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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 林修葳 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Hsiou-Wei Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 陳姿穎 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Tzu-Ying Chen | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T16:29:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-09 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2023-07-25 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Grindaker, M., A. R. Kostøl, K. Roszbach, 2021. Executive Labor Market Frictions, Corporate Bankruptcy and CEO Careers.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88312 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本篇論文探討(1)曾主持破產企業者後續被其他公司聘用為執行長的機會,以及(2)願意聘用此種高管公司的財務特徵。
過去文獻結果顯示:經歷過公司破產的高管,特別是 CEO,只有約三分之一的人後續擔任高管職,其他的則退出高管勞動市場,這當中又以大公司的CEO 更有可能在破產後退出高管勞動力市場,並承受重大損失責任,由此可知在破產對高管聲譽有損。然而仍有一部份的高管其後續被聘用,甚至可以很快的找到下一份新高管職,推測這些經歷過破產的高管,在人力市場中或非只有聲譽受損等負面影響,或也有正面受歡迎處。因此本篇論文假說測試考量破產經歷或為可能的正面效果,而是否具備此經歷或可幫助預測該員未來對於其他公司的價值,以至於被聘用機會。 研究結果顯示具有破產企業高管經歷者的被聘用為執行長的機會確實較為突出,特別是僅在破產後上任的高管,可見破產經歷在人力市場中具有價值;其中,經歷過chapter11 的高管會優於chapter7,而僅在申請chapter7 前任高管者聘用機會最差。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This research paper explores (1) the future career opportunities for a executive of a bankrupt firm, analyzing his odds of becoming an executive officer of another company and (2) whether the employers of these executives exhibit discernible financial characteristics. According to existing literature, the executives, particularly CEOs, who have undergone corporate bankruptcies, have varied outcomes in their subsequent careers. While some remain in executive positions, others exit the executive labor market. CEOs from larger companies are more likely to face substantial financial losses and exit the labor market after bankruptcy, indicating reputational damage for executives following bankruptcy. However, a portion of executives continue to be hired and even secure new executive positions relatively shortly, suggesting that these executives’ experience and/or abilities may be perceived as being valuable in the labor market.
Hence, this paper tests the hypothesis that the potential positive effects arising from bankruptcy experience may enhance the value of executives in the executive labor market, making them more attractive to companies that need such experience. The results are consistent with the notion that executives with bankruptcy experience have significantly more prominent hiring prospects, especially for those who assume executive positions immediately after bankruptcy. Specifically, the executives who have undergone Chapter 11 bankruptcy appear to be generally preferred over those who have undergone Chapter 7, and executives who assumed positions before the Chapter 7 filing date appear to be the least welcomed in the executive labor market. | en |
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dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝 I
中文摘要 II ABSTRACT III 目錄 IV 表目錄 V 圖目錄 VII 第一章 緒論 p.1 第二章 研究假說 p.2 第三章 研究方法 p.4 第一節 研究架構 p.4 第二節 資料處理 p.6 第三節 模型與變數 p.15 第四節 假說三樣本 p.18 第四章 實證結果 p.19 第一節 敘述性統計 p.19 第二節 模型一回測結果 p.24 第三節 模型二回測結果 p.28 第四節 願意聘用這類高管的公司特徵 p.35 第五節 考量高管屬「救火隊」類型之測試 p.36 第五章 結論 p.38 第一節 研究結論 p.38 第二節 研究限制 p.40 參考文獻 p.41 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 破產企業主持者後續被其他公司聘用為高階管理者機會之分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Next Career Move for a Executive of a Bankrupt Firm: Analyzing His Odds of Becoming Executive of Another Company | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳聿宏;黃承祖 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Yu-Hung Chen;Cheng-Tsu Huang | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 破產,高管,人力市場,財務特徵, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | bankruptcy,executive,executive labor market,financial characteristics, | en |
dc.relation.page | 45 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202301227 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2023-07-26 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學系 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業學系 |
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