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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 鄧敦民(Duen-Min Deng) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bing-Cheng Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃稟宬 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-19T23:43:05Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2022-09-05 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2022-08-31 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/86220 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 我的論文是一個針對性別概念的改良型計畫。這個改良型計畫分為四個部分。在第一部分，我從某個性別概念的目的開始，這個目的和我們對性別壓迫的理解有關。接著我論證，因為有不同類型的性別壓迫，我們需要三種性別概念來理解所有類型的性別壓迫。第一種性別概念將性別理解為和他人如何看待一個人有關。第二種性別概念將性別理解為和一個人如何看待自己或傾向做出什麼行為有關。第三種性別概念將性別理解為和一個人如何受到身體影響有關。在論文接下來的三個部分，我則分別處理這三種類型的性別概念，目的是找出在每個類型的性別概念中我們所應該使用的特定的性別概念。在第二部分中，我將焦點置於第一種性別概念。由於 Haslanger (2000) 和 Ásta (2018) 都提供了這種類型的概念，我將比較這兩者所提供的概念，並主張 Ásta 的概念更好。在第三部分中，我考慮的是第二種概念。在此部分中，我首先分別評估 McKitrick (2015)、 Bettcher (2017) 和 Jenkins (2018) 三者所提出的概念，並指出三個概念皆不充足。基於先前的討論，我會提出一個更好的概念。在第四部分，我討論了第三種性別概念。由於沒有人提供過這樣的概念，我將給出一個新穎的概念，並論證這個概念確實是我們所需要的。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | My thesis is an ameliorative project with respect to gender concepts. The project is divided into four parts. In the first part, I begin with the purposes of gender concepts concerning our understanding of gender oppression. Then I argue that because there are different types of gender oppression, we need three types of gender concepts to understand all types of gender oppression. The first type of gender concepts understands having a gender as a matter of how one is perceived by others. The second type understands having a gender as a matter of how one perceives oneself or is disposed to behave. The third type understands having a gender as a matter of how one is affected by one’s body. The next three parts of my project address the three types of concepts. The task is to determine, with respect to each type, which particular concept we should use. In the second part, I focus on the type of gender concepts that takes having a gender as a matter of how one is perceived by others. Since Haslanger (2000) and Ásta (2018) both offer a concept of this kind, I being by comparing the two concepts. I will argue that Ásta’s concept is better. In the third part, I consider the type of gender concepts that takes having a gender as a matter of how one perceives oneself or is disposed to behave. I will first assess three concepts from McKitrick (2015), Bettcher (2017) and Jenkins (2018) respectively. The result is that the three concepts are not good enough. So I will develop an alternative concept. In the fourth part, I discuss the type of gender concepts that takes having a gender as a matter of how one is affected by one’s body. Since no one has provided such a concept. I will develop a novel concept and argue that the concept is indeed required for us. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-03-19T23:43:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-3108202201410200.pdf: 1343382 bytes, checksum: fa0e4b80d106b2e1f5b66aacfc4cb196 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Chapter 1 Introduction: Ameliorating Gender Concepts 1 1.1 Some Basic Terminologies 3 1.2 How I Will Carry out the Ameliorative Project 5 Chapter 2 Gender in Three Places 9 2.1 The Purpose of Gender Concepts 9 2.2 An Argument from Jenkins 12 2.3 A Taxonomy of Gender Oppression 15 2.4 Which Gender Concept Is Required to Understand a Given Form of Gender Oppression 20 2.5 Why We Should Possess Three Types of Gender Concepts 23 2.6 On the Possibility of a Focal Analysis 29 2.7 Conclusion 35 Chapter 3 Gender in Others’ Eyes 36 3.1 Subordinate Social Classes and Conferred Statuses 36 3.2 Two Problems for Haslanger’s Concept 43 3.3 Understanding Third-Personal Gender Oppression 52 3.4 The Possibility of Gender Equality 56 3.5 Conclusion 59 Chapter 4 Gender in One’s Mind 60 4.1 Three Existing Internal Concepts of Woman 60 4.2 Two Requirements for the Internal Concept of Woman 63 4.3 Assessing the Three Internal Concepts of Woman 66 4.4 An Alternative Internal Concept of Woman 70 4.5 Trans-Inclusion 75 4.6 Conclusion 81 Chapter 5 Gender on One’s Body 82 5.1 A Lesson from Class and Disability 82 5.2 A Bodily Concept of Woman 86 5.3 Clarifications for the Opportunity Concept of Woman 90 5.4 The Opportunity Concept of Woman and Impersonal Gender Oppression 92 5.5 The Utility of the Opportunity Concept of Woman 99 5.6 Conclusion 106 Chapter 6 Conclusion: The Triple-Concept Model 108 Reference 113 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 改良型計畫 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 性別 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 形上學 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 女性主義 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 壓迫 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Feminism | en |
| dc.subject | Gender | en |
| dc.subject | Oppression | en |
| dc.subject | Ameliorative Project | en |
| dc.subject | Metaphysics | en |
| dc.title | 改良性別概念：三重概念模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | On Ameliorating Gender Concepts: The Triple-Concept Model | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 110-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.author-orcid | 0000-0003-0227-5414 | |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 陳湘韻(Hsiang-Yun Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳秀瑾(Shiu-Ching Wu),廖顯禕(Shen-Yi Liao) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 性別,形上學,女性主義,改良型計畫,壓迫, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Gender,Metaphysics,Feminism,Ameliorative Project,Oppression, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 123 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202202997 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2022-08-31 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2022-09-05 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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