權力不對等之互動結構與小國面對強鄰的策略選擇：古巴、斯里蘭卡和台灣

Abstract

在國際政治學界中，從理論層面來探討大國與小國之間的互動或是小國的外交政策的著作並不多見。許多研究者主張，只要專注於大國，我們就能全盤掌握國際政治發展的主旋律。甚至有研究者指出，基於小國而建立起來的國際政治理論是荒謬的。這些觀點我都不能贊同。本文認為，若能夠在研究議程上把小國喚回(bringing the small states back in)，我們將可以釐清國際次級系統內部權力關係的變化，對國際關係獲致更深刻的理解。在這本論文中，我們從小國的角度出發，探討小國面對強鄰時的策略選擇。為了完成這個任務，我提出了一個解釋小國強鄰政策的理論───我稱之為互動結構理論(interactive-sturcture theory)。這一理論表明，小國的強鄰政策主要受到它所面對的外部環境，即互動結構所影響。外部的互動結構對小國的國內政治結構產生形塑的效果，進而使小國採取特定類型的強鄰政策。整體而言，外部互動結構的威脅程度越高，將越可能帶來可以接受把龐大的資源配置於安全防衛之上的國內政治結構，從而使小國對強鄰採取抗衡的政策。經濟情況及外來的援助兩項因素則是決定高動員成本的政策持續時間長短之關鍵。 除了理論的建構以外，這本論文還涉及理論的驗證。我挑選古巴、斯里蘭卡與台灣三個小國作為經驗事例，並對它們進行案例內及案例間的經驗研究，藉以評估互動結構理論所提出的命題及預測。我發現，互動結構理論在許多方面都可以解釋小國與其強鄰之間的互動歷程。從互動結構理論的觀點來看，高度威脅的互動結構使古巴長期採取最高強度的抗衡政策，直到冷戰結束後才因為失去蘇聯在經濟和軍事上的奧援並面臨經濟上的困局而降低抗衡的強度。斯里蘭卡面對的互動結構在大部分的時間裡屬於低度威脅的類型，只要印度不介入其族群問題，斯里蘭卡無意與印度對抗。台灣在蔣中正時期追求的是權力極大化的目標，採取「反攻大陸」的政策，不過權力不對等的結構最終還是台灣被迫回到安全極大化的軌道之中。中共對台政策的和緩化使台灣的抗衡強度逐步下降，先從最高強度的抗衡過渡到低強度的抗衡，到了馬英九政府更進一步採取避險的政策。如果中共對台灣的態度不變，則台灣的大陸政策極可能隨著領導人偏好的不同而擺盪於低強度的抗衡及悲觀型的避險。

This thesis is a study on the small state’s policy towards its strong neighbor. It seeks to explain how small states behave when faced with potential external threats posed by the existence of strong neighboring countries. I employ straightforward research methods and procedures for my analysis. First, I construct a theory to conceptualize the decision-making process of small states’ policy vis-à-vis their strong neighbors. Second, I conduct a comparative investigation of Cuban, Sri Lankan, and Taiwanese strong-neighbor policies. The theory laid out in this thesis───what I refer to as interactive-structure theory───explains the causes of small state behavior in terms of the constraints and incentives imposed by the interactive structure. The interactive-structure theory argues that in general, the higher the threat level, the greater the tendency for the small state to balance against the stronger neighbor. In addition, the duration of high-resource-consuming policies such as the balancing strategy is determined by two factors: economic potential and the availability of allies. To test the interactive-structure theory, I derive specific propositions from it and test them in the three empirical cases: Cuba, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. Viewed from the interactive-structure theory, the high-level threat structure in the Cuban case caused Cuba to adopt the highest level of balancing until it faced economic crises after the end of the Cold War with the loss of Soviet economic and military aid. Sri Lanka, for the most part, experienced a low level of threat in its interactive structure with India. As long as India refrains from intervening in its ethnic problems, Sri Lanka has no intention of balancing against it. Taiwan sought to maximize its power in the Chiang Kai-Shek years with its plans to retake Mainland China. But the asymmetry of power between Mainland China and Taiwan eventually forced Taiwan to limit its goal to the maximization of security. The gradual shift toward accommodation from confrontation in PRC’s Taiwan policies was reflected in the lowered intensity of balancing. The Ma administration also adopted a hedging policy. If PRC’s attitude towards Taiwan remains unchanged, Taiwan’s Mainland strategy could sway from low-intensity balancing to pessimistic hedging according to the will of its leader. My conclusion is that the interactive-structure theory provides solid explanations and predictions for small states’ behavior. Many international relations theorists have questioned the necessity for the construction of a theory of international politics on small states. I believe such a claim is invalid. It is only through the study of small states in international relations can we answer how the international system comes to a specific equilibrium. This thesis is a start.