從民主觀點論全國性公民投票之合憲性控制—以少數群體權利保障為核心

Abstract

隨著2018年公民投票法的法制鬆綁，臺灣社會很快地面臨到直接民主行使與少數權利保障之間的摩擦。為了調和兩者間的衝突，本文嘗試理論性地詮釋憲法民主原則的內涵，藉此探究應如何對全國性公民投票，特別是針對少數群體權利議題的公民投票施加合憲性控制。 首先，從民主理論的角度，筆者拒斥同質性人民觀與靜態、僵固的國民意志預設，主張在多元異質的當代社會中，應透過強調擴大參與及溝通妥協的「涵容民主觀」，來確保少數群體成員的意志自由可能，維繫民主的規範理念於不墜。一般性而言，直接民主制度則有助於擴大參與，並在與代議民主相互制衡的「混合民主」過程中，深化多數與少數之間的溝通妥協。不過，當公投議題聚焦特定少數群體的基本權利時，公投機制容易放大偏見的影響，導致少數群體成員的意志自由遭到壓制，並因權利受限，淪為未獲平等尊重的次等階級。本文認為，此時司法權有充足的正當性介入檢驗公投決定，協助暴露偏見，並延續溝通說理的民主動態過程。 奠基於此理論視角之上，本文論證我國憲法的民主圖像充分呼應「涵容民主」理念，在擴大參與及透過分權制衡來促進溝通妥協的動態決策過程中，形塑總體國民意志，使每一位國民、特別是少數群體成員的意志自由，能夠獲得制度性保障。而公民投票法旨在落實憲法第17條所保障創制、複決權利，亦即直接民主之行使，並應有助於擴大決策參與，並在與代議體制相互制衡的過程中，促進多數與少數間之溝通妥協。筆者並提出，與代議體制的相互制衡關係，以及基本權保障，皆構成直接民主行使的憲法界限。 於爬梳現行公投法制後，筆者聚焦分析「人權不能公投」的問題，探討我國憲法秩序是否容許、如何落實公投事前合憲性控制。於歸納各國法制後，筆者發現採取事前合憲控制的國家不在少數，且主要由司法權擔任審查者。筆者並認為，強司法審查傳統與憲法法院的設置提供了制度條件，而比起政治部門，司法權也更適合擔任事前合憲控制的裁決者角色。進而，筆者提出並不存在一律禁止事前審查的合理論據，關鍵毋寧在於，應如何調和民主溝通與少數保障之要求。由此，筆者提倡事前應僅對公投提案寬鬆審查，唯有構成明顯違憲並將造成重大急迫且不可回復的損害時，方得禁止將公投交付投票。而限制少數群體權利的公投提案，即可能落入事前禁絕的範疇。最後，筆者也針對我國法制，提出具體的修法建議。 在事後合憲控制的面向，本文聚焦審查標準問題，探討經混合民主機制的程序要素，是否、如何影響審查標準選擇。筆者分別駁斥無影響論、一律放寬及一律趨嚴論，並主張應考量混合民主機制的規範設計與憲法民主圖像的呼應程度，來決定審查態度；而中介標準在於，直接與代議民主是否透過相互制衡的過程來深化溝通妥協。分析我國現行法制後，本文認為整體決策程序欠缺溝通妥協色彩，為了避免少數意見在決策過程中遭到忽略，過往基於「立法形成空間」而放寬審查的憲法預設，應一般性地不予適用。最後，筆者也提出類型化的可能性，特別是涉及少數群體權利的公投決定，基於偏見的作用可能遭到放大，使少數意志被壓制，甚至淪為次等階級，大法官應採取嚴格審查態度，協助少數者發聲、挑戰偏見，藉此維繫民主保障每一個人皆平等而自由之理念。

After loosening the regulation of the Referendum Act in 2018, the conflict between direct democracy and the protection of minority rights became a serious problem in Taiwanese society. In order to reconcile the contradictions, this thesis attempts to theoretically construct the connotation of the principle of the constitutional democracy, and based on this, it further explores how to control the constitutionality of national referendums, especially those restricting minority rights. First of all, from the perspective of democratic theory, the author rejects the assumptions of homogeneous people and static popular will, and advocates that, in a plural and heterogeneous modern society, the concept of “inclusive democracy”, which demands participation, communication and compromise, should be emphasized, to ensure the freedom of the members of minority groups, which is essential to the realization of the ideal of democracy. In general, direct democracy helps to expand participation and deepen mutual communication and compromise in the process of “mixed democracy” that maintains checks and balances between direct and representative democracy. However, when ballot issues focus on the basic rights of specific minorities, the referendum mechanism tends to magnify the influence of prejudice, which results in the suppression of the will of minority people, and produces second-class citizens who are not equally respected within the political community. This paper believes that, at this time, it is fully legitimate for the judicial power to intervene and examine the constitutionality of the popular decision, thereby to expose hidden prejudice, and channel the dynamic process of democratic communication and reason–giving. Based on the above theoretical perspective, this thesis argues that the democratic landscape of the Constitution fully echoes the concept of “inclusive democracy”, that is, a dynamic process of constructing sovereign will which ensures deeper participation and mutual communication and compromise through checks and balances among different political sectors. Through this process, the free will of each citizen can be guaranteed institutionally, and that is more so for the member of minority groups. Meanwhile, the Referendum Act aims to implement the rights of initiative and referendum guaranteed by Article 17 of the Constitution, that is, the exercise of direct democracy, and the mechanism created by the Act should help to expand participation and promote mutual communication and compromise through checks and balances between direct democracy and representative systems. The author also proposes that the mutual checks and balances, as well as the protection of constitutional rights, both constitute the constitutional boundaries of the exercise of direct democracy. After the brief introduction of the current referendum system, the author examines the claim of 'No referendum on human rights', exploring whether and how the Constitution permits the pre-election constitutional review of referendums. Through comparing and analyzing the referendum systems of various countries, it is found that there are numerous countries adopting pre-election control mechanisms, and mainly, the reviewers are judicial branches. The author further argues that the tradition of strong-form judicial review and the establishment of constitutional court provide institutional conditions to adopt prior review, and compared to political branches, the judiciary is more suitable for the role of impartial constitutional arbiter. Furthermore, the author proposes that the entire prohibition of prior review cannot be well justified; rather, the key point is how to reconcile the requirements of democratic communication and minority protection. Therefore, the author suggests that the court should adopt the most deferential attitude on the prior review of ballot measures. Only when the proposition is facially and patently unconstitutional and would cause a significant, urgent and irreparable damage, then it is justifiable to prohibit popular vote, and a ballot measure that limits the rights of minority groups may fall within this category. In the end, the thesis provides a concrete proposal to amend the existing law. In respect of ex post constitutional review, the thesis focuses on the issue of 'standards of judicial review', exploring whether and how the procedural characteristics of “mixed-democracy' affect the choice of levels of scrutiny. The author separately refutes the theory of non-influence, the theory of special respect and judicial suspicion, and advocates that the degree of the institutional design of the mixed-democracy in conformity with the democratic ideal of the Constitution should be considered to determine the standards of review. Whether communication and compromise are deepened through mutual checks and balances between direct democracy and representative democracy would be an intermediate criterion for the above decision of judicial attitude. After evaluating the current Referendum Act, this thesis believes that the overall decision-making process lacks the spirits of communication and compromise. In order to compensate for the neglect of minority opinions in the political process, the accustomed constitutional presumption of “legislative discretion”, which leads to the lower level of judicial scrutiny, should no longer be applied. Finally, the author proposes the possibility of categorization in specific spheres. Especially, in terms of the popular lawmaking to restrict minority rights, considering the influence of prejudice may be magnified, so that the minority groups would be suppressed, and even be devalued as second-class citizens; the constitutional court should adopt a strict scrutiny to help the minorities to be heard and fight against discrimination, thereby maintaining the ideal of democracy to guarantee that everyone is equal and free.