台灣參選保證金制度之研究

Abstract

參選保證金 (election deposit) 依法做為候選人登記參選的要件之一，在登記參選時必須「質押」一大筆金額於選委會至投票結束，影響公民參政權之得喪。本研究架構以「保障參政權」（法律面）、「成本效益」（經濟面）、「選賢與能」（政治面）三個面向來檢視，透過「資料分析」與「深度訪談」二種研究方法進行研究，針對參選保證金制度、數額、發還門檻等三個關鍵進行深入探討。

本研究發現，候選人數的多寡，雖非對選舉經費完全毫無影響，但其影響微乎其微，反而選區人口數及選舉種類數方為關鍵，當局素以「節省公帑」為由限制參選人數，然在確切的「消耗程度」及欲保障之「重要公共利益」並不明確的狀況下，顯然不符比例原則；且保證金數額訂定既無學理依據，全憑中選會委員開會決定，卻未曾說明依據哪些指標來求取「避免候選人恣意登記參選」與「兼顧維護人民參政權」兩者間的衡平？且缺乏監督及救濟機制，又系以金錢做為候選人登記之唯一篩選門檻，無其他可資替代方式，並非對「抑制參選人數」唯一且侵害最小手段，無法通過合憲性的檢驗。

本研究統整出，越民主的國家對參選的限制越低，現存有參選保證金制度的國家，多為前英國殖民地或曾受威權統治的國家；以民主指標評鑒結果觀之，名列前茅之國家多無保證金制度，而當局最愛舉例保證金數額高於臺灣的日、韓、星等國，在民主指數的排名及女性參政比率皆遠遠落後臺灣。

為使每一公民皆能在形式上盡可能相同地行使其選舉與被選舉權，並確保所有候選人皆有相同之當選機會，當局應以廢除保證金制度或大幅調降保證金數額及發還門檻、增加金錢以外（如連署）之參選形式等來降低參選門檻；在未廢除參選保證金制度之前，應明定檢驗「衡平」之指標並建立數額訂定之聽證制度，沒入之保證金應成立公費選舉公積金提供弱勢參選人保證金貸款及優化選舉制度，政府亦應從法規面對候選人私設廣告嚴加限制，並將選票補助款之預算轉化為設置公共看板、公共影音廣告等公共性宣傳管道，消弭資源弱勢所造成的競爭不平等、以促進民主正向發展。

Research of Mathenjwa shows that if elections are contested fairly, citizens are more inclined to replace an unpopular government through elections rather than by violence. Since the martial law period, the high election deposit in Taiwan has seriously hindered the resource-disadvantaged candidates from conducting fair political campaigns through elections. Election deposit systems, which reinforce the dominance of incumbents, and the impedance of candidacy also causes slow replacement rate of elected officials. This, forces voters to often choose between the candidates of the two major parties.

Election deposit has become one of the necessary conditions for candidates to register for election according to law. This makes would-be candidates to pledge large sums of money to the election commissions when they register to run. Therefore, the citizens' right of participation has been seriously affected by the system.

This thesis studies from three aspects: the guarantee of political rights from the constitutional perspective, the cost effectiveness from the economic perspective and the selection of talents from the political perspective. Through two research methods of data analysis and in-depth interview, this paper makes an in-depth discussion on three core aspects, such as the election deposit system itself, the specific amounts of the deposit and the threshold for refund.

This study found that the number of candidates has negligible effect on the cost of election organisation. Instead, the key factors affecting election organisation cost are linked with the populations of constituencies and the types of election held. The authorities have always restricted the number of candidates on the grounds of saving public funds. However, it is unclear what the exact amount of administrative resources and important public interests to be protected. It is also clear that the election deposit is not proportional. Moreover, there is no academically basis for determining the amount of deposit, which is determined by the meeting of Election Commissioners. It is not stated which indicators are used to strike a balance between deterring potentially insincere candidates from applying for registration and maintaining the people's participation in political power. The deposit however, which uses financial ability as the only screening threshold for candidate registration, has no alternative and lacks supervision and relief mechanisms. It is not the only and least invasive means of restraining the number of candidates, and it cannot pass the inspection of constitutionality.

The conclusion of this study shows that the more democratic countries have lower restrictions on being a candidate, and the countries with existing election deposit systems are mostly former British colonies or countries who were under authoritarian regime. According to the results of the democracy index, most of the top countries have no deposit system, while Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, which are the favorite examples by the authorities with higher deposit amounts than Taiwan, are far behind Taiwan in the ranking of democracy index and the low ratio of female participation in politics.

In order to enable every citizen to exercise the right to vote and stand for election, and to ensure that all candidates have the same chance of being elected, the authorities should reduce the election threshold by abolishing the deposit system or substantially reducing the amount of deposit and the threshold for refund, and increasing the forms of election other than money, such as joint signatures.

Even under the current election deposit system, the authorities should specify the criteria for testing equity and establish a hearing system for determining the amount of election deposit. The confiscated deposits should be used to set up a public election fund, provide deposit loans for vulnerable candidates and optimize the election system. The government should also strictly restrict private advertisements of candidates, and convert the budget of the subsidy for campaign funds into public publicity channels such as public billboards and public video and audio advertisements. Only in this way can we eliminate the competition inequality caused by resource weakness and promote the positive development of democracy.