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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林姿婷(Tzu-Ting Lin) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Jui-Yu Li | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 李瑞郁 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-24T09:25:42Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-11-24T09:25:42Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2021-07-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2021-06-24 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81685 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 美國自2007年爆發次貸危機以來，帶來的衝擊由本土擴散至國外，接連造成全球金融市場爆發金融危機，也連帶衝擊許多金融產業，諸如銀行、保險、證券業等皆深受其害。本研究旨在探討金融危機的衝擊下，美國保險監理制度中的保險監理官推選方式，是否會影響其對保險公司採取的監理活動，假定在兩種推選方式下所實施的監理干預相差無幾，則可推斷政治因素不影響保險監理官對監理干預的實施，但若有差異，則可推斷保險監理官可能因為連任等考量，而偏好不實行監理干預，使得保險公司受金融危機影響，可能須面臨更大的風險。使用difference-in-difference研究方法和離散型風險模式(discrete-time hazard model)來進行假說檢驗，樣本來自美國保險監理官協會的資料庫中產險業保險公司，變數包括受監理干預與否、交互作用項及公司、州、監理層級之控制變數。結果卻發現金融危機對於監理干預的影響為不顯著，而公眾選舉產生的監理官與州政府任命的監理官在沒有金融危機時是有差異的，但在金融危機時是無差異的，可能隱含在面對系統性風險時，監理官的選任機制較不會影響監理干預。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2022-11-24T09:25:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1806202102560900.pdf: 1388370 bytes, checksum: 3394826c7831173fd194d3800b69c8be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書......................................................................................................i 中文摘要........................................................................................................................ii 英文摘要.......................................................................................................................iii 目錄..................................................................................................................................v 表目錄............................................................................................................................vi 第一章 緒論...............................................................................................................1 第一節 研究背景與動機...........................................................................1 第二節 研究目的..........................................................................................2 第二章 文獻探討.....................................................................................................4 第一節 金融危機對保險業的影響........................................................4 第二節 政府機構與監理活動之關係...................................................5 第三節 保險業退場機制...........................................................................7 第四節 監理官選任機制...........................................................................9 第三章 研究方法...................................................................................................11 第一節 研究假設.......................................................................................11 第二節 資料搜集.......................................................................................12 第四章 敘述統計與實證結果...........................................................................19 第一節 敘述統計.......................................................................................19 第二節 實證結果與分析........................................................................20 第五章 結論與未來研究方向...........................................................................25 參考文獻.....................................................................................................................26 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 監理干預 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 監理官選任機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 金融危機 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Financial Crisis | en |
| dc.subject | regulatory intervention | en |
| dc.subject | regulatory commissioners’ selection methods | en |
| dc.title | 2007年金融危機下美國監理官選任機制對產險業監理活動之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The impact of regulatory commissioners’ selection methods on property-casualty insurance industry regulatory intervention during 2007 Financial Crisis | en |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 109-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蔡英哲(Hsin-Tsai Liu),詹芳書(Chih-Yang Tseng) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 金融危機,監理干預,監理官選任機制, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Financial Crisis,regulatory intervention,regulatory commissioners’ selection methods, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 29 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202101039 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2021-06-24 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| U0001-1806202102560900.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.36 MB | Adobe PDF |
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