中國5G科技如何影響美中權力競爭──武器化互賴理論在北約國家的實踐

Abstract

面對中國5G科技的快速發展，美國一再就中國5G產品提出國家安全疑慮，並訴求各國禁止中國基礎設施設備商參與國家5G建設，但在美國號召之初，許多傳統盟國卻未響應，凸顯出美國將5G定為衝突領域，甚至不惜以總體安全化嚴陣以待的選擇。我們不經好奇，美國會為什麼與眾不同、激烈回應中國的5G發展呢？權力轉移理論指出，其源自霸權國並不樂見權力轉移。然而，貿然使用權力轉移理論解釋中國5G發展如何影響美中權力競爭，將難以精準衡量中美5G衝突，主要源於三點因素：（1）對科技的定位未能反映其帶來的國安意義；（2）5G仰賴與各國事先建立關係的特質，與傳統從國內培養權力再直接施予標的之運作方式相異；（3）ICT與國際市場互動的特質，顯示5G以產品輸出為分析角度的必要性。 為此，本文導入武器化互賴理論來填補前述理論不足之處，並提出了檢驗5G具備武器化互賴能力、先發優勢協助中國取得能力、美國設定議題降低中國取得能力基礎可能性的三項假設。而在對5G基礎建設市場特質與技術結構的探討下，我們發現：（1）樞紐設備商是取得圓形監獄及扼制點兩種武器化互賴能力的關鍵，（2）先發優勢所型塑的結構性力量讓營運商傾向將訂單授予當前的設備商，（3）仍有推翻先發優勢市場力量的機會，使交易關係存在變動空間。接著透過英國、法國、德國與比利時的個案，我們則發現在2020年5月以前，結構性的市場力量大致落實，曾與華為合作的營運商多半遵循先發優勢繼續與華為進行5G RAN合作。但在2020年5月美國的技術禁令出台後，各國政府和營運商開始轉向，雖然態度改變未必與技術禁令直接相關，卻勢必受到美國設定議題與施壓各國表態的影響。最終，中國取得武器化互賴能力基礎的可能性在美國介入下降低，中國設備商5G科技的歐洲業務終究無法以武器化互賴能力形式成為中國縮短與美權力差距的權力資源。

In the face of China's rapid development of 5G technology, the U.S. securitized Chinese 5G products and kept requesting countries to ban Chinese infrastructure equipment providers from participating in their national 5G construction. However, many allies didn’t join the U.S. at first, and thereby highlighting the U.S. special concerns about China’s 5G development. According to the Power Transition Theory, this pattern shows that the hegemony seeks to resist power transition as China’s 5G development challenges the U.S. leading position. However, the Power Transition Theory fails to explain how and why the Chinese 5G global expansion influences the great power struggle due to the following three factors: (1) the measurement of technology doesn’t reflect the security impact of technology, (2) the resource and usage of power originated from 5G business are different from the traditional power, and (3) the ICT infrastructure market indicates that one needs to analyze 5G from an export perspective. We therefore applied the Weaponized Interdependence Theory to fill the shortcomings of the Power Transition theory and proposed three hypotheses: (1) 5G has weaponized interdependence capability, (2) first-mover advantage allows China to gain the aforementioned capability, and (3) the U.S. agenda-setting ability reduced China’s 5G weaponized interdependence on infrastructure. After examining the characteristics and technical structure of the 5G infrastructure market, we found that (1) hub-equipment-vendors are the key actors to conduct two types of weaponized interdependence, panopticon and choke points effect, (2) the market power shaped by first-mover advantage make operators incline to award orders to current equipment vendors, and (3) there are still opportunities to override the aforementioned market power. We tested the theory through cases of the UK, France, Germany and Belgium. We found that before May 2020, most of the operators that already cooperated with Huawei on 4G RAN followed the first-mover advantage and continued to work with Huawei on 5G RAN. But after the U.S. technology ban was announced in May 2020, governments and operators began to change their minds. While the change may not have been directly related to the technology ban, it was inevitably influenced by the way the U.S. set the 5G dispute agenda and pressured countries to take a stand. Ultimately, the likelihood of China acquiring a basis for weaponized interdependence is reduced by the U.S. intervention. Moreover, the European market footprint of Chinese equipment vendors in 5G technology will not be able to serve as a power resource for China to shorten the power gap with the U.S. in the form of weaponized interdependence.