將創新納入水平結合管制——借鑑經濟理論與比較法

Abstract

經濟理論與實證研究指出創新為經濟成長與生活水準提升最重要的動力，然而我國競爭法規範與實務仍以價格競爭為核心，往往僅附帶提及事業行為對創新的影響，且欠缺對創新的分析框架。尤其在結合審查此一具有預測性質的管制中，更有建構分析框架的必要。 本文嘗試回答以下兩個問題：為何競爭法應該促進市場創新？若是，水平結合審查又應如何將創新納入考量？針對第一個問題，本文認為追求創新符合競爭法維護消費者利益、促進經濟之安定與繁榮的立法目的，且智慧財產法對非技術創新保護較低又僅保護創新的成果而有不足，確實有由競爭法填補的必要。 至於第二個問題，本文參考學說與比較法後，認為評估水平結合對創新的影響，能以可競爭性、利潤獨享性與綜效作為判斷的核心三因素。並可依照個案涉及的創新樣態將案件類型化，包括：即將或已經商品化的開發中產品、距離商品化尚遙遠的早期開發中產品以及整體產業創新表現，再分別套用不同的證據門檻。 本文依序從市場界定、限制競爭效果、效率抗辯與救濟措施各個審查階層，說明如何將創新納入現行的結合分析框架。簡言之，若無法確定創新能運用於何種具體產品服務，界定創新市場（創新空間）仍有必要；在限制競爭效果的層次應重視單方效果，避免結構推定；效率抗辯亦須有事業整合計畫的相關證據，主管機關並應避免過度要求效率能於短期實現，以免評價不對稱；救濟措施則須考量創新本身的不確定性，積極運用較緩和的措施（如：強制授權研發所需技術），以降低錯誤成本；最後，關於近期甚受矚目的殺手併購問題，本文認為無須調整結合申報門檻，以公平交易法第9條禁止獨占濫用行為的規範即可。

Economic theories and empirical studies indicate that innovation is the most important driver of economic growth and welfare improvement. However, Taiwanese competition statutes and relevant decisions still focus on price competition. The decisions at most refer innovation occasionally, and lack proper analytical framework. This paper answers the two following questions: Why competition law should facilitate innovation? If the answer is positive, then how to incorporate innovation into horizontal merger control? As for the first question, innovation enhances consumer welfare and stimulates economic growth. Both are the ultimate goals of competition policy. Moreover, intellectual property law is not sufficient to fully facilitate innovation, for it gives non-technology innovation less protection and it only protects 'the results' of innovation, leaving the process of innovation unregulated. That is why competition law should intervene to promote innovation. As for the second question, after analyzing relevant economic theories and comparative law, this paper holds that contestability, appropriability and synergies are the core factors guiding innovation analysis in horizontal merger cases. In addition, it is helpful to categorize horizontal merger cases by the types of innovation encountered, which includes commercialized (or nearly commercialized) pipeline products, early pipeline products, and innovation at the industry level. In each category of cases, different evidence threshold is required for proving anticompetitive effect on innovation. This paper also explains how to incorporate innovation considerations in current analytical framework. Market definition, anticompetitive effects, efficiency claims, and merger remedies are all discussed. In short, defining innovation market (or innovation space) may be helpful in cases concern early innovation that still cannot be applied in specific products. Unilateral effects are of most importance in predicting merger anticompetitive effects on innovation, and structural presumptions should be abandoned. Efficiency claims can be established only if the merging firms provide sufficient evidences of specific asset integration plans, and competition authorities should not strictly require the efficiencies be materialized in short terms. Mild remedies, such as mandatory licensing of assets needed for further innovation, could be widely utilized so as to alleviate error costs arising from innovation uncertainty. With regard to killer acquisitions, amending merger filing threshold is unnecessary. Section 9 of The Fair Trade Act, which prohibits the abuse of monopolistic position, can duly tackle them.