法律天國：論Hans Kelsen「無國家的國家學」

Abstract

本文的研究對象，是Hans Kelsen的國家學；更正確地說，本文的研究對象是Kelsen將國家學解消的過程，並且從Kelsen的早期著作中（1911-1934），指出「國家」概念之解消是其法科學的必要條件。本文將分別指出，Kelsen要解消的國家概念為何（第二章）、如何解消（第三章）、為何需要解消（第四章）。首先，本文第二章將回顧在Kelsen提出其理論前，國家學是如何形塑並回答其問題。世紀之交的Georg Jellinek則是這類傳統國家學的集大成者。這些傳統的國家學理論則被Kelsen視為尚停留在「神學層次」，有待批判重構來達到現代科學的水準。第三章將焦點拉回Kelsen的理論。在他看來，傳統國家學犯下了實質化的錯誤，將法秩序的擬人與法秩序本身並列起來，進而造成了對象複製與隨之而生的諸多困難問題。藉由對傳統理論的批判與重構，Kelsen的國家學將國家正確地看作是法規範複合體，實質化錯誤所導致的諸多問題也就迎刃而解，同時也將研究核心從法主體移轉到客觀法規範、從實質移轉到關係。本文第四章進一步討論Kelsen思路上的環境因素與科學哲學。Kelsen成長過程中的「奧匈經驗」對他的世界觀有著重要的影響，這分別體現在對實然超個人統一體的否定，以及採納了反形上學、反實體思路。他接受了Ernst Cassirer的看法，認為科學的關鍵在於破除實體概念、形塑函數概念，並指出人類認識有著從實體往函數概念的演化進程。最後，Kelsen指出國家學與神學之間的平行關係，將國家學／法學類比於神學／自然科學，兩個組合都在系統中造成二元性的實體被解消、成為函數概念後，走向後者所表彰的現代科學。實體國家的解消、轉為體現法規範整體的函數概念，遂是Kelsen法科學的必要條件。

The aim of this work is to properly represent Hans Kelsen’s Staatslehre (Theory of State). It tries to point out, based on Kelsen’s early writings (1911-1934), that the “dissolvance” of the concept of state, and Staatslehre itself, is a precondition of Kelsen’s Rechtswissenschaft (Legal Science). It attempts to achieve the aforementioned aim by the following steps: First, it points out the kind of Staatslehre Kelsen must dissolve for his Rechtswissenschaft to emerge. This is discussed in Chapter 2, in which it tries to present how the Staatslehre of late 19th Century shaped and dealt with its main subject, and how did the development of 19th Century Staatslehre cumulated in Georg Jellinek’s works, which was considered the finest form of Staatslehre at the turn of the century. Kelsen regarded these “traditional” Staatslehre to be filled with “theological methods” and idologies, thus require thorough purification for it to gain a status of modern science. The process of legal theoretical “purification” of Staatslehre, is demonstrated in Chapter 3. Kelsen believed that the traditional Staatslehre had suffered from the mistake of doubling of its object (Verdoppelung), the legal personhood (Person), which was a result of substantialization (Hypostasierung) of what was meer personification of legal norms. In his own formation of Staatslehre, the state is simply a complex of legal norms, which is formed by all legal norms of a given legal system. This de-substantilized Staatslehre thus is a “stateless” theory of state, since what essentially left in it are legal norms, which can in a way signifies the dissolvance of Staatslehre itself. But in Kelsen’s mind, this is the way Staatslehre part with theological methods, and thus become a modern science. This general outline and understanding of theoretical task, embodies the geological and academic influence Kelsen had encountered, which is the focal point of Chapter 4. These influences, including the diversity of Austro-Hungarian Empire, the anti-metaphysics, -substance stance of Viennese academic community, shaped Kelsen’s anti-substance thought early on in his academic career. To theorize his position, he recourse to Ernst Cassirer’s work on the transformation of concept forming, in which substantial concept (Substanzbegriff) will eventually be replaced by functional concept (Funktionsbegriff), which also means a tendency towards pure science. By highlighting the parallelity between Staatslehre and Theology, Kelsen points out how the traditional Staatslehre is suffering from the same issue as Theology, and therefore employing “theological methods” to solve the “fake problems” which themselves created, namely by falsly juxtaposing the system and its personification, making the latter a substance heterogeneous from the system which it was personifying in the first place. After the dissolvance of the substances, i.e. the concept of God and State, lies the emergence of modern science, which are Natural Science and Legal Science, repectively. Legal Science, in Kelsen’s view, is thus the result of “statelessness”.