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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳聖賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Sheng-Syan Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 蔡云瀞 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Yun-Ching Tsai | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-01T17:05:13Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-02-01 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-01-18 | - |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/83252 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 沙賓法案通過後，獨立董事比率未達50%的公司被強制要求提升董事比率，因此對獨立董事的需求大幅增加。本篇文章探討社會資本 (Social Capital) 較高的公司是否比較能夠聘請到能力較佳的獨立董事。以企業社會責任 (Corporate Social Responsibility) 來衡量社會資本，實證結果發現在沙賓法案發生後，企業社會責任較高公司能夠聘請到獨立董事有較高的機率現在或曾經擔任過執行長、營運長、財務長等職務。當在地董事人選較為稀少時，上述的關係會變得更強。綜合來說，社會資本較高的公司確實比較能夠吸引到具有能力的獨立董事。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms with an independent director proportion of less than 50% were required to increase the director percentage, resulting in a significant increase in demand for independent directors. This study investigates whether companies with greater social capital are more likely to hire talented independent directors. Using corporate social responsibility to measure social capital, the empirical results show that after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms with higher corporate social responsibility are able to hire independent directors, and had a higher probability of having currently or previously served as chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer. This relationship is stronger when local directors are scarce. In general, companies with higher social capital are indeed more be able to attract more talented independent directors. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-02-01T17:05:13Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-02-01T17:05:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Abstract (Chinese) i
Abstract ii 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 9 3. Data 11 3.1 Sample Selection 11 3.2 Social Capital Variable 13 3.3 Director Ability Variables 14 3.4 Control Variables 14 3.5 Summary Statistics 15 4. Empirical Results 17 4.1 Main Difference-in-Differences Results 17 4.2 Parallel Trend Tests 19 4.3 Falsification Tests 21 4.4 Mechanism Tests 21 4.5 Director Ability Index 23 4.6 Firm Performance and Valuation 24 5. Conclusion 25 References 27 Appendix. Variable Definition 44 List of Tables Table 1. Sample Distribution 31 Table 2. Descriptive Characteristics 34 Table 3. Correlation Matrix 36 Table 4. Difference-in-Differences Results 37 Table 5. Parallel Trend Tests 38 Table 6. Falsification Tests 40 Table 7. Mechanism Tests 41 Table 8. Director Ability Index 42 Table 9. Firm Performance and Valuation 43 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 獨立董事 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 沙賓法案 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 社會資本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 企業社會責任 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事能力 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Corporate Social Responsibility | en |
| dc.subject | Sarbanes-Oxley Act | en |
| dc.subject | Independent Directors | en |
| dc.subject | Director Ability | en |
| dc.subject | Social Capital | en |
| dc.title | 做正確的事：來自招聘董事的證據 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Do the Right Thing: Evidence from Hiring Directors | en |
| dc.title.alternative | Do the Right Thing: Evidence from Hiring Directors | - |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-1 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳業寧;何耕宇;黃嘉威;周冠男;陳嬿如 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Yehning Chen;Keng-Yu Ho;Chia-Wei Huang;Robin K. Chou;Yenn-Ru Chen | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 沙賓法案,獨立董事,董事能力,社會資本,企業社會責任, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Sarbanes-Oxley Act,Independent Directors,Director Ability,Social Capital,Corporate Social Responsibility, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 45 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202300156 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-01-18 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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