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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 李艷榕 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Yen-Jung Lee | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 羅暐翔 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Wei-Xiang Lo | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-19T16:33:37Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-07-19 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-04-26 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Andrade, G. and Stafford, E. (2004). Investigating the economic role of mergers. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10, 1-36.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87799 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究探討各公司採行non-GAAP盈餘作為CEO薪酬的衡量手段對於公司發動併購可能性的影響。本文發現，以non-GAAP盈餘作CEO薪酬衡量因子與公司發動併購可能性產生了顯著的正相關。本文另外探討在non-GAAP盈餘做為衡量CEO績效手段下，其他因子是否會顯著增強併購可能，實證結果發現研發強度較低或CEO權力較弱的公司，以non-GAAP盈餘做為衡量CEO績效與併購的關聯性更為顯著。這些發現證實薪酬的衡量手段會影響公司的決策行為，可做為未來研究績效評估相關因素對於併購可能性的相關研究基礎。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study examines the impact of companies adopting non-GAAP earnings as a performance measure in CEO compensation on the likelihood of companies launching mergers and acquisition activities (hereafter, M&A). This paper finds that the use of non-GAAP earnings as a performance measure in CEO compensation is positively associated with the likelihood of firms launching M&A. This paper also explores whether other factors moderate the association between M&A and the use of non-GAAP earnings measure in CEO compensation contracts. Empirical results show that companies with low R&D intensity or weak CEO power enhance the association between the use of non-GAAP earnings in CEO compensation and the likelihood of firms launching M&A. These findings confirm that the performance measure used in CEO compensation can affect the decision-making of the company, and can be used as the basis for future research on the relevant factors of performance evaluation on the possibility of M&A. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-07-19T16:33:37Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-07-19T16:33:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員會審定書 I 謝誌 II 摘要 III Abstract IV 目錄 V 表目錄 VI 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻回顧 3 第三章 假說建立 6 第四章 研究方法 一、模型建立與變數定義 9 二、樣本選取與變數收集 16 第五章 敘述統計與迴歸分析 一、敘述統計 21 二、迴歸分析 24 第六章 額外分析 一、Heckman 二階段分析 27 二、敏感性分析 34 第七章 研究結論與限制 37 參考文獻 39 表目錄 表一 變數定義表 15 表二 迴歸樣本選取 17 表三 各年度占樣本數百分比 17 表四 公司數相關統計 18 表五 各產業併購數 19 表六 敘述統計 22 表七 相關係數 23 表八 迴歸結果 25 表九 Heckman 第一階段結果 31 表十 Heckman 第二階段結果 32 表十一 敏感性分析迴歸結果 35 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 併購 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | non-GAAP盈餘 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 薪酬衡量因子 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | mergers and acquisitions | en |
| dc.subject | compensation performance measures | en |
| dc.subject | non-GAAP earnings adjustment | en |
| dc.title | 企業使用non-GAAP盈餘於CEO薪酬合約之績效評估標準與發生併購之關聯性 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Use of Non-GAAP Performance Measures in Executive Compensation Contracts and M&A Decisions | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻;劉心才 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chih-Hsien Liao;Hsin-Tsai Liu | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | non-GAAP盈餘,薪酬衡量因子,併購, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | non-GAAP earnings adjustment,compensation performance measures,mergers and acquisitions, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 42 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202300691 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-04-27 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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