請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳暐(Wei Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yu-Pei Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳玉配 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-25T07:29:56Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-02-01 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2022-02-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2022-01-22 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/82374 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 公投機制中的門檻制度會使選民投票率下降。為了解決公投投票率低的問題，有些國家會合併舉行公投與其他選舉來提升投票率，不過關於此作法能否提升投票率的證據仍相當稀少。過去的研究皆為自然實驗或準實驗，不是隨機對照試驗，也無法探討其他影響投票率的因素與合併投票的交互作用。本研究以實驗室實驗的方式，探討公投綁大選是否會提高投票率，並同時討論門檻的存在、政治立場相同的人數多寡對於投票率的影響，並以遊戲化語言進行實驗說明，使用 BDM (Becker–DeGroot–Marschak) 法為核心方式蒐集受試者的願付價格，以多元線性迴歸模型分析投票意願。實驗結果顯示，公投綁大選能有效提升選民投票率，且至少能增加公投或大選其中一場的投票率，不過，公投綁大選也降低了社會福利程度，使多數方選民的獲勝率降低；結果同時也顯示參加門檻確實會降低選民投票率、相對多數方選民的投票意願較少數方更高，但門檻只會降低相對少數方選民的投票意願，對相對多數方選民並無影響。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2022-11-25T07:29:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1901202216495200.pdf: 1642622 bytes, checksum: 5460310e76a6aea6114188c311eff994 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝i 摘要ii Abstract iii 目錄iv 圖目錄vi 表目錄vii 第一章緒論1 第二章研究方法5 2.1 實驗設計. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2 實驗過程. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 第三章假說11 3.1 參加門檻的存在與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2 政治傾向相同的選民人數多寡. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.3 兩場選舉同時舉辦與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 第四章實驗結果14 4.1 參加門檻的存在與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2 政治傾向相同的選民人數多寡. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3 公投綁大選與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3.1 同時提升大選與公投的投票率. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3.2 至少促進公投或大選其中一場選舉. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3.3 單獨增加公投（大選） . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.4 個別受試者分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.5 社會福利分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 第五章結論與建議26 參考文獻28 附錄A — 設計參數33 A.1 分組配置. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 附錄B — 實驗說明、小測驗題目以及試後問卷35 B.1 實驗說明– 以下範例為控制組. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B.2 實驗小測驗題目– 以下範例為綁大選組. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 B.3 試後問卷. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 遊戲化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投票率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 參加門檻 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公投綁大選 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Combining general election and electoral referendum | en |
| dc.subject | gamification | en |
| dc.subject | participation quorum | en |
| dc.subject | voting rate | en |
| dc.title | 公投綁大選會提高投票率嗎？一個遊戲化的實驗研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Does combining general election and electoral referendum increase the voter turnout? A gamified experimental study | en |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 110-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 何率慈(Shiou-Hwei Yeh),陳儀(Yuan-Yu Lin),沈智新(Bor-Rung Ou),(Yu-Hsiang Yu),(Shuen-Ei Chen),(Shuen-Ei Chen),(Shuen-Ei Chen) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公投綁大選,投票率,參加門檻,遊戲化, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Combining general election and electoral referendum,voting rate,participation quorum,gamification, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 52 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202200105 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2022-01-22 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 生物資源暨農學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 農業經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2024-02-01 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 農業經濟學系 | |
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