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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81132完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林宗男(Tsung-Nan Lin) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bing-Jyue Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳秉玨 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-24T03:32:13Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-08-23 | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-11-24T03:32:13Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2021-08-23 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2021-08-19 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81132 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 由於區塊鏈能讓參與者在去中心的環境中達成對資料的共識，它在許多領域中扮演著重要的角色。在類比特幣協議中，所有的礦工都必須去競爭、檢查和確認每一個區塊。這樣子的設計隱含了一個思想：「所有的交易都必須用最高安全等級的規格來保護」。這個思想導致了今日區塊鏈的每秒交易吞吐量受限在一個非常低的常數值。在真實世界的應用中，不同交易的安全需求經常是相異的；根據這個想法，我們提出了一個每秒交易吞吐量能夠擴展的區塊鏈。該方法打破了現有區塊鏈在區塊安全上的限制，從而能夠更有效率地分配系統資源來確認各種具不同安全需求的交易。在我們的分析中，此區塊鏈能夠繼承類比特幣協議的「最終一致性」，這使得本系統的使用者既能享受低安全要求所帶來的低手續費，又不必擔心已確認的交易受到駭客的攻擊（即雙花攻擊）。在這之上，我們也實作了開源的模擬器，根據我們的模擬結果，能見我們的系統交易吞吐量可以達到現有系統的一百倍之上；同時，相比於現有系統，在此區塊鏈中等待過久仍未確認的交易也大幅減少了七成以上。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2022-11-24T03:32:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-0908202123032200.pdf: 2738878 bytes, checksum: 700a376e175860bb6c221b738909756d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i 致謝 iii Acknowledgments v 中文摘要 vii Abstract ix 1 Introduction 1 1.1Bitcoin-like blockchains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1.2The proposed architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 1.3The structure of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 2 Blockchain and its Application 5 2.1Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2.1.1Data Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2.1.2Network Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2.1.3Consensus Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 2.1.4Incentive Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 2.2Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2.2.1Cryptocurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2.2.2DApp: Decentralized Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 3 Attacks on Blockchain 17 3.1Attacks on transaction verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 3.1.1Race attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 3.1.2Finney attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 3.1.3Vector76 attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3.1.4Blockchain reorganization attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3.1.5Majority attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3.1.6Double-spending attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3.2Attacks on blockchain network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3.2.1Eclipse attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3.2.2Sybil attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 3.2.3Routing attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 3.3Attacks on user wallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3.3.1Attacks on hot wallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3.3.2Attacks on cold wallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3.4Attacks on smart contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3.4.1Re-entrancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 3.4.2Integer overflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 3.5Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 4 To Prevent Double Spending: Understanding Proof-of-Work Consensus Al-gorithm 25 4.1Proof-of-Work algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 4.1.1The inequality to be satisfied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 4.1.2Mining: to update a blockchain ledger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 4.1.3The mining model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 4.2Revisit double-spending attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 4.2.1The probability of a successful double-spending attack . . . . . .29 4.2.2Eventual consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4.3Problem: limited throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 5 Related Works: Toward a High-throughput Blockchain 33 5.1Sharding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 5.2High-forking blockchains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 5.2.1GHOST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 5.2.2SPECTRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 5.2.3PHANTOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 5.3Adaptive security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 5.4Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 6 Proposed architecture: B++39 6.1Core Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 6.1.1Security Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 6.1.2Finite State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 6.2Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 6.2.1Data Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 6.2.2Network Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 6.2.3Consensus Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 6.2.4Incentive Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 7 Results 49 7.1Theoretical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 7.1.1Average Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 7.1.2Eventual Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 7.2Blockchain Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 7.3Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 7.3.1System Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 7.3.2Distribution of Block Interval Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 7.3.3Number of Timeout TXs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 8 Discussion 59 8.1Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 8.2Future works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 8.2.1Make a deal when a TX is secure enough . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 8.2.2Adjust the minimal security leveldmin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 8.2.3Use other consensus algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 8.2.4Stabilize system throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 9 Conclusion 65 Bibliography 69 Appendices 75 A.1 Proof for Proposition 1: Constant Interval in B++ . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 A.2 Proof for Proposition 2: Eventual Consistency in B++ . . . . . . . . . . .78 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 最終一致性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 區塊鏈 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 可擴展的系統交易量 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 可調整的安全性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 工作量證明 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Scalable throughput | en |
| dc.subject | Adaptive security | en |
| dc.subject | Blockchain | en |
| dc.subject | Eventual consistency | en |
| dc.subject | Proof-of-Work | en |
| dc.title | 具動態安全性及每秒高交易量的工作量證明區塊鏈 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A High-Throughput Proof-of-Work based Blockchain with Adaptive Security | en |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 109-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 鄧惟中(Hsin-Tsai Liu),陳俊良(Chih-Yang Tseng),蔡子傑 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 區塊鏈,可擴展的系統交易量,可調整的安全性,工作量證明,最終一致性, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Blockchain,Scalable throughput,Adaptive security,Proof-of-Work,Eventual consistency, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 79 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202102231 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2021-08-19 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 電機資訊學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 電信工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 電信工程學研究所 | |
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