東亞盟友的避險模式變動:以南韓與日本為例

Abstract

本文嘗試研究中美權力競爭下的韓日避險模式之變動。雖然韓日的戰略環境存在根本上的差異，但兩個國家的避險行為呈現同樣的趨勢。為解釋此種趨勢，本文首先將避險行為區分為「軟避險」與「硬避險」，根據兩個特徵進行分類：交往形式與結盟信號。以該定義作為基礎來觀察兩個東亞盟友韓國與日本在權力競爭下對於避險政策的調整。 透過案例研究，本文得出了三個主要發現。第一，國家的政策主要受到結構性因素之影響。從這兩個案例可以看出，權力競爭因素是優先於政治取向或國內問題。第二，強化結盟信號的觸發點來自安全威脅，國家願意犧牲經濟利益來維護安全。在安全威脅上升的情況下，兩國都試圖以犧牲經濟為代價，進而保護安全利益。最後，本文證明了主要論點：在權力競爭變得更激烈的情形下，兩國的避險模式呈現出從軟避險向硬避險調整的趨勢。韓國和日本雖然依據不同的外交政策改變了戰略選擇，但總體政策調整都顯示兩國的政策改變存在一致的趨勢。 本文透過補充現有理論的細節、以及對避險行為進行具體分析，以兩種方式對國際關係理論做出貢獻。第一，現有關於兩種避險模式的文獻仍未提供區分兩者的具體衡量標準，而本文則補充了區分兩種避險行為的具體特徵、提供分析國家對外政策調整的標準。第二，案例研究的研究結果，證明了本文的主要論點可以進一步應用於其他東亞盟友的戰略行為的可能性。

This thesis studies the adjustment to patterns of hedging behavior in South Korea and Japan in the context of the power competition between the United States and China. I argue that there are consistent trends in their hedging strategy adjustments despite the fundamental differences in both countries’ strategic environments. To illuminate the trends, I begin by distinguishing hedging behavior into “soft hedging” and “hard hedging,” which can be categorized by two characteristics: engagement form and alignment signal. Using the definition as a guide, this research observes adjustments in the hedging behavior of two East Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, as the power competition intensifies. This thesis yielded three major discoveries by examining case studies. First, the countries’ policies were mainly coordinated by structural factors, especially the power competition between the two great powers. In both cases, it can be observed that the factor of power competition has dominated political orientation or domestic issues. Second, the trigger for strengthening the alignment signal comes from security threats, and states are willing to sacrifice their economic interests to protect their security. Both countries sought to protect security interests at the expense of economic ones when facing elevated security threats. Finally, and most importantly, the hedging patterns of the two countries have shown a trend of adjustment from soft hedging to hard hedging amid the intensifying competition. Although South Korea and Japan have changed their behavior according to various diplomatic policies, the graph of overall policy adjustments demonstrates that their policies have moved in the same direction with a general pattern that can be drawn from the policies of both countries. This research contributes to the international relations theory in two ways, complementing the details of existing theory and presenting a specific analysis of hedging behavior. First, while extant literature on soft and hard hedging does not provide the specific measurements to distinguish the two, this thesis supplemented the specific characteristics of hedging behavior to make it possible to closely scrutinize states’ foreign policy adjustments. Second, the results of the case studies imply the possibility that the main argument of this thesis can be further adopted in the strategic behaviors of other East Asian allies that have established deep economic ties with China while engaging in security cooperation with the U.S.