空洞投票與公司治理

Abstract

表決權為公司股東向公司表達其意見之重要權利及管道，且由於公司中董監事之選任均係由表決權行使之結果決定，故表決權在公司治理中實佔有舉足輕重之地位。根據我國公司法第179條第一項之規定對於股份有限公司中之股東其擁有之表決權，係採取原則上一股一表決權，而在法律允許之範圍內，例外得發行非一股一表決權之特別股。依照此項規定，若未發行特別股，則股東依照持所持有之股份，享有等量的表決權，此狀況可謂是「一股一表決權」及股東平等原則之具體呈現。 在一股一表決權之情況下，由於股份之經濟利益以及其表決權同屬一人，故投票者會為了自己的最大利益而行使其投票權。蓋基於股份所生之經濟利益與公司之利益直接連結，因此投票者行使其表決權時，具有支持最大化公司利益議案之誘因。然而，在特定情況下，當表決權與股份之經濟所有權並非一致而係相互解離、且表決權大於經濟所有權時，即產生’’Empty voting’’（以下以空洞投票稱之）現象。 在空洞投票之狀況下，由於其持有之表決權數大於股份經濟所有權數，故其經濟利益和公司價值間可能非正相關，於極端情況下，公司價值之減損反而可能有利於空洞投票者之個人經濟利益。故此時，空洞投票者表決權之行使即有可能有害於公司價值及公司其他股東之權益；更有甚者，可以藉由空洞投票達到規避監管規定，並同時避開公司經營層及市場投資人耳目之效果，空洞投票者更可藉以作為爭奪經營權之工具，而對公司治理產生偌大威脅。 雖然上述提及空洞投票於「特定情況」下才會發生，惟因近年金融市場的高速發展，使得衍生性金融商品於資本市場中日漸普及，而衍生性金融商品低成本、高槓桿、不公開的特性隨即也獲得空洞投票者的青睞，成為空洞投票者之新歡，如此種種均使得該特定情況日益普遍。 準此，本文欲透過比較法之研究方式，探討美國法現行規範空洞投票之相關規定以及其不足之處，並同時統整外國學者對於美國法不足之立法建議，接著於第四章中介紹我國案例「紅火案」及證券交易法中主要的持股揭露規定：第43-1條第1項以及第25條。本文認為，我國現行證券交易法對於揭露之規定仍有不足之處，對於「共同取得股份」、「利用商業慣例」、之定義及涵蓋範圍尚有未明，且對衍生性金融商品亦甚少著墨。準此，本文欲借鑑外國法及外國學者提出之立法建議，提出對我國法之立法建議。 本文以「公開揭露」為核心，提出三項不同的立法建議，建議應擴大我國現行法之揭露範圍，應將「利用衍生性金融商品取得股權」、「表決權數」以及「表決權超過經濟所有權之狀態」均列入揭露範圍。然而，上述建議並非最終定論，仍待分析擴張揭露規定後所獲得的效益及其成本，判斷二者是否相符，始能進一步探討是否以維持現狀為已足，抑或應繼續擴大揭露範圍。

Voting rights are important rights and channels for shareholders to express their opinions to the company. Since the election of directors and supervisors in a company is determined by the exercise of voting rights, voting rights hold a significant position in corporate governance. According to Article 179, Paragraph 1 of the Company Law in our country, shareholders in a limited liability company generally have one vote per share. However, within the legal permissible scope, exceptions can be made to issue special shares with non-proportional voting rights. Under this provision, if no special shares are issued, shareholders have equal voting rights in proportion to their shareholdings, which can be considered the concrete manifestation of the "one share, one vote" principle and the principle of shareholder equality. In the case of "one share, one vote," since the economic interests of shares and voting rights belong to the same entity, voters would exercise their voting rights for their own maximum benefit. Based on the direct link between the economic benefits of shares and the company's interests, when exercising their voting rights, voters have an incentive to support proposals that maximize the company's interests. However, in specific situations where voting rights and economic ownership of shares are not aligned and voting rights exceed economic ownership, the phenomenon of "empty voting" can occur. In the situation of empty voting, since the number of voting rights held is greater than the number of shares owned, there may be a non-positive correlation between their economic interests and the company's value. In extreme cases, the impairment of the company's value may actually be beneficial to the personal economic interests of empty voters. Therefore, the exercise of voting rights by empty voters in such cases can be detrimental to the company's value and the rights of other shareholders. Moreover, by engaging in empty voting, regulatory requirements can be avoided, and the effects of company management and market investors' attention can be bypassed. Empty voting can even be used as a tool to contest control over the company, posing a significant threat to corporate governance. Although the occurrence of empty voting mentioned above is limited to "specific situations," the rapid development of the financial market in recent years has made derivatives increasingly popular in the capital market. The low cost, high leverage, and non-transparency characteristics of derivatives have attracted the attention of empty voters, making the specific situations more common. In this regard, this thesis conducts research on the current regulations on empty voting in the United States through comparative observation, identify their deficiencies, and summarize legislative proposals from foreign scholars regarding the shortcomings of US law. In Chapter 4, the paper introduces a case in our country, the "Redfire case," and the main shareholding disclosure provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act: Article §43-1, Paragraph 1, and Article §25. This thesis believes that the current provisions on disclosure in our Securities and Exchange Act still have deficiencies in defining and covering "acquisition of shares in concert" and "utilization of market convention," as well as in addressing derivatives. Therefore, this thesis seeks to draw on foreign laws and legislative proposals from foreign scholars to provide legislative recommendations for Taiwanese law. With "public disclosure" as the core, this thesis proposes three different legislative recommendations, suggesting that the current disclosure scope in our country should be expanded to include "acquisition of equity using derivatives," "number of voting rights," and "states where voting rights exceed economic ownership." However, these recommendations are not conclusive and further analysis is required to assess the benefits and costs of expanding disclosure requirements before determining if they are in line with each other. Only then can we further explore whether maintaining the status quo is sufficient or if the disclosure scope should continue to be expanded.