美國失業補助與員工待遇對成本僵固性的影響

Abstract

本研究旨在探討美國失業補助與員工待遇對成本僵固性的影響。其中，成本僵固性現象之一—成本黏性指的是當成本對銷售減少的反應小於成本對銷售增加的反應時出現的現象。過去的研究已提供了多種關於非對稱成本行為的解釋，而本研究透過探索與失業保險及員工待遇的關聯性，試圖解釋這種行為。雖然較高的失業保險福利可能會降低失業風險，但它同時也增加了員工從事不良行為的動機。本研究的結果顯示，更慷慨的失業保險福利與較高水平的成本黏性相關。此外，更高的失業保險福利結合更好的員工待遇，導致成本黏性水平的提升。即使在控制了公司層面的成本黏性決定因素、州級經濟條件以及不可觀察的時間不變州特徵後，這些發現仍然具有可靠性。總結而言，本研究顯示公司可能會對員工在工作場所的不良行為（例如偷懶）增加的風險做出更高水平的成本黏性反應。這意味著當失業保險福利提高時，公司更傾向於以提高成本黏性來應對員工不良行為所帶來的風險。

This study examines the effect of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on the cost stickiness. Cost stickiness occurs when the response of cost decreases to sales decreases is smaller than the response of cost increases to sales increases. Prior studies have provided many explanations for the asymmetric cost behaviors. My study addresses the puzzling behaviors by exploring the relationship with UI. While higher UI benefits may reduce the unemployment risks, it increases employees’ incentives to engage in adverse behaviors. My results show that more generous unemployment insurance benefits are associated with higher levels of cost stickiness. Additionally, higher unemployment insurance benefits, combined with better employee treatment, lead to higher levels of cost stickiness. These findings remain robust even after controlling for firm-level determinants of cost stickiness, state-level economic conditions, and unobservable time-invariant state characteristics. Overall, this study suggests that firms may react with higher cost stickiness to increased risk of employees’ adverse behavior (e.g., shirking) at the workplace.