我國證券交易法第155條第1項第4款之構成要件明確化

Abstract

在現今證券市場蓬勃發展，投資股票儼然成為全民運動之際，證券市場之健全與否，無論對於發行股票之企業，抑或是對於整體國民經濟均有著無法忽視的重要性。而證券市場上充斥各種操縱行為，不僅往往使投資人受害，亦破壞證券市場之健全，因此實務上各國多立法明文禁止操縱市場之行為，我國亦以證券交易法第155條列舉數種操縱行為態樣，並訂定第7款概括規定。其中證券交易法第155條第1項第4款之連續交易行為，可謂實務上最常見的操縱態樣之一，亦為學說討論與批評之重點。 學理上討論的切入點主要在於，相較於其他類型之操縱行為，所謂連續交易，亦即連續以高價買入或連續以低價賣出，在外觀上，與一般合理之投資行為無異，則此種行為應否納入管制，或者應如何管制，使受管制的對象得以預見自身行為可能受法律制裁，即為連續交易罪之規範重點。然而我國證券交易法第155條第1項第4款法條文字不甚明確，導致本款構成要件諸如何謂「連續」、「高（低）價」在解釋上產生諸多疑義，以及且過去無論行為人連續交易行為是否產生影響市場價格之結果均成罪，以及「主觀意圖」如何判斷的難題，均引起學界廣泛之批評。 為了解決上述條文不明確之問題，我國於民國104年試圖修法增訂更為明確之結果要件加以回應。然而，本文透過研究104年修法前後之實務見解，發覺該次修法並無法解決條文欠缺明確性、容易流於法官恣意之問題，甚至還新增關於是否進行新舊法比較適用以及何謂「有影響市場秩序之虞」之疑問。基此，本文從美國法學說上的討論出發，並參酌104年修法前後我國學說上之討論，嘗試思考104年立委提案版本之可能性，並參考司法實務運作之模式，試圖透過新增「臺灣證券交易所股份有限公司公布或通知注意交易資訊暨處置作業要點」作為連續交易構成要件，建立較為數據化、客觀化之連續交易監管法制。

After the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress started to deem manipulation as a main cause of the 1929 stock market crash and the economic collapse. Therefore, the U.S. prohibits manipulation with its Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Sections 9 and 10(b). Yet, the difficulties for manipulation law begin with the statutory provisions themselves. The Exchange Act gives very little guidance on the conduct covered by statutory provisions. Section 9(a)(2) targets conduct that involves virtually any trading strategy: buying or selling a security, since buying or selling a security essentially involves creating an actual transaction and often affecting its price. As a result, The focus of the prohibition is left to the vague terms related to purpose. And the legal framework thus lacks precision, persuasion, and consistency of application. Confusion about what constitutes unlawful manipulation can produce unpredictable and different outcomes for cases with similar facts, which raise unpredictability and issues of fairness. Also, we can understand that it is often difficult to judge the motivation of a particular transaction, so objective rules may more accurately identify and prevent manipulative trading. And given how quickly the practice of financial markets changes, even if a perfect set of rules could be drafted, they could soon become outdated. Accordingly, the administrative agencies are more likely to do better on regulating manipulation than Congress, considering administrative rules can be amended more rapidly. This article suggests that existing methods to detect securities market manipulation rely heavily on a vague set of rules. Due to new technologies and changing investment strategies over the past few years, the securities market has strayed from its traditional form. The current securities market demands data-based and objective detection methods or machine learning algorithms supporting identification of market manipulation activities. Based on this understanding, the Directions for Announcement or Notice of Attention to Trading Information and Dispositions made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation may be a relatively better solution.