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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 洪茂蔚(Mao-Wei Hung) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Lin-Huei Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張令慧 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-19T22:17:18Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2022-09-23 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2022-09-19 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/84604 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 現有文獻記載，家族企業在世界大部分地區佔主導地位，庫藏股是這些公司靈活的財務策略之一。最近關於庫藏股的文獻主要集中在買回庫藏股的動機以及其宣告的效果上。比較少文獻研究家族企業與買回庫藏股兩者間的關係。因此，本研究採用兩階段回歸的方法，透過臺灣的資料來分析家族企業與買回庫藏股。我們的實證結果推斷，家族企業的控制力遠大於非家族企業。由於家族企業的控制力可以透過交叉持股或金字塔結構的股權結構來強化，因此，與非家族企業相比，家族企業較少實施庫藏股。由於家族企業較不樂意於透過買回庫藏股來對外披露營運的資訊，導致大股東對小股東的掠奪效果更為嚴重。 除上述情況外，本研究還透過檢視臺灣經由庫藏股制度，使得少數股權者向多數股東轉移財富的可能性。無論家族企業的董事者是否同時擔任公司的執行長，或者公司的執行長是否同時也是公司的董事，家族企業傾向於買回庫藏股的目的是用來轉移給員工。此外，獨立董事的存在會減少這一趨勢，而控制權大於現金流量權的家族企業，則會族增加了這一趨勢。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Extant literature documents that family firms are predominant in the majority areas of the world and that share repurchasing is one of the flexible financial strategies among these firms. Recent literature on share repurchase focuses primarily on investigating motivation and its announcement effects, but little research exists regarding family control and share repurchases. Accordingly, this study introduces a two-stage regression to analyze family power and share repurchases by a dataset from Taiwan. Our empirical results infer that family power is stronger than earlier predicted and that compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are passive share repurchasers because a family’s controlling power is enhanced by crossholding and pyramidal structures. Hence, family firms are less willing to disclose, and thus entrenchment effects emerge. Except the above, this research examines the likely wealth transfer from minority investors to majority owners via share repurchase in Taiwan. The family firms tend to announce repurchase programs with the purpose to transfer to employees regardless of situations where chief executives including CEO simultaneously hold the positions of directors in the board or chief executive officers are chairpersons at the same time. Further, the presence of independent directors mitigates the tendency, while the ultimate dominant families with excess control over cash flow ownership increment the tendency. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-03-19T22:17:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1509202211542700.pdf: 2196625 bytes, checksum: c1708f72eb5458c229762938e560b2b7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄 中文摘要 ii 英文摘要 iii Chapter 1. The Share Repurchases Of Family Firms 1 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 7 2.1. Literature Review 7 2.2. Development of Hypotheses 9 3. Data And Method 13 3.1. Data 13 3.2. Method 14 3.3. Summary Statistics 18 4. Empirical Results 22 5. Robustness Checks 26 6. Conclusions 28 Chapter 2. The Family Firms' Effects On The Purposes Of Share Repurchase 32 1. Introduction 32 2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 37 2.1. Literature Review 37 2.2. Development of Hypotheses 39 3. Data and Method 43 3.1. Data 43 3.2. Method 46 3.3. Summary Results 50 4. Empirical Results 53 5. Additional Test 56 6. Conclusions 57 Tables 61 References 87 表目錄 Table 1.1 Yong Feng Yu Group Stockholding Structure 60 Table 1.2 Formosa Group Stockholding Structure 61 Table 1.3 Far Eastern New Group Stockholding Structure 62 Table 1.4 Industry Distribution By Two-Digit Sic Code For Taiwan Stock Exchange 63 Table 1.5 Yearly Distribution Of Repurchase Incidence Rate 64 Table 1.6 Summary Of Variable Definitions 65 Table 1.7 Descriptive Statistics 66 Table 1.8 Foxconn Technology Group Stockholding Structure 67 Table 1.9 Coefficients Of Correlation Between Variables 68 Table 1.10 Two Stage Logit Regressions 69 Table 1.11 Logit Regressions Of Cash Capital Reduction By The Correlated Random Effect Model 70 Table 1.12 Difference Between Family And Nonfamily Firms On Annual Changes OF Share Percentage Held By Pyramidal Affiliated Firms 72 Table 1.13 Logit Regressions Of Repurchase Announcements By The Correlated Random Effect Model 73 Table 2.1 Yearly Distribution Of Repurchase Purpose Incidence Rate 75 Table 2.2 Industry Distribution By Two-Digit Sic Code For Taiwan Stock Exchange 76 Table 2.3 Summary Of Variable Definitions 78 Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics 80 Table 2.5 Coefficients Of Correlation Between Variables 81 Table 2.6 Results Of Regressing Share Repurchase Purposes On Family Firm 82 Table 2.7 Results Of Regressing Share Repurchase Purposes On Family Firm And It' s Interactive Terms 84 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 家族企業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 控制家族 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 庫藏股 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 庫藏股買回目的 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Family firm | en |
| dc.subject | Repurchase purpose | en |
| dc.subject | Controlling family | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | en |
| dc.subject | Share repurchase | en |
| dc.title | 財務金融研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Essays on Finance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 110-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳思寬(Shi-Kuan Chen),余士迪(Shih-Ti Yu),董澍琦(Shuh-Chyi Doong),楊聲勇(Sheng-Yung Yang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 家族企業,庫藏股,公司治理,控制家族,庫藏股買回目的, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Family firm,Share repurchase,Corporate governance,Controlling family,Repurchase purpose, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 99 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202203427 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2022-09-20 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2022-09-23 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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