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標題: | 生存權的司法實踐:人民請求社會給付違憲審查之比較研究 The Practice of Right to Life in Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study on Judicial Review Concerning the Social Benefit Claims |
作者: | Chu-Hsuan Wang 王筑萱 |
指導教授: | 葉俊榮(Jiunn-rong Yeh) |
關鍵字: | 生存權,社會權,社會給付,違憲審查,憲法解釋,可司法性,釋憲制度, Right to life,social rights,social benefit,judicial review,Constitutional interpretation,justiciability,judicial review system, |
出版年 : | 2009 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 在探討自由權、平等權之領域時,往往強調國家應給予最大限度的維護;但不同於前者,學說與實務對於以給付請求功能面向為主的社會權領域,卻因思及這種權利的理念是要求國家介入,且權利的具體落實通常挾帶著國家預算及資源,一般而言,這種憲政權能是優先分配給立法者的,從而基於權力分立、責任政治以及司法權本質之考量,社會權的規範效力以及可司法性遭到了質疑,甚至被根本的否定憲法上不該存有這種概念類型的權利。在實務的運作上也是如此,面對人民請求社會給付的案件時,大法官往往不正面直接回應所據以審查的「權利」基礎,反而用「基本國策」來包裝,並以國家的義務來回應,似乎刻意避免在憲法解釋中使用到社會權的概念。換言之,社會權背後強烈的司法正當性疑慮,是導致其概念無法如其他憲法基本權在司法上有效揮灑的原因;然本文思考到:不論憲法上社會權的概念「好不好」,既然我們的憲法人民權利章中有一個一向被認為是社會權類型之一的「第15條生存權」,或許可以換個方向,認真去思考這個已經存在的、社會性格濃厚的憲法第15條生存權在我們憲政架構下「要怎麼用」;因此嘗試從我國憲法解釋的實踐作為觀察分析的起點,去瞭解憲法第15條「積極」的生存權於司法審查中可發揮之功能意義及其侷限,作為化解以往社會權可司法性論辯的一條嘗試路徑。
透過憲法解釋實證研究之分析以及外國案例之比較觀察,本文發現,我國憲法生存權條款作為一個人民得據以請求社會給付的憲法權利基礎應無庸置疑,實不必對人民是否因此擁有具體請求權等情過於擔心,司法者不必刻意迴避它的權利面,反而應該正面回應它,好好地把它講清楚、說明白。而大法官對於生存權的內涵闡述太少,可能也是無法打破可司法性疑慮、彰顯其異於其他權利之特質的原因,因此嘗試描繪生存權內涵的圖譜,希望可以幫助對生存權的理解,也希望能幫助生存權在我國憲法下可以跳脫學界對社會權的束縛,而具有司法實踐的可操作性。 本文也從南非人權委員會與印度社會行動訴訟(social action litigation,簡稱SAL)機制背後所支撐的「民間專家委員會調查監督」、「強化正當程序民眾參與」以及「為貧窮弱勢簡化司法救濟程序」等設計理念,得到一些強化民主功能、突破司法正當性的制度啟示。另一方面,面對國際化、全球化的影響,生存權保障範圍與國家主權疆界的關係被突顯出來;經研究發現,本國人與外國人的界分,其實又是一種司法正當性疑慮的反映,而目前這條正當性的界線則仍以國家主權疆界作為劃分,不計較國籍與經濟能力差異的社會連帶意識尚未真正形成。 然而,在整體實證分析後,本文深刻的發現,以上所探討各項生存權所遭遇的一系列可司法性疑慮與障礙的分析以及解決之道的探尋,所呈現出的都是「人民生存權保障需求的特質」與「司法審查制度下之司法權能」之間的激烈拉距──這也正是真正的核心問題所在。申言之,生存權保障需求具有非常個別性、個案差異性的特質,以及其核心保障「攸關生命維繫」所需最迫切、最即時的救濟,此特徵正鮮明地透露出現行抽象違憲審查制度昧於現實之處。或許,當前生存權研究最需要去解決的問題,不是法釋義學上主客觀權利性格的定位,也不是審查標準如何去類型化的問題,而是關於個案(具體)違憲審查-甚至是採行分散式違憲審查機制-來切實落實憲法生存權保障意旨之更深層的省思。 “Social rights” are a debatable legal term, especially when it comes to the judicial remedies for these kind of rights. Through the practice of social rights, it requests our governmentto expand his power to private lives and involves the allocation of financial resources which should be left to the legislative authorities rather than the courts. Additionally in consideration of the essence of separation of powers, political accountability and judicial authority, disputes remain stalled over the justiciablity during the judicial remedy for social rights. Therefore, many scholars to date refuse to recognized social rights as the fundamental rights of people. However, there is definitely a “right to life” (which is generally deemed as a kind of social right) set in Article 15 of our Constitution. For good or bad, the understanding of how to practice this right should be taken seriously. This thesis discusses the judicial practice of the right to life in two ways. First, the implementation of the right to life by our Grand Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan, is analyzed. Second, the consequences of our constitutional interpretations are compared with the counterparts in foreign countries, such as the United States, Japan, South Africa, and India,. This thesis also evaluates the constitutional theories and further presents its perspectives of our judicial practice of the right to life. After a thorough survey, it is discovered that our Grand Justices have made every efforts to establish various standards to review the cases involved claims to social benefits. The right to life own its own, however is scarcely interpreted by the Grand Justices. In fact, it is unnecessary as this thesis indicates to worry too much that people would use this right to claim things immodestly, and neither the real problem of the judicial practices of the right to life is simply related to the choice between a strict or a loose standard of the judicial review. Therefore, in order to make feasible the judicial practice of the right to life, the thesis mentions that we need to clarify the right to life directly and clearly, and reconsider the relationship between the right to life, the system of judicial review, and the real need of people who claim the right to life through judicial remedies. This thesis attempts to develop a 3-level graphic model to illustrate the elements and features of the right to life: the core element of ”the right to live”, the second level of “the basic need of physical life”, and the third level of “the preferable living standard”. The 3-level model could help determine the urgency and the degree of the protection regarding various people’s right to life. Since the requirements of the right to life are very personal, different from person to person and diverse from case to case, a predicament of incompatibility and dilemmas arises when our judicial review system regulates the constitutional interpretation in an abstract way (without being subject to the “case or controversy” requirement). To address this issue, this thesis on one hand discusses the inspirations from the social action litigation (SAL) system in India and its socio-legal commission consisting of civil experts, which plays a very important role in helping people with urgent need for aids in time, in protecting their rights during judicial remedies, and in reinforcing the justiciability and the democratic legitimacy of judicial reviews. On the other hand, this thesis challenges the abstract manner of constitutional interpretation (judicial review) in the current system. It suggests that the Grand Justices abolish the current practice of statute review in an abstract way, and that they adopt the standard of concrete case reviews, even by switching to the diffuse system of judicial review. In this way, the judicial practice of the right to life can be more feasible, and the spirit of the Constitution can be better realized. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8795 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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