中共對台策略（1989-2022）：以關係性權力不對稱模型之視角檢視

Abstract

本文旨在探討中共對台策略之影響變數與具體策略選項。在回顧完中共對台策略演變、影響變數、理論建構後，本文依據兩岸關係存在「相互衝突的主權要求」、「權力不對稱」兩大結構性特徵，選擇以「不對稱關係」之視角切入，並發現過往理論分析過度重視物質性因素而忽略小國國內因素及大國與主要第三方關係兩大非物質性因素。因此，本文修正過往理論並提出「關係性權力不對稱模型」，該模型說明大國制定策略時，主要依據「小國是否對大國友善」、「大國與主要第三方關係是否正向」兩大因素，形成「羈縻」、「劃清紅線」、「孤立」、「兼併/嚇阻」四種策略。本文研究方法係以1989-2022年為範圍，對江澤民、胡錦濤、習近平三位領導人任內美中台互動進行個案研究，並以論述分析法檢視重要政策講話意涵、比較研究法檢驗本文假設，以及過程追蹤法檢驗本文理論因果機制。最後，本文的結論是中共對台策略大致上能以本文模型解釋，針對少數較為複雜之情況本文則提出修正模型補充分析。而由於本文模型係考量結構性因素，因此亦保留未來在兩岸關係外，對跨時、跨域案例之延伸適用空間。

The article aims to discuss the influencing variables and strategy options of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s strategy toward Taiwan. After reviewing the evolution of the PRC’s Taiwan strategy, the influencing variables, and the related theories, this article adopts the perspective of “asymmetric relations” accoding to two structural characteristics of cross-strait relations: “mutually conflicting sovereignty claims” and “power asymmetry.” However, previous theoretical analyses have placed excessive emphasis on material factors while neglecting non-material factors such as the domestic factors of the minor state, and the relationship between the major state and the key third party. Hence, this article proposes the “Relational Power Asymmetry Model,” arguing that when a major power formulates its strategy against a minor counterpart, it primarily considers two factors: “whether the minor power is friendly toward the major power” and “whether the major power’s relationship with the key third party is positive.” Based on these factors, four strategies are formed: “jimi,” “setting red lines,” “isolation,” and “annexation/deterrence.” The research methods employed in this article includes establishing a case study of the interactions among the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan during the leadership tenures of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping from 1989 to 2022, and combining discourse analysis to examine the implications of significant policy speeches, comparative research to verify the hypotheses of this article, and process tracing to test the causal mechanism of this article’s model. In conclusion, this article's model can generally explain the PRC's strategy toward Taiwan, and for a few more complex situations, the article proposes a modified model for supplementary analysis. As this model considers structural factors, it provides potential applicability for future research on cross-temporal and cross-regional cases beyond the context of cross-strait relations.