我國股東資訊權之研究—以股東查閱權及檢查人制度為中心

Abstract

股東對於公司業務及財產狀況之掌握，係其適切監督公司經營者之重要基礎，亦為行使股東權利之前提。為避免不當經營手段蔓延，股東無法取得所需資訊提起代位訴訟、董事解任訴訟等，股東資訊權之保障日漸重要。又股東資訊權在比較法上之下位權利包含查閱權、質問權以及檢查人選派請求權，惟我國並無質問權，故本文以查閱權及檢查人選派請求權為討論中心。 首先，關於股東查閱權之部分，本文聚焦於股份有限公司股東之查閱權。依公司法第210條以及第229條，股份有限公司股東僅能查閱上開兩條所列舉之文件，較比較法上所賦予之查閱權範圍來得窄，故可知股份有限公司股東之查閱權有其局限性，而有檢討之空間。 其次，為有效防止公司經營者濫權，我國公司法第245條或證券交易法第38條之1第2項由法院或金管會選派之檢查人介入調查公司之內部狀況，亦可滿足股東知的權利，而為股東資訊權之一環。又我國公司法第245條於民國107年修正後，增加必要性等要件，是否係有限制股東權利行使之意，具有討論的意義。本文透過實務見解與比較法之觀察，整理我國股東聲／申請選派檢查人制度之實務作法並提出未來展望。 此外，檢查人制度除了彌補股東查閱權之不足外，各國檢查人制度有著不一樣的功能，例如日本公司法上之股東會檢查人，即有在事前防止股東會在召開過程中違反法律的功能，可能可以改善上述違法決議發生之問題。如此多元及彈性的檢查人制度設計，應有我國得借鏡參考的地方，故為追求完整性，本論文將就各國之檢查人制度做出一併討論，而非侷限於與股東資訊權有關之部分。 比較法方面，由於我國股東資訊權制度與日本法較為接近，故本論文將以日本法為主，並一併探討美國法上之股東查閱權及英國法上之股東查閱權及檢查人制度，以期能完善比較法之檢討。 本文藉由比較法之分析、我國制度比較以及我國實務見解整理，提出我國股東資訊權在現行規定下可能發生之問題或爭議，並就此梳理出可能之若干修法建議，以期立法者能重視，使我國股東資訊權能獲得更進一步之保障。

Shareholders' grasp of the company's business and property status is an important basis for their proper supervision and a prerequisite for exercising shareholders' rights. To avoid the spread of improper business practices, the protection of shareholders' information rights is becoming increasingly important. In addition, shareholders' information right in comparative law includes the inspection right, the inquiry right and the right to request the appointment of inspectors. However, there is no inquiry right in Taiwan, so this thesis focuses on the inspection right and the right to request the appointment of inspectors. First of all, about the shareholder's inspection right, this thesis focuses on the inspection right of the shareholders of the companies limited by shares. According to articles 210 and 229 of the Company Law in Taiwan, shareholders of a company limited by shares can only inspect the documents listed in the above two articles, which is narrower than the scope of inspection rights granted in the comparative law. Because of its limitation, there is room for review. Secondly, investigations of inspectors prevent companies' directors from abusing their power. According to Article 245 of the Company Law or Article 38-1 of the Securities and Exchange Law of Taiwan, shareholders can request the appointment of inspectors. Also, after the amendment of Article 245 of the Company Law in 2018, there are some additional elements, such as necessity. It is room for discuss if this element has the meaning of restricting the exercise of shareholders' rights. This thesis sorts out the shareholders' application for the inspectors through practical insights and comparative observations and puts forward prospects for the future. In addition, the inspector system not only makes up for the lack of shareholders' inspection rights, but the inspector system in various countries has different functions. For example, the inspector of the shareholders' meeting in the Company Law of Japan can prevent the shareholders' meeting from violating the law in advance. The design of such a diverse and flexible inspector system should be a reference for Taiwan. Therefore, for completeness, this thesis will discuss the whole inspector system in Japan and British, not limited to the part related to the shareholder information rights. Furthermore, since the system of shareholder information right in Taiwan is relatively close to Japanese law, this thesis will focus on the Japanese law, and discuss shareholder inspection rights in American law and shareholder inspection rights and the inspector system in British, to improve the comparative law review. Based on the research on comparative law, the comparison of Taiwan's system, and the collation of Taiwan's practical insights, this thesis puts forward the possible problems or disputes that may arise under the current regulations on shareholder information right. Then, sorting out some possible amendments to the law, hoping the public can pay attention to it so that the shareholders' information right is further protected.