一元體系下的大國類同盟現象：後冷戰時期中俄安全合作的實踐（1991-2019）

Abstract

國家透過建立同盟來抵抗外部威脅，是國際關係中常見的手段。然而在當代的國際環境，中國與俄羅斯在面對美國的威脅時卻沒有見到同盟的出現。一種解釋是美國本身的威脅沒有達到足夠引發同盟的程度，另一種解釋是中俄之間存在許多利益衝突，抑或是歷史因素，以致於同盟難以出現。然而美國對中俄同盟對抗美國的擔憂卻從未停止，甚至認為美國應當更積極防範。面對此一爭論，本文提出以一元體系下的「類同盟」來解釋當前的中俄關係在面對美國競爭時是如何運作的。 本文的「類同盟」概念是基於「一元體系理論」、「同盟理論」、以及「訊號理論」三者結合所推演出來的概念，用以解釋在「一元體系」中，面對霸權戰略競爭的「大國」彼此之間專門應對霸權的手段。「中俄戰略夥伴關係」就是上述「類同盟」現象的體現。「類同盟」是屬於「一元體系」中針對霸權的權力平衡。透過將承諾與實際行動拆開以創造模糊空間的形式運作，大國會避免使用強訊號行為，如明確的國際條約、以聲譽擔保的承諾。轉而偏好採取弱訊號行為，如不具強制力的聯合聲明、實際的軍備交易等。採取後者的做法讓中俄兩國營造出可能建立同盟抵抗美國的樣貌，卻保留各自的詮釋空間，不會完全破壞對美關係。 1991 年至 2001 年是「類同盟」形成時期，2001 年至 2019 年則是「類同盟」運作階段。面對美國霸權的挑戰，「類同盟」使中俄得以維持對美競爭與合作，並在美國加強制衡壓力時給予協助，如北約東擴、顏色革命、2016 年之前的南海爭端。但「類同盟」並非傳統同盟，中俄兩國有更多推卸責任的動機，放大了同盟的缺點。這體現在 911 事件、喬治亞戰爭、烏克蘭事件、以及 2017 年以後的南海爭端，尤其在美國戰略轉變或與中俄其中之一產生激烈衝突的情況。明顯可以發現中俄雙方在強調彼此之間的友好與互信時，實際行動中卻產生極大的反差。但這並不會破壞中俄關係，而是「類同盟」運作的結果。

States defend against external threat from forming alliance is a common behavior in international relations. However, during the international environment nowadays, China and Russia did not enter an alliance while facing a national security threat coming from the United States. One explanation is that the threat is not strong enough for them to take such action. The other one is considering the conflict of national interest and historical factors as main reasons to explain why alliance is hardly appeared. But neither of those interpretations can remove hegemon’s doubt, even some scholars are urging the U.S. government to take a primitive action in order to prevent the consequence. According to those arguments, we provide a “Quasi Alliance Under Unipolar System” as another approach to understand how current Sino-Russian relations work under the competition with the United States. The concept of “Quasi Alliance” in this thesis is deduced based on three international relation theories: “Theory of Unipolarity”, “Alliance theory”, and “Signal Theory”, which is a specific policy under unipolarity for major states which are competing with hegemon to cooperate together. “Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership” is exactly the reflection of “Quasi Alliance”, and it is a transformation of traditional balance of power solely exists under “Under Unipolar System” as well. It can be operated by separating commitment and actual behavior, then create a grey area. Instead of using “strong signal”, such as staking their reputation on a formal treaty or promise, Major states would prefer using “weak signal” means which with no binding force, like joint statement, arm transfer and so on. The later one gives China and Russia a possibility to form an alliance against the United States, but still leave space for each other to maintain the relations between the hegemon and other major states. The Sino-Russia “Quasi Alliance” takes place during the period 1991 to 2001, and is has been in operation for almost 20 years hitherto. “Quasi Alliance” raises the capability of China and Russia to both compete and cooperate with the United States. It also provides partial support to each other when the United States increases pressure on one of them. It happened during NATO enlargement, color revolution, South China Sea dispute before 2016. However, China and Russia might have higher motivation for “buckpassing”, which means they are more likely putting the primacy focus on relationship between the United States. As a result, “Quasi Alliance” amplifies the disadvantages of traditional alliance. This kind of situation occurred when the hegemon’s strategy change or sharp conflict between hegemon and one of the members in “Quasi Alliance”, such as September 11 Attacks, Georgia War in 2008, Ukraine crisis in 2014, and South China Sea dispute after 2016. apparently, we can find the disparity when we make a comparison between the statements describing their strength, mutual trust relationship and the actual behavior. Even though it doesn’t really mean that there is potential conflict within SinoRussion relations, it just how “Quasi Alliance” works under unipolarity.