可轉換證券對新創公司治理之影響

Abstract

新創公司的公司治理，是相對被忽略的議題。因為新創公司需要經常募資，股東人數隨著時間經過不斷增加，而董事會的組成也會越趨複雜，因此新創公司治理經常存在著衝突。 因應新創公司的募資需求，實務上發展出不同的募資工具，包含可轉換特別股、可轉換債、SAFE及KISS這四種可轉換證券。本文重視新創公司治理的重要性，以代理成本理論為研究架構，以次級資料蒐集法及訪談為研究方法，分析可轉換特別股、可轉換債、SAFE及KISS這四種可轉換證券對種子期新創公司公司治理所造成的影響。 本文認為，四種可轉換證券分別對新創公司治理造成不同程度的資訊不對稱及代理成本。不過，即使新創公司的公司治理問題隨著募資的進程呈現衝突增加的趨勢，但從代理成本來看，種子期使用SAFE的新創公司，其代理成本可能反倒是在種子期較高，直到SAFE被轉換為種子系列特別股後略微下降，再重新隨著募資的進程升高。 本文肯定SAFE作為募資工具的價值，同時建議如果要降低種子期使用SAFE的代理成本，可以在SAFE文件裡加上資訊權、獨立董事設置或給予董事會觀察員席次的約定，以降低資訊不對稱的程度及代理成本。

Startup corporate governance is a relatively less-often discussed issue as compared to the governance of public companies. This thesis emphasizes its importance. Because fundraising is an ongoing effort in startups and the number of their shareholders increase over time, startup governance also becomes more complicated. Startup governance issues exist with different sets of intensions among various participants. When a startup raises funds, it has the options to issue convertible preferred stocks, convertible notes, Simple Agreements for Future equity (SAFE) or Keep It Simple Securities (KISS). Adopting the agency cost theory as its framework, this thesis aims to analyze influence of these four types of convertible securities on startup corporate governance in the seed stage. Each type of convertible security results in different levels of information asymmetries and agency costs on startups. While startup governance intensions may be on an increasing pattern over a startup’s lifetime span, this thesis argues that agency costs for startups using SAFEs in the seed stage are relatively higher until those SAFEs are converted into series seed preferred stocks. Thereafter, startup agency costs increase again with each round of financing. SAFE is a convenient, cost-saving, and efficient funding tool. To reduce the agency costs that SAFE may create for startups without prejudice to its strengths, granting investors an information right is worth consideration given that this obligation is easy to perform by startups. In addition, requesting startups to have an independent director or granting SAFE investors a right to appoint a board observer are also potential solutions.