商譽減損規範與股價崩盤風險：以財務會計準則第 142 號公報為例

Abstract

本研究透過美國財務會計準則第142號公報的適用情形，探討商譽相關會計處理的變更對公司股價崩盤風險的影響。基於提升資訊品質的觀點，本研究認為公司在遵循第142號公報的要求後，亦即僅採用減損方式並每年進行更嚴格的減損測試，將促使管理階層收集額外資訊，從而提升資訊的品質，並使管理階層能夠做出更正確的商譽減損決策，以及揭露與商譽相關的經濟實質，進而降低股價崩盤風險。然而，本研究也考量管理階層擁有商譽減損決策的裁量空間，可能為自身利益或投機目的而推延商譽減損的認列。運用差異中之差異法模型，研究結果顯示受第142號公報影響的公司在公報施行後，股價崩盤風險顯著下降。此外，本研究發現對於具有更穩固的公司治理機制的公司而言，第142號公報對其股價崩盤風險的影響較不明顯。整體而言，我的研究結果凸顯第142號公報對於商譽會計處理的變更可以透過促進內部資訊環境的改善以及減輕代理成本，進而降低公司的股價崩盤風險。

By leveraging the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142), I examine the impact of accounting treatment changes for goodwill on a firm's future stock price crash risk. Based on the information argument and discretion in goodwill impairment, I propose that compliance with SFAS 142, which mandates the impairment-only approach and more rigorous annual impairment tests, incentivizes managers to gather additional information, thereby enhancing the quality and quantity of information sets. This, in turn, enables managers to make more informed decisions regarding goodwill impairment, revealing the economic circumstances associated with goodwill and ultimately reducing stock price crash risk. However, I also acknowledge the potential for managerial discretion in goodwill impairment decisions, which may offer opportunities for managers to defer goodwill write-offs for opportunistic reasons. Employing a difference-in-differences design, my findings demonstrate that firms affected by SFAS 142 experience a decrease in stock price crash risk during the post-SFAS 142 period. Furthermore, I find that this negative effect of SFAS 142 on stock price crash risk is less pronounced for firms with stronger monitoring mechanisms.