請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/85634完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林姿婷(Tzu-Ting Lin) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Chun Shih | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 施怡均 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-19T23:20:12Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2022-07-22 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2022-06-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻 王大維，2003，公司治理相關要素與公司績效關聯性之研究－以台灣上市公 司為例，淡江大學會計學系碩士論文 王淑芬、謝文馨，2008，台灣地區銀行經營績效之分析-以泛公股銀行與民營銀行為例，台灣銀行季刊第六十一卷第一期，20-4 何雁，2007，企業風險與公司保險需求，華南師範大學西方經濟學碩士論文。 吳及揚，2005，企業風險評估與風險控制策略之研究，國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文 宋明哲，2003，現代風險管理，中國紡織出版社 林育雅，1994，我國上市公司董事會特性與盈餘操縱現象之研究，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文 高軍，2003，企業風險管理決策問題探析，現代企業第6期，41-42 崔海慧，2013，保險對企業價值的作用機制及實證分析，中國海洋大學金融學系碩士論文 張書維，2013，企業風險管理與公司治理、公司特性之關聯性研究:對企業績效之影響，國立中正大學會計與資訊科技研究所碩士論文 許崇源、林宛瑩、周慈芳、陳書鈺，2005，科技類企業集團控股型態(II)-大同集團，貨幣觀測與信用評等雙月刊第52期，66-80 許琇涵，2014，論我國引進及強制設置獨立董事之必要性--兼論監察人制度之改造，東吳大學法律學系碩士論文 陳彥達，2013，機構持股穩定度與企業風險管理決策，國立暨南國際大學財務金融學系碩士論文 陳彩稚，2006，財產與責任保險，智勝文化 陳彩稚、黃慧琳，2011，產品責任保險與企業風險管理，臺大管理論叢 21卷2期，81 – 110 陳彬弘，2003，內部稽核與企業風險管理之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計系碩士論文 陳穎萱，2021，分心的獨立董事對公司表現之影響分析，國立中正大學經濟系國際經濟學研究所碩士論文 陳錦烽，2004，公司治理變革—對內部稽核之意涵，內部稽核季刊第47期，10-15 曾佑生，2014，員工獎酬及公司治理對於短視研發行為之影響，長榮大學經營管理研究所學位論文，1-62。 游輝城、吳怡慧，2015，資訊透明度與企業風險之間的關聯性，商管科技季刊第十六卷第四期，459-480 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002。公司治理與評等系統，台北：商智文化事業股份有限公司 廖瀅絜，2018，從公司治理面向探討獨立董事監督機制，東吳大學法律學系碩士論文 蔡佳卉，2003，台灣地區ＩＣ製造業風險管理成本效能之個案研究－以某家電子公司為例，銘傳大學風險管理與統計資訊研究所碩士班碩士論文 鄧家駒，2005，風險管理，華泰文化事業股份有限公司 賴丞坡、黃珮瑋，2019，獨立董事兼職對公司經營績效之影響，管理科學研究13:2 ，35-48 羅明軒，2018，公司治理與企業創新程度，國立臺灣大學管理學院財務金融研究所碩士論文 英文文獻 Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 217-250. Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 25(2), 143-161. Bacon, J. (1973). Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of the Board, New York: The Conference Board. Beasley, M. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465. Beatty, A., Gron, A., & Jorgensen, B. (2005). Corporate risk management: Evidence from product liability. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14(2), 152-178. Bens, D. A., & Monahan, S. J. (2004). Disclosure quality and the excess value of diversification. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(4), 691-730. Bhagat, S. & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2), 231-273. Bhimani A., Gulamhussen, M. A., & Lopes, S. (2009). The effectiveness of the auditor’s going-concern evaluation as an external governance mechanism: Evidence from loan defaults. The International Journal of Accounting, 44(3), 239-255. Black, B., Jang, H., & Kim, W. (2006). Does corporate governance predict firms' market value? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law Economics & Organization. 22(2), 366-413. Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. W. (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics. 20(1-2), 267-291. Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(4), 409-434. Chen, A., Kao, L., Tsao, M., & Wu, C. (2007). Building a corporate governance index from the perspectives of ownership and leadership for firms in Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 251-261. Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, J. (2002). Institutional Monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48. COSO. (2004). Enterprise risk management: Integrated framework. Jersey City, NJ: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Crowe, T. D. (2000). Crime prevention through environmental design: Applications of architectural design and space. Management Concepts, US：Butterworth-Heinemann. Culp, C. (2001). The risk management process: Business strategy and tactics. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons Inc. Dalton, D., & Daily, C. (1999). Directors and shareholders as equity partners? handle with care!. Compensation and Benefits Review, 31(1), 73-79. Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35-54. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325. Fan, P. H., & Wong, T. J. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earning in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 401-425. Fatemi, A., & Luft, C. (2002). Corporate risk management costs and benefits. Global Finance Journal, 13 (1), 29-38. Fich, E. M., Harford, J., & Tran, A. L. (2015). Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors’ portfolio weights. Journal of Financial Economics, 118 (1), 21-48. Garven, J. R., & MacMinn, R. D. (1993). The underinvestment problem, bond covenants, and insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 60 (4), 635-646. Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-155. Harrington, S. E., & Niehaus, G. R. (2003). Risk management and insurance (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Inc. Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital market: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3), 405-440. Hermalin, B. E. & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. The American Economic Review, 88 (1), 96-118. Hermalin, B. E. & Weisbach M. S. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm. Performance. Financial management, 20 (4), 101-112. Hirst, D., & Hopkins, P. E. (1998). Comprehensive income reporting and analysts’ valuation judgments. Journal of Accounting Research, 36 (3), 47-75. Hoyt, R. E., & Khang, H. (2000). On the demand for corporate property insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67 (1), 91-107. Hutchinson, M., Seamer, M., & Chapple, L. E. (2015). Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance. The International Journal of Accounting, 50(1), 31-52. Hutter, B. M., & Power, M. (2005). Organizational encounters with risk. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. Jensen, M. C. & Ruback, R. S. (1983). Market for corporate control: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 1(1), 5-50. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4),305-360. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. Jenter, D., & Lewellen, K. (2015). CEO preferences and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 70(6), 2813-2852. Kosnik, R. D. (1987). Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(2), 163-185. Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 308-328. Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59-77. Lorsch, J. W., & MacIver, E. (1989). Pawns or Potentates : the Reality of America's Corporate Boards. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. Luan, C. J., & Tang, M. J. (2007). Where is independent director efficacy? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 636-643. MacMinn, R. D. (1987). Insurance and corporate risk management. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54 (4), 658-677. Mayers, D., & Smith, C. W. (1982). On the corporate demand for insurance. Journal of Business, 55 (2), 281-296. Mayers, D., & Smith, C. W. (1987). Corporate insurance and the underinvestment problem. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54 (1), 45-54. McConnell, J., & Servaes, H. (1995). Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 39(1), 131-157. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1-2), 293-315. Myers, S.C., & Majluf, N.S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221. Myers, S.C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147–175. Patton, A., & Baker, J. C. (1987). Why won’t directors rock the boat. Harvard Business Review, 65(6), 10-18. Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1-2), 237-265. Regan, L., & Hur, Y. (2007). On the corporate demand for insurance: The case of Korean nonfinancial firms. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74(4), 829-850. Saunders, A., Strock, E., & Travlos, N. G. (1990). Ownership structure, deregulation, and bank risk taking. Journal of Finance, 45(2), 643-654. Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms' hedging policies. Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 391-404. Tufano, P. (1996). Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1097-1137. Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2001). Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 9(4), 323-362. World Bank, (1999). Corporate governance: A framework for implementation overview. P5. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-221. Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Board of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrated model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334. Zou, H., & Adams, M. B. (2006). The corporate purchase of property insurance: Chinese evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15 (2), 165-196. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/85634 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究主要檢驗超額公司治理指數與公司保險費用支出間的關聯性。本研究在控制公司產業類別、公司特性以及經理人特性後，採用Jenter and Lewellen (2015)、Fich, Harford and Tran(2015)二階段迴歸方法，以台灣2011-2019年間的上市櫃公司為研究樣本，建構出可對同類型公司的治理績效進行相對比較的超額公司治理指數。 本研究實證結果顯示，超額公司治理指數與企業保險費用支出呈顯著正相關，表示公司治理績效優良的企業，管理階層將更願意考慮購入保險以管理風險增進公司價值。另外，本研究發現當董事長與總經理非同一人、機構投資人持股比率越高、資訊揭露與透明度越高，因監督增強而促使企業提高對風險管理的重視，對企業保險費用支出有顯著正向影響。再者，本研究觀察到獨立董事比率與企業保險費用支出之間有負向影響，推測與我國獨立董事有兼職繁忙以及缺乏獨立性情形，造成管理層更容易操弄風險管理費用有關。最後，實證指出經理人持股率與企業保險費用支出之間有正向影響，此結果支持當經理人內部持股越多，決策態度會傾向風險規避的風險趨避說。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the relationship between the abnormal governance index and firm insurance expenses. After controlling the industrial category, corporate characteristics, and manager characteristics, we follow the methodology in Jenter and Lewellen (2015), Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015) while using listed or OTC-listed firms in Taiwan between 2011 and 2019 as the sample, to build the abnormal governance index that can relatively compare the governance performance of the same type of companies. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the abnormal governance index and firm insurance expenses, which means firms with good corporate governance performance, the manager will be more willing to consider purchasing insurance to manage risks to enhance firm value. In addition, the results also prove that when without CEO duality, higher institutional investors' shareholding ratio, and higher information disclosure and transparency have a significant positive relationship with firm insurance expenses, because the enhanced supervision promotes managers to pay more attention to risk management. Furthermore, the results indicate that the independent directors' ratio is negatively related to firm insurance expenses, which we speculate the busy part-time and lack of independence of independent directors in Taiwan making it easier for managers to manipulate risk management expenses. Finally, the results suggest that the CEO shareholding ratio is positively related to firm insurance expenses, supporting the managerial risk-aversion theory. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-03-19T23:20:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1506202212165400.pdf: 2582638 bytes, checksum: b80d4706177de33bbec12a1147913538 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄 口試委員審定書 i 誌謝 ii 中文摘要 iv ABSTRACT v 表目錄 vii 圖目錄 vii 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻探討與假說 5 第一節、 公司治理與風險管理之關聯 5 第二節、 假說建立 7 第三節、 其他控制變數的預期效果 14 第三章 研究方法及樣本 16 第一節、 樣本選取與資料範圍 16 第二節、 實證模型與變數定義 16 第三節、 敘述統計與相關係數矩陣 22 第四章 實證模型與分析 24 第一節、 超額公司治理指數與企業保險費用支出之實證結果 24 第二節、 超額公司治理指數組成因子之迴歸結果 26 第五章 結論 28 參考文獻 30 表目錄 表一、第一階段迴歸模型 39 表二、變數統計敘述表(第一迴歸應變數Y) 40 表三、變數統計敘述表(第一迴歸自變數X) 41 表四、變數統計敘述表（第二迴歸變數） 42 表五、相關係數矩陣(一) 43 表六、相關係數矩陣(二) 44 表七、相關係數矩陣(三) 45 表八、相關係數矩陣(四) 46 表九、迴歸實證結果-保險費用支出占資產總額比率 47 表十、超額公司治理指數組成因子之迴歸結果-保險費用支出占資產總額比率 48 圖目錄 圖一、研究方法架構圖 49 圖二、TSE產業類別劃分與樣本所屬公司數目 50 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 超額公司治理指數 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 超額公司治理指數 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 風險管理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會結構 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 企業保險費用支出 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 企業保險費用支出 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會結構 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 風險管理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.subject | Board Structure | en |
| dc.subject | Firm Insurance Expenses | en |
| dc.subject | Risk Management | en |
| dc.subject | Abnormal Governance Index | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.subject | Board Structure | en |
| dc.subject | Firm Insurance Expenses | en |
| dc.subject | Risk Management | en |
| dc.subject | Abnormal Governance Index | en |
| dc.title | 公司治理與企業保險費用支出關聯性 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Corporate Governance and Firm Insurance Expenses | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 110-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蔡英哲(Ying-Che Tsai),詹芳書(Fang-Shu Chan) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,超額公司治理指數,風險管理,企業保險費用支出,董事會結構, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Corporate Governance,Abnormal Governance Index,Risk Management,Firm Insurance Expenses,Board Structure, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 50 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202200956 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2022-06-29 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2022-07-22 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| U0001-1506202212165400.pdf | 2.52 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。