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標題: | 論機構投資者之公司治理定位——以被動型投資管理人與投資公司之治理架構為重心 The Corporate Governance Role of Institutional Investors: Focusing on the Stewardship Framework for Passive Asset Managers and Investment Companies |
作者: | Wei-Cheng Lin 林暐程 |
指導教授: | 楊岳平 |
關鍵字: | 機構投資者,公司治理,啟發式股東價值,股東行動主義,短期主義,盡職治理,受託人責任, Institutional Investor,Corporate Governance,Enlightened Shareholder Value,Shareholder Activism,Short-Termism,Stewardship,Fiduciary Duty, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文以機構投資者為研究對象,欲探討在國際與我國資本市場之投資者逐漸法人化之趨勢下,機構投資者能在公司治理中扮演何種角色,並以此結論為基礎,進一步探究機構投資者在實踐該治理定位時所可能面臨之障礙與隱憂,以及提出可能之修法建議與政策方向。 於第二章,本文藉由回顧公司治理發展之進程,說明機構投資者被賦予之政策期待,指出包含我國在內,世界各國逐漸發展出以機構投資者為重心之治理變革,並在此背景下將本文之問題意識聚焦於機構投資者之治理定位,以及其參與治理之障礙與應對上。在說明機構投資者之概念後,本文指出目前機構投資者在我國之市場占比有逐漸攀升之態勢,其中又以證券投資信託基金與一般投資公司為主要類型。 於第三章,吾人試圖透過重新審視公司治理之論辯以掌握機構投資者之治理定位,本文指出,公司治理基本上嘗試回答兩個問題,即公司應為了誰的利益而管理,以及公司應由何人以如何之方式進行管理。圍繞在這兩個問題下,本文進一步探討了股東優先原則與利害關係人理論之內涵與論據,在說明其各自之優缺點後,提出以啟發式股東價值搭配法規補充之折衷方案,並認為仍應將公司控制權之中心往股東偏移。在此基礎下,本文認為,機構投資者能成為該折衷方案之實踐者,亦即機構投資者有能力與誘因本於自身之長期價值監督經營階層,以促使其在決策過程中考量利害關係人之權益,故應以此作為機構投資者之公司治理角色。 第四章中,以上開治理定位為根基,本文分析了在鼓勵機構投資者參與上可能面臨之困難,這主要表現在被動性與短期主義之問題上。就被動性問題而言,本章首先說明被動性之成因可能與參與成本、持股多元化與搭便車等因素相關,並藉由實證數據之調查,指出我國機構投資人確實普遍在參與治理上呈現消極之態度,而這可能與我國主動型投資管理人較不發達有關,但即使如此,機構投資者之私下對話,以及與行動主義者之互動均值得持續關注。而就短期主義問題部分,在說明其成因可能包含經營者與投資者之面向後,本文將重點聚焦於機構投資者之短期疑慮,並指出避險基金、共同基金與投資公司等機構均具有潛在之短期風險。 於第五章,本文針對被動型投資管理人之治理架構進行探討,在介紹了我國現行之機構投資人盡職治理守則後,本章指出其施行成效不如預期之原因可能在於受託人責任之內涵不明、部分原則過於空泛、欠缺執行力與未著重於降低參與成本等缺失。而在比較了歐盟、美國與英國之相關規範後,本文提出可能之政策方向與守則之修正建議,包含可訂定守則應揭露之具體內容、指定審查機關、建立評鑑制度與令被投資公司主動揭露長期資訊等。 於第六章,本文以一般投資公司為對象,在說明其政策方向應側重於如何防範短期風險與保護利害關係人後,本章首先探討了以盡職治理守則與公司負責人責任進行規範之可能性,並指出前者由於責任基礎與聲譽誘因之不足,可能難以使投資公司自願遵循;後者則在我國對實質董事嚴格之定義,以及社會責任之內涵不明下,能發揮之治理效果有限。因此,本文一方面提出了以投資公司為主體之盡職治理架構建議,要求具一定規模之投資公司說明其有適當之機制考量對目標公司長期價值之影響;另一方面,本文透過對公司負責人範圍與社會責任內涵之解釋,課予具實質影響力之投資公司有保障利害關係人核心利益之義務。 經過以上之分析,本文期待能先在理論與實證層面探究機構投資者能發揮之治理功能,並在制度層面為我國之相關規範提供可能之修正與發展方向,以建立完善之機構投資者盡職治理法制。 This thesis focuses on institutional investors and attempts to explore the role of institutional investors in corporate governance under the trend investor institutionalization in international and Taiwan’s capital markets. It further explores the obstacles and hidden concerns faced with by institutions investors when playing this governance role and proposes possible legislative amendments and policy directions. In this thesis, Chapter Ⅱ reviews the development process of corporate governance, explains the policy expectations given to institutional investors, and points out that many countries, including Taiwan, have gradually developed their corporate governance reforms with a focus on institutional investors. Due to this phenomenon, this thesis focuses on the role of institutional investors when participating in governance as well as the obstacles they face and their responses. After explaining the concept of institutional investors, this thesis points out that the current market share of institutional investors in Taiwan's market is gradually rising, among which securities investment trust funds and investment companies are the main types. Chapter Ⅲ attempts to clarify the role of institutional investors in corporate governance by re-examining related corporate governance debates. Corporate governance basically tries to answer two questions, namely, for whom the company should be managed and how the company should be managed. Based on these two issues, this thesis further explores the content and grounds of the shareholder primacy theory and the stakeholder theory. After explaining their respective advantages and weaknesses, this thesis proposes a compromise solution which is supplemented by the enlightened shareholder value with regulations. The center of corporate control should also be shifted to shareholders. On this basis, this thesis argues that institutional investors can be implement this compromise solution because they have the ability and incentives to monitor the management based on their long-term values and they would thus consider the rights and interests of stakeholders in the decision-making. Consequently, this should be the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Chapter Ⅳ analyzes the difficulties in encouraging the participation of institutional investors, which mainly include the issues of passiveness and short-termism. In respect of passiveness, this thesis first explains that it might result from factors such as participation costs, ownership diversification, and free-riding. This thesis then points out that, after investigating empirical data, it finds that institutional investors in Taiwan seldom participate in corporate governance. This may result from the lack of active investment managers in Taiwan. Even so, the private engagement of institutional investors and the interaction between institutional investors and active shareholders still deserve continued attention. In respect of short-termism, after explaining that it may result from the identity of operators and investors, this thesis focuses on the short-termism of institutional investors and argues that institutional investors such as hedge funds, mutual funds, and investment companies are at potential risks of short-termism. Chapter Ⅴ discusses the governance structure of passive investors. After introducing Taiwan’s Institutional Investors Stewardship Code, this chapter argues that this Code performs poorly because of the misunderstanding of fiduciary duty, too vague or uncertain principles, the lack of execution mechanism, and the failure to reduce participation costs. After comparing similar regulations in the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, this thesis proposes feasible policy directions and amendments to the Code, including: formulating specific contents that should be disclosed, designating examination institutions, developing an evaluation system, and requesting the investee companies to disclose long-term information, etc. Chapter Ⅵ focuses on investment companies. After explaining that the policy direction should focus on how to prevent risks of short-termism and protect stakeholders, this chapter further explores the possibility of regulating investment companies via Stewardship Code and the Fiduciary Duty. However, the former may have difficulties in mandating investment companies to comply voluntarily due to the lack of liability basis and reputational incentives; the latter has limited governance effects under the strict definition of de facto directors and the uncertainty of corporate social responsibility in Taiwan. Therefore, this thesis proposes a possible stewardship structure for investment companies, which requires investment companies of a certain size to prove that they have appropriate mechanisms to evaluate their impacts on the long-term value of the investee company. Moreover, by interpreting the scope of “company responsible persons” and the concept of “social responsibility”, this thesis argues that investment companies with substantial influence shall have the duty to protect the core interests of stakeholders. Based on the above analysis, this thesis explores the governance functions that institutional investors can serve at theoretical and empirical levels and proposes possible amendments and development directions for Taiwan's relevant norms. Hopefully, it may establish a comprehensive stewardship rule for institutional investors. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8107 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201903232 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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