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標題: | 我們需要兩層次知識論嗎?——Sosa的德性知識論再探討 Do We Need a Bi-level Theory of Knowledge?—Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology Revisited |
作者: | Yu-Tang Wu 吳予瑭 |
指導教授: | 鄧敦民(Duen-Min Deng) |
關鍵字: | Sosa,德性知識論,兩層次知識論,動物知識,省思知識,AAA結構,觀點論, Sosa,virtue epistemology,bi-level epistemology,animal knowledge,reflective knowledge,AAA structure,perspectivism, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 在本論文中,我對於Ernest Sosa的兩層次知識理論做出批判,指出Sosa的建構並沒有成功達到他心目中帶有內在論色彩的知識圖像。 Sosa的德性知識論——兩層次知識論,是當代知識論上極具開創性的嶄新理論,在知識論的各項議題上都帶來非常大的影響與貢獻;尤其在懷疑論的討論上,提供了令人怦然、眼睛為之一亮的回答。於是首兩章我以懷疑論作為開端,尤其聚焦在Sosa對於「外在世界懷疑論」與「循環問題」的解法。在端視Sosa的回答的過程中,Sosa帶有內在論色彩的兩層次知識輪廓也會逐步呈現,然而同時Sosa所做建構的缺陷也會隨之浮現。 在第三章,我旨於提出一套對於Sosa的詮釋。我認為Sosa歷來對於他的兩層次知識理論的不盡相同的描述,可以歸納成兩套不同的刻畫方式:「觀點論」的刻畫方式,以及「AAA結構」的刻畫方式。其中前者所構築出的,是Sosa心目中的知識論圖像,在這個圖像中,Sosa描繪了他對於知識的期望,包含達到融貫與理解、知道來源的可靠性,以及擁有內在論式的資源以回應懷疑論的挑戰;而後者則可以視為Sosa對於他心目中的知識論圖像所做的明確建構,在這個建構中,Sosa定義了「適切」的概念,再從這個概念來建構出兩層次的知識,而如此建構的目的便是要達到他在觀點論中所描繪的期望。 再接下來的兩章,我對於Sosa的兩層次理論做出更進一步的批判。我先是探討Kornblith對於Sosa所提出的兩個攻擊,並從中擷取出關於內外在論議題的靈感,發展出我自己對於Sosa的一套批評。而我的批評會呼應到我在首章所預告的:我們之所以會認為懷疑論是個挑戰,是因為光是在實際的層面上指出「我們實際上沒有在作夢、實際上也沒有惡魔在欺騙我們,因此我們的確擁有知識」是不夠的,實際上我們當然有可能是醒著的、也有可能是在作夢,這些狀況當然都是有可能發聲的,顯然實際上如何並不是知識論上所關注的,我們所追求的是要站在更高層次「去說我擁有知識」,是要認知到自己處在對的環境、認知到自己的能力可靠。然而,雖然Sosa為了避免直接用「實際上條件適當」作為回答方式,提出了兩層次知識理論以描述我們如何得知條件適當,可是根據他的刻畫結果,決定我們是否擁有(省思)知識的,卻還是「實際上」條件是否適當——這只不過是把原先的問題往後退一步而已,同樣的問題依然存在。 最後一章,我對Sosa兩層次理論的建構進行再思,探討可能的修正方向。首先我從對於Sosa的SSS能力理論的分析發現到,若是將二階能力與二階條件作修正,強調認知主體是要在「出問題時會有徵兆」的條件下行使「對於徵兆有所反應」的能力,似乎可以一定程度地緩解我所提出的批評,原因是這麼一來就得以不再淪為由二階環境的實況來「保證」我們可以預設一階環境適當,而是可以讓我們「透過徵兆」去對環境有所認知。於是接著,我便運用此修正,對於二階能力做出更詳盡的刻畫,以說明我們是如何行使二階能力來對於能力可靠、狀態適當、情境適當等有所認知,而如此一來便能如Sosa在觀點論所述的:達到某種知性觀點,得到省思知識。然而我認為,這份修正依然沒有真正解決Sosa的刻畫所遇到的問題,除了有懷疑論劇本尚待解決之外,還會面臨無限後退難題:雖然我所提出的批評在表面上獲得緩解,但其實在新的層次上又會再度出現類似的問題。我的結論是:Sosa的建構並沒有成功達成他所追求的觀點論圖像;而末尾我也提供了下一步的可能發展方向:或許建構之所以會出問題,是因為錯誤地將第一層次與第二層次之間刻畫成線性的;而如果將觀點論中所勾勒出的融貫的網狀結構作為藍圖,或許可以得到回應無限後退難題的理論資源。 In this thesis, I challenge Ernest Sosa’s bi-level theory of knowledge by arguing that he does not successfully incorporate the insight of internalist epistemologies into virtue reliabilism. In chapter one and two, I introduce Sosa’s theory by discussing two forms of skepticism, dream skepticism and the problem of criterion. Sosa distinguishes two sorts of knowledge: the animal versus the reflective. Animal knowledge only requires that the believer gets truth through competence rather than just luck. Reflective knowledge goes beyond that by requiring that the believer understands that their competence is reliable and the ambient situation is appropriate through meta-competence. After outlining Sosa’s theory and his responses to skepticism, I point out some problems with his theory, and will elaborate them in detail in chapters four and five. In chapter three, I find that in his writings over several decades, Sosa has employed different ways to characterize the bi-level theory of knowledge. I then argue that there are at least two ways of characterization: “perspectivism” and “AAA structure”. The former can be viewed as the picture he pursues in epistemology, which includes gaining coherence and understanding, being aware of the reliability of our competences and having resources to respond to the skeptical threats. The latter is the construction of the theory and the means to achieve the goals. More specifically, he defines two sorts of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, in terms of the notion of aptness, so as to attain his perspectivism. In chapters four and five, I examine Hilary Kornblith’s criticisms, and argue that he misunderstands Sosa’s theory thereby. In addition, I provide my criticism of Sosa’s theory. Sosa grants that the reason why we think skepticism would pose threats is that if we only appeal to our “in fact” not being in a dream, our “in fact” not being deceived by an evil demon, our “in fact” not being BIVs etc. to justify our “in fact” having knowledge, then the reply is superficial. What we want to explore is not what actually happens but to say we have knowledge at a higher level. Sosa prima facie avoids this problem by appealing to the bi-level theory of knowledge; however, according to his construction, whether we have reflective knowledge or not also appeals to the idea that we are “in fact” in the appropriate second-order condition. Therefore, Sosa’s theory only postpones the problem rather than solving the problem. In the last chapter, I revisit Sosa’s theory and try to find a way out for him. To start, I modify the account of second-order competence and second-order conditions. From Sosa’s SSS competence theory, on the one hand, I found that we should underline that second-order competence is constituted by responsiveness to warning signs such as the missing of the first-order skill/shape/situation. On the other hand, we should emphasize that the second-order conditions are that the present or absence of such first-order skill/shape/situation is not hidden. If these are the cases, then Sosa’s theory dodges my criticism. This is because we acquire understanding through the warning signs. Also, our knowledge of first-order conditions is no longer determined by the fact of second-order conditions. However, the modification does not succeed on the grounds that it is subject to skeptical scenarios, and the regress problem. Therefore, I conclude that Sosa’s construction of bi-level epistemology does not succeed. Nevertheless, I think that Sosa’s theory is not sentenced to death, so I provide a possible approach to develop his construction. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8247 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202003044 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 |
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