投資人對薪酬比率揭露意見不一致之探討

Abstract

根據Dodd-Frank Act的規定，美國證券交易委員會(SEC)規定上市公司自2017年起須揭露CEO之薪酬與員工薪酬中位數之比率(Pay Ratio)。本研究主要探討投資人針對公司揭露薪酬比率意見不一致的情形。本文以2018年至2020年，標準普爾1500指數(S&P1500)為樣本。研究結果發現，公司在上傳包含薪酬比率之股東會說明書日後，異常交易量顯著為正，顯示揭露薪酬比率使投資人存有意見不一致的情況。且，公司在揭露薪酬比率時，若有額外的揭露補充資訊，將可降低投資人意見不一致的情形。此外，2018年首次揭露薪酬比率時，相較於薪酬比率為中等之公司，薪酬比率較低和較高之公司投資人意見不一致的情形更高。最後，實證結果顯示，薪酬比率較低之公司，若有額外揭露補充資訊，得以降低意見不一致。然而，薪酬比率較高之公司若有揭露額外資訊，則無法有足夠證據支持得以降低投資人意見不一致的情況。

According to Dodd-Frank Act, all U.S. public listed firms are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to disclose the annual total compensation of CEO, the median of employee pay, and the ratio of those two amount (pay ratio). Using data consisting of S&P 1500 firms from 2018 to 2020, this study examines whether the pay ratio disclosure brings about disagreements among investors. The result shows that abnormal trading volume is significantly positive surrounding the days when firms file the proxy statements which include pay ratio disclosures. The result indicates that pay ratio disclosures do increase investors’ disagreement. In addition, this study also finds that if firms voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures along with the disclosure of pay ratio, investors’ disagreement decreases. Focusing on the first year that the pay ratio was disclosed, I further find that compared to the investors of companies with medium pay ratio, the investors in the companies with higher and lower pay ratio have higher level of disagreement on the pay ratio disclosures. Finally, this study also finds that the voluntarily supplemental disclosures along with pay ratio disclosure can reduce investors’ disagreement on the disclosure when firms’ pay ratio is low.