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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳政鴻(Cheng-Hung Wu) | |
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳政鴻(Cheng-Hung Wu | wuchn@ntu.edu.tw | ), | |
dc.contributor.author | Yang Yang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 楊洋 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-19T23:25:55Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2022-03-07 | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2022-03-01 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/85836 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 隨著市場競爭的加劇,越來越多的公司將注意力從吸引新消費者轉移到留住現有消費者。消費者滿意並不一定會導致消費者忠誠。相比之下,使消費者在轉換時支付一定的轉換成本是增加利潤的有效手段。研究表明,即使在一段不滿意的關係下,轉換成本也可以在提高顧客保留方面起到積極作用。隨著轉換成本變得越來越普遍,其在商業戰略和市場動態中扮演的角色也愈發重要。然而,轉換成本對公司決策的影響尚有爭議。 為了解決文獻中相互矛盾的發現,本論文研究了在同一市場中競爭的兩家公司之間的動態定價和轉換成本賽局。消費者根據其購買歷史被劃分為不同的細分群體,並在轉換購買時產生一次性的轉換成本。我們採用混合多項式羅吉特模型(mixed multinomial logit,MMNL)來靈活描述產品和消費者特徵。由於 MMNL 模型的廣泛理論適用性,我們的結果可以推廣到一般的離散選擇模型中。本論文的主要研究內容和結論如下: 第 3 章推廣了純策略納什均衡存在的條件,從而使MMNL模型適用於廣泛的市場。在加強的條件下,我們進一步驗證了均衡的唯一性。 第 4 章研究了兩個競爭公司之間的多期同時賽局。 企業可以通過改變價格和重新設計產品來增加或減少每個時期的轉換成本,從而影響消費者的購買行為。我們的理論結果表明轉換成本的三種效應:轉換成本較小時促進價格競爭的反壟斷效應、轉換成本較大時的壟斷效應,以及在任何轉換成本下對前瞻性企業的投資效應。對於價格和轉換成本策略的聯合效應,來自智能手機市場的實證案例研究表明,投資轉換成本可以使市場領導者的價格顯著提高。 第 5 章介紹了技術領導者和追隨者之間的多時期賽局理論框架。兩者依次製定定價和轉換成本戰略。雖然領導者最初表現技術優勢,跟隨者可以模仿領先者的技術作為後發優勢。我們建立了跟隨者的技術追趕與轉換成本之間的反向關係。因此,轉換成本可以看作是領導者阻止跟隨者技術模仿的先發優勢。我們發現市場上至少有一家公司打算降低轉換成本。我們還發現在高轉換成本下,隨著兩家公司之間的技術差距縮小,兩家公司可能會主動降價。 總結起來,本論文的主要貢獻包括:1)同時考慮了雙寡頭壟斷中的定價和轉換成本競爭;2)提供了 MMNL 模型下納什均衡存在及唯一的條件;3) 刻畫了轉換成本對企業短期和長期定價策略的影響;4) 確定了企業如何採用內生轉換成本來提高盈利能力。 5) 檢驗了轉換成本和技術模仿之間的相互作用。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | With the intensification of market competition, more and more firms shift their focus from attracting new consumers to retaining existing consumers. Consumer satisfaction does not necessarily lead to consumer loyalty. In contrast, making consumers pay a certain switching cost when switching is an effective way to increase profits. Research shows that switching costs can indeed play a positive role in improving customer retention, even in an unsatisfactory relationship. As switching costs become more prevalent, their role in business strategy and market dynamics has become increasingly important. However, the impact of switching costs on a firm's strategy is still controversial. To resolve the conflicting findings in the literature, this dissertation investigates the dynamic pricing and switching cost game between two firms competing in the same market. Consumers are divided into different segments according to their purchase history and incur a one-time switching cost when they switch. A mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model is adopted to flexibly describe product and consumer characteristics. Our results can be extended to a general class of discrete choice models without modification because of the broad theoretical applicability of the MMNL model. The main research content and conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: Chapter 3 generalizes the condition to verify the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, so that the MMNL model is applicable to a broad range of markets. Under further conditions, the uniqueness of equilibrium is verified. Chapter 4 studies a multi-period simultaneous game between two competing firms. In which, firms can change prices and redesign their products to increase or decrease switching costs in each period to influence the consumers' purchase behavior. Our theoretical results suggest three effects of switching costs: the anti-monopoly effect of small switching costs that boosts price competition, the monopoly effect of large switching costs, and the investment effect for forward-looking firms under any switching costs. For the joint effect of the price and switching cost strategies, an empirical case study from the smartphone market shows that investing in switching costs can significantly increase the market leader's price. Chapter 5 presents a multi-period game-theoretic framework between a technology leader and a follower who sequentially develop pricing strategies under exogenous and endogenous switching costs. While the leader initially exhibits technological advantage, the follower can invest in technology imitation as a late-mover advantage to catch up with the leader. The inverse relationship between the technology catch-up investments of the follower and switching costs is established. Therefore, switching costs can be regarded as the first-mover advantage of the leader to impede the technological imitation of the follower. We find that at least one firm in the market intends to decrease switching costs. Our analysis also indicates that under high switching costs, both firms may actively cut the price as the technology gap between the two firms decreases. In summary, the main contributions of this dissertation include: 1) Simultaneous considering pricing and switching cost competition in duopoly; 2) Providing the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium under the MMNL model; 3) Characterizing the effect of switching costs on firms' short- and long-run pricing strategy; 4) Identifying how firms adopt endogenous switching costs to improve their profitability. 5) Examining the interaction of switching costs and technological imitation. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-03-19T23:25:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2602202200142400.pdf: 2895505 bytes, checksum: 0037b13908a53bdc09b10e038a9f54ad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Acknowledgements......................iii Abstract ......................v 摘要......................iv Table of Contents ......................xi List of Figures......................xv List of Tables ......................xvii Chapter 1 Introduction...................... 1 1.1 Background and Motivation ...................... 1 1.2 Scope of Research...................... 5 1.3 Thesis Organization...................... 9 Chapter 2 Literature Review...................... 11 2.1 Consumer Switching Costs...................... 11 2.1.1 Concept and source of switching costs...................... 12 2.1.2 Classification of switching costs................... 14 2.1.3 Measurement of switching costs................... 16 2.2 Discrete Choice Model......................... 18 2.2.1 Multinomial logit model and mixed multinomial logit model......................... 18 2.2.2 Equilibrium behavior under logit model......................... 20 2.2.3 Revenue management with discrete choice model ......................... 22 2.3 Competition unde rSwitching Costs .................. 22 2.3.1 Compete with exogenous switching costs .................. 23 2.3.2 Compete with endogenous switching costs .................. 25 Chapter 3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Under Mixed Multinomial Logit model.............. 29 3.1 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium .................. 29 3.2 Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium .................. 35 Chapter 4 Pricing and Switching Cost Competition under Discrete Mixed Multinomial Logit Demand 39 4.1 Dynamic Pricing Game with Switching Costs .................. 39 4.1.1 Model description and consumer behavior ................. 40 4.1.2 Dynamic game model ........................ 42 4.2 Analysis of the Game-theoretical Model........................46 4.2.1 Effect of switching costs on a firm’s price strategies in a single-period....................... 49 4.2.2 Effect of switching costs on a firm’s dynamic price strategies in multi-periods.................. 51 4.2.3 Firms' switching cost strategies................... 61 4.2.4 Asymmetric switching costs..................... 63 4.3 Numerical Analysis........................... 66 4.3.1 Relationship between equilibrium price and switching costs........................... 67 4.3.2 Case study of a smartphone market ................. 71 4.4 Managerial Insights........................... 74 Chapter 5 Competition under Endogenous and Exogenous Switching Costs and Technological Imitation........................... 77 5.1 Model Formulation........................... 77 5.1.1 Problem description ......................... 77 5.1.2 Consumer choice model....................... 79 5.1.3 Two-period Stackelberg game model ................ 82 5.2 Model Analysis............................. 85 5.2.1 The second period competition ................... 85 5.2.2 The first period competition..................... 95 5.3 Numerical Analysis: Competition in the Smartphone Market..................... 104 5.4 Managerial Insights........................... 108 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Further Research........................... 111 6.1 Conclusions............................... 111 6.2 FurtherResearch ............................ 114 Appendix — Proof of Theorem 4.1............................ 129 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 離散選擇模型與消費者轉換成本下之動態競爭研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Dynamic Competition under Discrete Choice Model and Consumer Switching Costs | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 110-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.author-orcid | 0000-0002-9026-9913 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳文智(Wen-Chih Chen),喻奉天(Vincent F Yu),洪一薰(I-Hsuan Ethan Hong),黃奎隆(Kwei-Long Huang),藍俊宏(Jakey Blue) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 賽局理論,轉換成本,定價策略,動態競爭,市佔率,混合多項式羅吉特模型, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Game Theory,Switching Cost,Pricing Strategy,Dynamic Competition,Market Share,Mixed Multinomial Logit Model, | en |
dc.relation.page | 135 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202200606 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2022-03-02 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
dc.date.embargo-lift | 2025-03-01 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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