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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 邵慶平 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Ching-Ping Shao | en |
dc.contributor.author | 許庭瑄 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Ting-Hsuan Hsu | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-05-18T17:09:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-10 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-07-19 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2002-01-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部分
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Content_List.aspx?n=C2B00972B2ADA711。 深圳証券交易所,〈股票列表〉,http://www.szse.cn/www/market/product/stock/list/。 新浪財經(09/12/2020),〈科创板vs创业板,二者有何差异?〉,https://finance.sina. com.cn/money/fund/jjxylc/2020-09-12/doc-iivhvpwy6339411.shtml。 經濟日報(11/25/2021),〈沈榮津:台灣科技島優勢在人才 政府拚育才攬才留才〉,https://money.udn.com/money/story/5613/5916533。 經濟部商業司,〈閉鎖性公司專區常用問答〉,https://gcis.nat.gov.tw/ mainNew/subclassNAction.do?method=getFile&pk=607。 資誠(PwC Taiwan)、台灣經濟研究院,〈2021台灣新創生態圈大調查〉,https://www.pwc.tw/zh/publications/topic-report/2021-taiwan-startup-ecosyste m-survey.html。 臺灣證券交易所,〈投資人類別交易比重統計表年報〉,https://www.twse.com.tw/ zh/statistics/ statisticsList?type=07&subType=262。 臺灣證券交易所,〈臺灣創新板(TIB)交易制度〉,https://www.twse.com.tw/ zh/page/products/tib/mechanism.html。 臺灣證券交易所,〈歷年上市公司資本來源統計表年報〉,https://www.twse.com.tw/ zh/statistics/statisticsList?type=07&subType=256。 數位時代(03/30/2021),〈Appier東京上市,盤中一度飆漲37%!7大關鍵數字拆解台灣獨角獸〉,https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/62005/appier-ipo-infographic?。 證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心,〈團體訴訟及仲裁受理案件類型〉,https://www.sfipc.org.tw/mainweb/Article.aspx?L=1&SNO=iRgcTPafbAZLJiI6U+J9yw==。 證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心委託專案研究(2012),《各國證券集體訴訟制度之研究—以各國對於第一、第二上市公司(外國公司)之證券事件訴訟追償機制為中心》,https://www.sfipc.org.tw/mainweb/Article.aspx?L=1&SN O=7gwW8nJ55GPuJhrNcgYhXw==。 證券櫃檯買賣中心,〈新興戰略新板制度介紹〉,https://www.tpex.org.tw/ web/psb/rwd/system/listing.php?l=zh-tw。 蘋果日報(10/29/2018),〈顧立雄:同股不同權恐影響公司治理〉,https://tw.appledaily.com/property/20181029/LTVDN2JL36B4RBCMZ7NM56DOZM。 二、英文部分 (一)書籍 RIPLEY, WILLIAM Z. (1927), MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET. (二)期刊論文 Ashton, Douglas C. (1994), Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW 863. Bainbridge, Stephen M (2007), The Scope of the SEC’s Authority Over Shareholder Voting Rights (UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 07-16). Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1991), The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 565. Bebchuk, Lucian A et al. (2000), Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual-class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Kobi Kastiel (2017), The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 585. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Kobi Kastiel (2019), The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers 107 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1453. Berle, A. A., Jr. (1926), Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control”, 39 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 673. Cremers, Martijn et al. (2018), The Life-Cycle of Dual-class Firms (European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance Working Paper No. 550). Dimitrov, Valentin & Prem C. Jain (2006), Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12(2) JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 342. Dyck, Alexander & Luigi Zingales (2004), Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59(2) THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 537. Easterbrook, Frank H. & Daniel R. Fischel (1983), Voting in Corporate Law Corporations and Private Property, 26 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 395. Fisch, Jill & Steven Davidoff Solomon (2019), The Problem of Sunsets, 99 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1057. Gelter, Martin & Gurrea-Martínez, Aurelio (2020), Addressing the Auditor Independence Puzzle: Regulatory Models and Proposal for Reform, 53 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 787. Gompers, Paul A. et al. (2010), Extreme governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1051. Gordon, Jeffrey N, Ties that Bond: Duel Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1988). Goshen, Zohar & Assaf Hamdani (2016), Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125(3) YALE LAW JOURNAL 560. Goshen, Zohar & Assaf Hamdani (2020), Corporate Control, Dual-class, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 120 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 944. Goshen, Zohar & Richard Squire (2017), Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance Essay, 117 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 767. Gurrea-Martínez, Aurelio (2021), Theory, Evidence, and Policy on Dual-Class Shares: A Country-Specific Response to a Global Debate, 22(3) EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 475. Hirst, Scott & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1229 (2019). Hofstetter, Karl (2005), One Size Does Not Fit All: Corporate Governance for Controlled Companies, 31(3) NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 597. Hoi, Chun-Keung & Ashok Robin (2010), Agency Conflicts, Controlling Owner Proximity, and Firm Value: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 18 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 124. Howell, Jason W. (2017), The Survival of the U.S. Dual-class Share Structure, 44 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 440. Huang, Robin Hui, et al. (2020), The (Re)Introduction of Dual-Class Share Structures in Hong Kong: A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 20 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 121. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Annette B. Poulsen (1988), Dual-Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence, 20 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 129. Jensen, Michael C. & William H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3(4) JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 305. Jordan, Bradford D. et al. (2016), Growth Opportunities, Short-Term Market Pressure, and Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 304. Karmel, Roberta S. (2001), The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU LAW REVIEW 325. Kim, Hyunseob & Roni Michaely (2019), Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of the Benefits of Dual-class Structures (European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance Working Paper No. 590). La Porta, Rafael et al. (1999), Corporate Ownership Around The World, 54 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 471. Li, Kai et al. (2008), Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms, 37(4) FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 713. Lin, Yu-Hsin & Thomas Mehaffy (2016), Open Sesame: The Myth of Alibaba’s Extreme Corporate Governance and Control, 10 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF CORPORATE, FINANCIAL & COMMERCIAL LAW 437. Lowenstein, Louis (1989), Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 979. Lund, Dorothy S (2019), Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 687. Meece, Gregory S. (1987), Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule 10b-5: Will the Typical Representative Please Stand Up?, 36 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 649. Moore, Marc T. (2020), Designing Dual-Class Sunsets: The Case for a Transfer-Centered Approach, 12 WILLIAM AND MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 93. Pacces, Alessio Maria (2009), Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits of Control (European Corporate Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 131/2009). Partch, M. Megan (1987), The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth, 18 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 313. Reddy, Bobby V. Finding the British Google: Relaxing the Prohibition of Dual-Class Stock from the Premium-Tier of the London Stock Exchange, 79 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 315 (2020). Seligman, Joel (1985), Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 687. Sharfman, Bernard S. (2018), A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual-class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 1. Sharfman, Bernard S. (2019), The Undesirability of Mandatory Time-Based Sunsets in Dual-class Share Structures: A Reply to Bebchuk and Kastiel, 93 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW POSTSCRIPT 1. Stevens, W. H. S. (1926), Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 353. Winden, Andrew & Andrew Baker (2019), Dual-Class Index Exclusion, 13 VIRGINIA LAW & BUSINESS REVIEW 101. Winden, Andrew William (2018), Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018(1) COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 852. Yan, Min (2020), Differentiated Voting Rights Arrangement Under Dual-Class Share Structures in China: Expectation, Reality, and Future, 28 ASIA PACIFIC LAW REVIEW 337. Yan, Min (2021), The Myth of Dual-class Shares: Lessons From Asia’s Financial Centres, 21 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 397. (三)網路資料 Allaire, Yvan, Dual-class Companies Should Adopt a Coattail Provision, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (January 18, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/0 1/18/dual-class-companies-should-adopt-a-coattail-provision/. Aycock, Jason, Yelp Caught in M&A Chatter, Up 2.6%; Ends Dual-Class Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (September 23, 2016, 3:11 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/news/ 3210618-yelp-caught-m-chatter-2_6-percent-endsdual-class-shares. Barreto, Elzio & Sumeet Chatterjee, Blackrock Pitches for Shareholder Protection as Asia Bourses Weigh Dual-Class Listings, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://ww w.reuters.com/article/us-summit-regulation-blackrock-idINKCN1C10K D. Berger, David J. & Laurie Simon Hodrick, Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (April 15, 2018), https://corpgov.law. harvard.edu/2018/04/15/are-dual-class-companies-harmful-to-stockholders-a-preli minary-review-of-the-evidence/. Bertsch, Ken, CII Comment Letter to MSCI On Unequal Voting Structures, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (May 16, 2018), https://corp gov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/16/cii-comment-letter-to-msci-on-unequal-voting-str uctures/. Bradford, Hazel, Snap IPO Igniting Furor; Institutions Not Pleased, PENSION & INVESTORS (March 20, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170320/PRINT/ 303209977/snapipo-igniting-furor-institutio ns-not-pleased. CFA INSTITUTE, DUAL-CLASS SHARES: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 4 (2018), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/apac-dual-class-shares-surv ey-report.pdf. China’s A-share Market Sees First Dual-Class IPO, CHINADAILY (January 21, 2020), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/21/WS5e2695fda310128217272898.html?fbclid=IwAR1v1xb6ULRRTtGVtzE1CKXUJ3xpB7da2UPk8mpAgtZZr12TvbGpy8L1HzQ. Chiu, Ning, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes Exclusion from Indexes, DAVIS POLK BRIEFING (October 23, 2017), https://www.briefinggovemance.co m/2017/10/blackrock-wants-equal-voting-rights-but-opposes-exclusion-from-index es/. CII Advocacy on Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, https://www. cii.org/dual-class-stock-advocacy. Coffee, John C., Jr., Dual-class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (November 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stock-theshades-of-sunset/. Companies with Time-Based Sunsets on Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (January 19, 2022), https://www.cii.org//Files/issues_and_advocacy /Dual%20Class%20post%206-25-19/22_1_19%20Time-based%20Sunsets.pdf. Consultation Paper: Possible Listing Framework for Dual-class Share Structures, SGX (February 16, 2017), https://www.sgx.com/regulation/public-consultations/201702 16-consultation-paper-possible-listing-framework-dual-class. Consultation Paper: Proposed Listing Framework for Dual-class Share Structures, SGX 9 (March 28, 2018), https://governanceforstakeholders.com/wp-content/up loads/ 2017/04/Response-to-DCS-consultation-paper_050417.pdf. Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.transpa rency.org/en/cpi/2021. Davies, Paul, UK Listing Review (March 3, 2021), OXFORD BUSINESS LAW BLOG ARTICLE (March 16, 2021), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/03/uklis ting-review-march-3-2021. Descovich, Kaitlin et al., Voting Rights Gone in a Snap – Unequal Voting Rights Back in the Spotlight, WEIL (April 3, 2017), https://governance.weil.com/whats-new/voting-rights-gone-in-a-snap-unequal-shareholder-voting-rights-back-in-the -spotlight/. Dual-class Companies List, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (March 2020), https://www.cii.org/files/FINAL%20format%20Dual%20Class%20List%203-16-20(1).pdf. Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017–2020 Statistics, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, https://www.cii.org/files/2020%20IPO%20Update%20Graphs%20.pdf. Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/dualcl ass_stock. FCA, PRIMARY MARKET EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW: FEEDBACK AND FINAL CHANGES TO THE LISTING RULES (2021), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps21-22.pdf. Framework for Issuance of Differential Voting Rights Shares, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (2019), https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/aug-2019 /1565346231044_1.pdf FTSE Russell, Voting Rights Consultation (July 2017), http://www.ftse.com/pr oducts/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf. Gek, Tay Peck, US Bourses Can Take a Leaf from Singapore DCS Framework: SEC Commissioner, THE BUSINESS TIMES (September 25, 2018), https://www.businesst imes.com.sg/companies-markets/us-bourses-can-take-a-leaf-from-singapore-dcs-framework-sec-commissioner. Gladman, Kimberly, The Dangers of Dual Share Classes, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (May 21, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu /2012/05/21/the-dangers-of-dual-share-classes/. Goshen, Zohar, Against Mandatory Sunset for Dual-class Firms, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (January 2, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/02/against-mandatory-sunset-for-dual-class-firms. HKEX, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS: A LISTING REGIME FOR COMPANIES FROM EMERGING AND INNOVATIVE SECTORS (2018), https://www.hkex.com.hk/News/ Market-Consultations/2016-to-Present/February-2018-Emerging-and-Innovative-S ectors?sc_lang=en. Hufford, Austen, Zynga Moves to Single-Class Share Structure, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 2, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/zynga-moves-to-single-class-sharestructure-1525293576. Index Providers and Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, https://www.cii.org/index-providers-dual-class-stock. Jo, Mi-hyun & Geong-jin Min, S.Korean Govt Pushes Dual-Class Share Structure amid Coupang US listing, KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY (February 19, 2021), https:// www.kedglobal.com/dual-class_share_structures/newsView/ked202102190001. Karyadi, Freddy, Indonesia – IDX Recognizes Dual-Class Shares In Move To Boost Tech Listings, CONVENTUS LAW (January 7, 2022), https://conventuslaw.com/report /indonesia-idx-recognizes-dual-class-shares-in-move/. Khaitan & Co, Framework for Issuance of Differential Voting Rights Shares (July 5, 2019), https://www.khaitanco.com/thought-leadership/framework-for-issuance-of-differen tial-voting-rights-shares. Letter from Jeffrey P. Mahoney General Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors et al., to Madam Chairwoman & Ranking Member McHenry, Committee on Financial Services United States House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www. cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2021/October%201,%202021%20letter%20to%20Committee%20on%20Financial%20Services%20(final).pdf. Mainboard, SGX, https://www.sgx.com/securities/mainboard. Marriage, Madison, State Street Asks SEC to Block Non-Voting Shares, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 18, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9595e5c4-51db-11e7-bfb8-997009366 969. Melas, Dmitris, Putting the Spotlight on Spotify: Why have Stocks with Unequal Voting Right Outperformed?, MSCI RESEARCH (April 3, 2018), https://www.msci.com/ www/blog-posts/putting-the-spotlight-on/0898078592. MSCI, Consultation on the Treatment of Unequal Voting Structures in the MSCI Equity Indexes (June 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/8328554/Con sultation+Voting+Rights.pdf/15d99336-9346-4e42-9cd3-a4aO3ecff339. Nam, Gilnam, A Thought on the Proposed Amendment to Korea’s Venture Firm Law for Introducing Dual-class Shares, KOREA MARKET CAPITAL INSTITUTE (December 08, 2020), https://www.kcmi.re.kr/en/publications/pub_detail_view?syear=2020&zcd= 002001017&zno=1569&cno=5606. Nam, Gilnam, Tech Companies Changing Global Stock Exchanges and Issues in Dual-class Share Structures, KOREA MARKET CAPITAL INSTITUTE (May 04, 2021), https://www.kcmi.re.kr/en/publications/pub_detail_view?syear=2021&zcd=002001017&zno=1595&cno=5693. Nam, Hyun-woo, Debate Over Dual-Class Shares Reignites on Coupang IPO, KOREA TIMES (February 15, 2021), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/02/ 694_304060.html?fl. Newly Public Operating Companies Snapshot: 2021, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, https://www.cii.org//Files/issues_and_advocacy/Dual%20Class%20 post%206-25-19/2022_1_19%20Dual-Class%20IPO%20Snapshot%202021_.pdf. Page, Larry & Sergey Brin, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, ALPHABET (2004), https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html. Papadopoulos, Thomas, Legal Aspects of the Breakthrough Rule of the European Takeover Bid Directive, SSRN (2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1114671. Park, Dong-Hui, Coupang applies for IPO on New York Stock Exchange, KED GLOBAL (February 15, 2021), https://www.kedglobal.com/ipos/newsView/ked202102140 001. Policies on Corporate Governance, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (March 7, 2022), https://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies#shareowner_rights. Responses to Comments on Consultation Paper: Proposed Listing Framework for Dual-class Share Structures, SGX (June 26, 2018), https://api2.sgx.com/sites/ default/files/Responses%2Bto%2BFeedback%2Bon%2BDCS%2BConsultation%2BPaper%2B%2528260618%2529.pdf. Ritter, Jay R., Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics (December 23, 2021), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPO-Statistics.pdf. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (February 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporate-royalty. 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Tani, Shotaro, Indonesia Allows Multiple Voting Shares to Boost Tech IPOs, NIKKEI ASIA (December 7, 2021), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/IPO/Indonesia-allo ws-multiple-voting-shares-to-boost-tech-IPOs. The Proposed Class Action Regime for Hong Kong, DEACONS, (October 6, 2014), https://www.deacons.com/tc/2014/10/06/the-proposed-class-action-regime-for-hon g-kong/. The Tragedy of the Dual-class Commons, ISS (February 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/public/ resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf. What Is the New Economy?, INVESTOPEDIA (March 04, 2021), https://www.in vestopedia.com/terms/n/neweconomy.asp. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2019 (2019), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf. (四)其他 Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 5, 2018). Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 56 (June 2, 2016). Google Inc., Registration Statement (Amend. No. 9 to Form S-1) (August 18, 2004). Magna Int’l Inc., Notice of Special meeting of Holders of Class A Subordinate Voting Shares and Class B Shares of Magna International Inc (Exhibit 22.1) (May 31, 2010). Snap Inc., Bylaws of Snap Inc. 22 (amended June 30, 2013). | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87338 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 雙層股權結構的優點在於可以保護新創公司創辦人的經營決策權,並同時滿足公司籌資之需求,與此同時,掌握表決權之控制股東與其他股東之間的代理成本也隨之提升,產生了傷害公司治理的風險。雙層股權結構與公司治理的相互影響在比較法上已有相當討論。近來,國際上的數個重要金融市場,如香港、新加坡、上海、倫敦陸續放寬雙層股權上市,這些市場不約而同地採取強制監管措施來緩和雙層股權可能造成的負面效應,這也讓雙層股權的監管制度成為更趨重要的議題。其中,日落條款因其多元化設計與來自美國機構投資人的擁戴,成為在學術和實務上討論較為熱烈的監管措施。
近年台灣政府為推動國內產業創新與轉型,大力扶植提供高科技創新產品和服務的公司,而這類型的公司也是雙層股權的最大潛在使用者。然而台灣在2018年公司法修正之後,仍禁止公開發行公司發行複數表決權股來建構雙層股權結構,此與香港、新加坡等亞洲國家允許公司在上市時採用雙層股權結構的模式有所差異。台灣的立法者及主管機關是否應提供上市公司採用雙層股權結構之選項?我國是否為適合引進雙層股權結構之資本市場?由於新法制的引進仍須考量本土因素,因此本文嘗試從市場、政策方向、公司法制等不同面向來討論這些問題,並嘗試提出我國引進雙層股權結構應採取的監管模式及法制設計。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The advantages of the dual-class share structure are that it protects the founder’s right to make decisions about the company’s operations while satisfying his need to raise capital. However, the dual-class share structure increases the agency costs between the controlling shareholder who holds the voting rights and the other shareholders leading to the risk of undermining corporate governance. The interplay between the dual-class share structure and corporate governance has been well discussed in comparative law. Recently, several major international financial markets such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai and London have been liberalizing their dual-class share structure listings, and these markets have coincidentally adopted mandatory regulatory measures to mitigate the potential negative effects of this structure. The sunset clause is one of the most hotly debated regulatory measures in both academic and practical terms due to its diverse design and popularity among institutional investors in the US.
In recent years, the Taiwanese government has been promoting innovation in the domestic market by fostering companies that provide high-tech innovative products and services, and these companies are also the largest potential users of the dual-class share structure. However, after the amendment to the Companies Act in 2018, Taiwan still prohibits public companies from issuing plural voting shares to create a dual-class share structure, which separates Taiwan from other Asian jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and Singapore that allow companies to adopt dual-class share structure when going public. Should Taiwan’s legislators and policy makers provide the option for listed companies to adopt dual-class share structure? Is the introduction of dual-class share structure suitable for Taiwan’s capital market? As the introduction of a new legal scheme still needs to take local factors into consideration, this article attempts to discuss these issues in terms of different factors such as market, policies and corporate legal system, and attempts to propose a regulatory model and legal design for the introduction of dual-class share structure into Taiwan. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-05-18T17:09:08Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-05-18T17:09:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 圖目錄 x 表目錄 xi 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第一項 問題的源起 1 第二項 雙層股權結構的新課題 2 第二節 研究方法 4 第三節 論文架構 4 第二章 雙層股權之總論 6 第一節 雙層股權結構之概述 6 第一項 一股一表決權原則之省思 6 第二項 現金流量權與控制權的偏離 9 第三項 設計樣態 11 第四項 發行方式 12 第一款 首次公開發行 12 第二款 資本結構重組 12 第一目 換股要約 13 第二目 特別分配 14 第三目 表決權轉換 14 第三款 再次發行 15 第二節 雙層股權結構之發展 15 第一項 雙層股權結構之發展歷史:美國 15 第一款 1800年晚期到1920年代:雙層股權結構初次登上舞台 16 第二款 1926年到1980年:風潮的趨緩 17 第三款 1980年代:風潮的復興 18 第四款 1980年代晚期:SEC的監管──Rule 19c-4 19 第五款 2010年後:科技產業帶動的新風潮 23 第二項 雙層股權結構發展數據:美國 23 第三項 雙層股權結構發展:其他國家 25 第三節 建構雙層股權結構之合理性 27 第一項 契約與組織中的私法自治 27 第二項 不完整契約與剩餘控制權 28 第三項 契約理論與雙層股權結構 29 第四節 雙層股權結構與公司治理的衝突 31 第一項 代理成本理論 31 第二項 雙層股權結構與公司價值的關係 32 第一款 實證研究結果分歧 32 第二款 現階段實證研究的侷限性 33 第三項 公司內部監督機制失靈 35 第四項 機構投資人的反動 35 第五節 雙層股權結構的重要性 38 第一項 本人成本理論 39 第一款 概述 39 第二款 代理成本論之盲點 39 第一目 代理人與本人所生的成本 40 第二目 雙層股權與本人成本 41 第二項 雙層股權結構的優勢 42 第一款 經營者的獨有見識得以受到保障 42 第二款 促使更多新創公司選擇進入公開市場 43 第三款 經營者得以專注長期發展而非短期獲利 44 第四款 提升全體股東談判能力,抵抗惡意併購 45 第六節 小結 46 第三章 雙層股權結構的監管制度 47 第一節 全球視角下的監管制度 47 第一項 監管制度的三種模式 47 第二項 雙層股權在全球市場的開放熱潮 47 第二節 監管措施之概述 50 第一項 事前限制 51 第一款 適用主體之限制 51 第一目 公司種類限制 51 第二目 是否限定於新上市公司 54 第三目 公司規模限制 55 第二款 不同表決權持股人資格限制 57 第三款 表決權差異上限 57 第二項 事中監管 59 第一款 強制日落條款 59 第二款 突破規則 60 第三款 強化資訊揭露 62 第四款 強化公司治理標準 65 第一目 改變特定議案可行使之表決權數 65 第二目 強化普通股東的保障 70 第三目 強化功能性委員會之設置 72 第三節 雙層股權能否有效促進IPO?──亞洲市場的現況 75 第四節 監管措施之檢討 76 第一項 過猶不及的事前監管制度──事後救濟制度的強化 76 第二項 證券事件的事後救濟──各國團體訴訟制度 77 第五節 小結:監管政策之論辯 82 第四章 雙層股權結構與日落條款 84 第一節 永遠的雙層股權? 84 第一項 雙層股權結構的案例 84 第二項 小結 87 第二節 日落條款 88 第一項 歷史背景 88 第二項 日落條款之設計 89 第一款 期間型日落條款 89 第二款 事件型日落條款 91 第三款 持有比例型日落條款 92 第三項 日落條款的爭議 93 第一款 強制性7年期間型日落條款的訴求 93 第二款 學說爭辯 95 第四項 國際上日落條款的使用 97 第一款 期間型日落條款──倫敦、印度 98 第二款 事件型日落條款──香港、新加坡、上海、深圳、印度 99 第三款 期間型與事件型日落的選擇 102 第三節 小結:雙層股權的落幕 103 第五章 台灣資本市場與雙層股權 105 第一節 雙層股權結構於我國發展情況 105 第一項 複數表決權股之修法歷程 106 第二項 2018年公司法修正禁止公發公司發行複數表決權理由分析 107 第一款 代理問題 107 第二款 國情問題 109 第三款 股東平等原則 110 第三項 新創企業採用閉鎖性公司法制所遇之難題 111 第四項 2018年修法後特別股發行現況 113 第二節 以無表決權或限制表決權特別股建構之雙層股權 115 第一項 特別股與普通股之差異 116 第二項 持有無表決權股或限制表決權股與複數表決權股之差異 117 第三節 其他強化控制權機制 118 第四節 引入雙層股權結構之思考 120 第一項 國內因素之檢視 121 第一款 資本市場的成熟度 121 第二款 促進新創、IPO市場轉型與競爭政策 123 第三款 控制私益 126 第四款 完善的會計規範與雙層股權在會計上的意義 127 第五款 與現行公司法制的矛盾 129 第一目 現有雙層股權公司上市成本高昂 129 第二目 定足數計算方法架空複數表決權作用 130 第三目 董事優位主義和累積投票制 132 第四目 新股認購權與控制權稀釋 134 第五目 特別股收回制度使控制權的期限存在隱憂 136 第六款 股東救濟制度 137 第一目 普通股股東的保護 138 第二目 救濟程序與司法審查 140 第三目 證券事件的團體訴訟 144 第二項 我國應如何引進雙層股權結構 146 第一款 監管制度之模式 146 第二款 法制設計之建議 148 第一目 雙層股權公開募資之管道 149 第二目 立法模式 150 第三目 監管制度之設計 151 第六章 結論 155 參考文獻 158 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 論雙層股權結構的監管制度――探究引入我國之可行性 | zh_TW |
dc.title | A Study on the Regulation of Dual-Class Share Structure: Exploring the Prospects of Its Introduction into Taiwan | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 江朝聖;胡韶雯 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chao-Sheng Chiang;Shao-Wen Hu | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 雙層股權結構,日落條款,複數表決權,股份平等原則,公司治理, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | dual-class share structure,sunset clause,plural voting rights,principle of equality of shares,corporate governance, | en |
dc.relation.page | 172 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202202320 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2022-08-16 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學系 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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