習近平時期中國海洋戰略的進展與挑戰：從率土之濱到海洋強國

Abstract

2012年，中國共產黨的十八大報告首次提出「建設海洋強國」的目標並將其列入「中國夢」的大戰略宏圖中，展現當代中國向海發展的強烈地緣戰略企圖。然而，若對照中國攸久的陸權傳統，海洋戰略之於中國是一個相對新穎的領域。本文的研究目標即在於探索當代中國——特別是習近平主政後——的海洋戰略形成、邏輯與蘊藏其中的傳統與現代元素。 為了綜合分析形成當代中國海洋戰略的物質性與理念性因素，本文採用的是位置、身分以及戰略文化的理論變項設定。分析層次上，本文著重於體系層次的分析。本文檢視的海洋戰略涵蓋政治、軍事、經濟與法律等不同層面，屬於廣義式與大戰略式的海權建構。透過不同海權階段的三種理念型，本文先簡要回顧了當代中國在習近平主政以前的海權兩階段，再聚焦於習近平執政後的海軍建設與海洋治理，並在結論中收束前文發現並提出中國海洋戰略面臨的前景與挑戰。 習近平主政以前，中國海洋戰略主要受到改革開放後對於海外貿易與能源進口的需求牽引，戰略目標從「經濟式海洋強國」逐步形成加入政治與軍事元素的「大戰略式海洋強國」。中國對於《聯合國海洋法公約》在內的國際海洋建制也在不同階段採取部分抗拒與部分配合的混合態度。習近平主政後，「陸海統籌」方針下的「海洋強國」大戰略目標確立，軍事面隨著海外利益擴張不斷推向遠海，經濟面也出臺21世紀海上絲綢之路倡議。然而，中美關係競爭激化與中國在南海仲裁等海洋法領域受挫後，中國的海權發展也面臨莫大阻力。 本文發現，當代中國的海洋戰略是一漸進形塑的過程，而其基本問題是位置與身分不一致。中國雖然在海軍遠航與串連國際海港的經濟實力上有大幅進展，但缺乏美國等西方國家認可的海權身分。國際社會對中國海上爭端處理的質疑也使中國更偏好以國內法而非國際建制正當化自己在近海的控制。此外，中國的陸權傳統與戰略文化對當代中國的「海洋強國」追求仍有影響力，其雖然導致地緣身分難以調適與容易戰略示意失敗的問題，但也有潛能幫助中國不藉由戰爭便能奠定不容忽視的海權，是中國在新時代向海發展的束縛與祝福。

In 2012, the report of the 18th party congress of the Chinese Communist Party stated that “building a great maritime power” was part of the grand strategy of fulfilling the “Chinese Dream,” demonstrating China’s strong geopolitical ambition to march towards the seas. Crafting a maritime strategy, however, is a relatively new task for China, considering China’s long strategic tradition of being a land power. This thesis explores the formation, logic and underlying traditional elements of the maritime strategy of modern China– especially China under Chinese president Xi Jinping's rule. This thesis adopts “position”, “identity”, and “strategic culture” as the main theoretical variables to comprehensively analyse the materialistic and idealistic factors of modern China’s maritime strategy. From a systematic level of analysis, this thesis views the term “maritime power (seapower)” from a grand strategic perspective, including political, militaristic, economic and legal aspects. We look back to the first two stages of China’s maritime power development before Xi Jinping’s rule through the three ideal types of maritime power. This thesis then focuses on China’s naval force building and maritime governance after Xi Jinping becomes China's president, concluding this thesis by suggesting the future challenges of China’s maritime strategy. Before Xi Jinping came to power, China’s reliance on seaborne trade and oversea energy supplies after the start of reform and opening-up guided China’s maritime power development. The Chinese geopolitical objective gradually transformed from an economic “great maritime power” to a grand strategic “great maritime power”, including political and militaristic elements. China also adopted a hybrid approach toward international maritime regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, joining relevant regimes when it suited China and resisting them when they did not meet Chinese interests. After Xi Jinping became the Chinese president, China established the grand strategic goal of becoming a “great maritime power” under the guiding principle of “overall planning of land and sea.” China subsequently pushed its navy towards the far seas to secure growing overseas interests and rolled out the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. However, China’s maritime power development faced serious obstacles after China-US relations deteriorated and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration. This thesis found out that the formation of China’s maritime strategy is a gradual process, and the fundamental challenge lies in China’s inability to match China’s identity and position. China achieved a stronger maritime position by far sea naval operations and the economic power to link international ports. The international community's doubt about China’s dealing with near sea disputes nonetheless propelled China to control the near seas with domestic law rather than international regimes. The strategic culture based on China’s land power tradition also influences China’s modern pursuit of a “great maritime power.” A constraint but also a blessing, China’s strategic culture makes it difficult for China to mould a modern geopolitical identity but has the potential to make China a considerable maritime power without war.