ronald Dworkin的平等論證

Abstract

本文之目的，在於尋找Dworkin與關懷倫理學之間的超然性立據，試圖嫁接Dworkin與Gilligan的觀點對話，並比較Anderson和吳秀瑾等關懷倫理學者對他的批判，論證以下兩件事:一、Dworkin並未將主體預設為抽象的、原子式道德主體。二、Dworkin在談論平等時，並未忽略社會結構與歷史脈絡對公民間平等的影響。。 首先介紹從鄧育仁的理論溝通方法出發，以Gilligan和Dworkin對於墮胎議題的共識，為Dworkin與關懷倫理之間可能具有著超然性共識做鋪墊；其次，爬梳Anderson的民主平等理論、吳秀瑾的依靠批判理論，對Dworkin平等觀的批評，於第三部分，介紹Dworkin的人性尊嚴觀與倫理和道德統一性，說明他的平等觀和關懷倫理實則具有共識，第四章則以墮胎和言論自由兩個議題為實例，分析Dworkin的平等觀，如何涵概了對社會結構與歷史脈絡的認知，最後一章為結論。

The purpose of this article is to explore the transcendental reasoning between Dworkin and care ethics, attempting to bridge the perspectives of Dworkin and Gilligan, and compare the criticisms of Anderson and scholars such as Wu Xiu-jin, in order to argue the following two points: First, Dworkin does not presuppose the subject as an abstract, atomistic moral agent. Second, when discussing equality, Dworkin does not overlook the influence of social structures and historical contexts on equal citizenship.

First of all, by utilizing Professor Deng Yu-ren's method of theoretical communication, the consensus between Gilligan and Dworkin on the issue of abortion is introduced as a foundation for the potential transcendental consensus between Dworkin and care ethics. Secondly, by examining Anderson's theory of democratic equality and Wu Xiu-jin's reliance on critical theory to critique Dworkin's concept of equality.Following introduces Dworkin's view of human dignity and the unity of ethics and morality to demonstrate the consensus between his concept of equality and care ethics. In the fourth chapter, using abortion and freedom of speech as examples, to analyzes how Dworkin's concept of equality encompasses an understanding of social structures and historical contexts. The last chapter presents the conclusion