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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳儀玲(Yi-Lin Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Zhi-Xun Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王之尋 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-19T21:25:28Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2022-07-05 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2022-06-21 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/83965 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Say-on-Pay投票制度對代理問題的影響一直備受爭議。支持者相信這一制度可以使公司股東和管理者的利益聯繫更緊密，確保董事會行使監督的職責。反對者質疑股東很難理解高管薪酬的結構設計，會影響董事會制定最優薪酬策略。在本文中，我發現當下公司確實存在代理問題，低Say-on-Pay投票支持率歸因於不匹配的高管薪酬。然後我檢驗了Say-on-Pay投票對高管接下來薪酬變動的影響，用兩個工具變數解決了內生性問題，並且用一階差值回歸解決了遺漏變數偏誤使得結論更可信。證據表明低Say-on-Pay投票支持率可以減少高管超額薪酬的增加，尤其是股權類薪酬。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The effect of the Say-on-Pay (SOP) vote on the agency problem has been a controversial issue. Proponents of the provision believe that SOP votes further align owners’ interests with managers’ interests, ensuring that board members fulfill their monitoring duty. Critics doubt that it is difficult for shareholders to understand the design of executive compensation structure, discouraging the board from developing an optimal compensation strategy. In the paper, I find that the agency problem does exist in modern firms and low SOP support is attributed to misaligned executive compensation. Then I examine the effect of SOP votes on the subsequent growth of executive composition. I solve the endogeneity problem with two instrumental variables and eliminate the omitted-variable bias with first-difference regressions to make the results more convincing. Evidence shows that low SOP support can reduce the growth of excess executive compensation, especially equity-based compensation. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-03-19T21:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-3105202215290100.pdf: 1623141 bytes, checksum: 65ee6b1bdfce35a9a325ada2ce169124 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i 誌謝 ii 摘要及關鍵詞 iii Abstract & Keywords iv Table of Contents v List of Figures vii List of Tables vii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Hypothesis development 9 2.1 Voting and executive compensation 10 2.2 Hypothesis development 11 Chapter 3 Data selection and variable measure 15 3.1 Sample and data source 15 3.2 Measure of excess compensation 17 3.3 Measure of low SOP support 19 3.4 Measure of other dependent variables 22 3.5 Summary statistics 23 Chapter 4 Empirical analysis 24 4.1 The link between CEO networks and CEO compensation 25 4.2 The determinants of SOP votes 29 4.3 The impact of SOP votes on executive compensation 33 4.4 IV regression 37 4.5 Subsample analysis 43 Chapter 5 Conclusion 48 Chapter 6 References 50 Chapter 7 Appendix 52 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Say-on-Pay制度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 高管薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股東投票 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Executive compensation | en |
| dc.subject | Shareholder voting | en |
| dc.subject | Principal-agent problem | en |
| dc.subject | Say-on-Pay | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.title | 美國Say-on-Pay 投票對高管薪酬變動的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The effect of the Say-on-Pay vote on the growth of executive compensation in the U.S. | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 110-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃景沂(Ching-I Huang),江淳芳(Chun-Fang Chiang), 李宗穎(Chung-Ying Lee) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Say-on-Pay制度,高管薪酬,股東投票,代理問題,公司治理, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Say-on-Pay,Executive compensation,Shareholder voting,Principal-agent problem,Corporate Governance, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 53 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202200845 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2022-06-23 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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