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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 電機資訊學院
  3. 電子工程學研究所
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/78842
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor劉宗德zh_TW
dc.contributor.author賴又誠zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorYou-Cheng Laien
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-11T15:23:23Z-
dc.date.available2024-01-31-
dc.date.copyright2019-01-31-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.date.submitted2002-01-01-
dc.identifier.citation[1] Brief Introduction of Deep earning.http://speech.ee.ntu.edu.tw/~tlkagk/courses/ML_2016/Lecture/DL%20(v2).pdf. Accessed: 2018-12-04.
[2] Classification: Logistic Regression. http://speech.ee.ntu.edu.tw/~tlkagk/courses/ML_2016/Lecture/Logistic%20Regression%20(v3).pdf. Accessed:2018-12-04.
[3] Ensemble. http://speech.ee.ntu.edu.tw/~tlkagk/courses/ML_2016/Lecture/Ensemble%20(v6).pdf. Accessed: 2018-12-04.
[4] Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF). http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~kaiyuan/images/Drawing2.jpg. Accessed: 2018-12-04.
[5] Support Vector Machine. https://medium.com/@yehjames/%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90-%E6%A9%9F%E5%99%A8%E5%AD%B8%E7%BF%92-%E7%AC%AC3-4%E8%AC%9B-%E6%94%AF%E6%8F%B4%E5%90%91%E9%87%8F%E6%A9%9F-support-vector-machine-%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9-9c6c6925856b. Accessed: 2018-12-04.
[6] V. G. A. Maiti and P. Schaumont. A systematic method to evaluate and compare the performance of Physical Unclonable Functions. pages 245–267, 2013.
[7] M. S. Alkatheiri and Y. Zhuang. Towards fast and accurate machine learning attacks of feed-forward arbiter PUFs. In 2017 IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing, pages 181–187, Aug 2017.
[8] A. O. Aseeri, Y. Zhuang, and M. S. Alkatheiri. A Machine Learning-Based Security Vulnerability Study on XOR PUFs for Resource-Constraint Internet of Things. In 45 2018 IEEE International Congress on Internet of Things (ICIOT), pages 49–56, July 2018.
[9] Q. Guo, J. Ye, Y. Gong, Y. Hu, and X. Li. Efficient Attack on Non-linear Current Mirror PUF with Genetic Algorithm. In 2016 IEEE 25th Asian Test Symposium (ATS), pages 49–54, Nov 2016.
[10] S. Jeloka, K. Yang, M. Orshansky, D. Sylvester, and D. Blaauw. A sequence dependent challenge-response PUF using 28nm SRAM 6T bit cell. In 2017 Symposium on VLSI Circuits, pages C270–C271, June 2017.
[11] R. Kumar and W. Burleson. On design of a highly secure PUF based on non-linear current mirrors. In 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), pages 38–43, May 2014.
[12] J. W. Lee, D. Lim, B. Gassend, G. E. Suh, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas. A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and authentication applications. In 2004 Symposium on VLSI Circuits. Digest of Technical Papers (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37525), pages 176–179, June 2004.
[13] D. Lim. Extracting Secret Keys from Integrated Circuit. Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[14] M. Majzoobi, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak. Testing Techniques for Hardware Security. In 2008 IEEE International Test Conference, pages 1–10, Oct 2008.
[15] U. Rührmair, J. Sölter, F. Sehnke, X. Xu, A. Mahmoud, V. Stoyanova, G. Dror, J. Schmidhuber, W. Burleson, and S. Devadas. PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data. volume 8, pages 1876–1891, Nov 2013.
[16] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas. Physical Unclonable Functions for Device Authentication and Secret Key Generation. In 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, pages 9–14, June 2007.
[17] A. Vijayakumar and S. Kundu. A novel modeling attack resistant PUF design based on non-linear voltage transfer characteristics. In 2015 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), pages 653–658, March 2015. 46
[18] X. Xi, H. Zhuang, N. Sun, and M. Orshansky. Strong subthreshold current array PUF with 265challenge-response pairs resilient to machine learning attacks in 130nm CMOS. In 2017 Symposium on VLSI Circuits, pages C268–C269, June 2017.
[19] K. Yang, Q. Dong, D. Blaauw, and D. Sylvester. A physically unclonable function with BER<10−8 for robust chip authentication using oscillator collapse in 40nm CMOS. In 2015 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference - (ISSCC) Digest of Technical Papers, pages 1–3, Feb 2015.
[20] K. Yang, Q. Dong, D. Blaauw, and D. Sylvester. 8.3 A 553F2 2-transistor amplifierbased Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) with 1.67% native instability. In 2017 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC), pages 146–147, Feb 2017.
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/78842-
dc.description.abstract隨著物聯網的應用越來越廣泛,而物聯網中的安全性的需求也隨之提高,而物理不可被複製函數(physically unclonable function, PUF),非常適合拿來當物聯網的安全系統,因為每個晶粒(die)都具有其特有的隨機函數,可以使每一個裝置上都裝有物理不可被複製函數的晶片,並先於註冊時期先將認證的挑戰碼和其所對應之回應碼存於雲端伺服器,在認證時由雲端伺服器傳出多筆挑戰碼給所要認證之裝置,並等待回傳對應值,而裝置端需填入所有挑戰碼所對應之回應碼,而錯誤量要少於雲端伺服器所能接受之數量才算認證成功。

由於PUF分為兩類,一類為弱PUF,主要用於產生一組隨機亂數,用於加解密系統所要的亂數值,另外一類為強PUF,主要用於裝置端的身分驗證,論文會直接切入強PUF的部分,並介紹各種現有的強PUF,以及各個電路的優缺點,和目前機器學習攻擊強PUF的演算法,接著介紹用以區別強PUF好壞的重要參數。

最後著重在我們所提出的強PUF,除了在不同的電壓、溫度變化的情況,都足夠穩定度,也具備防機器學習攻擊的能力,甚至是目前面積最小的強PUF。我們使用TSMC 28nm製程來分析其電路行為,然後使用TSMC 28nm製程下線成晶片,未來會做成測試晶片並量測實際結果。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractWith the rise of the Internet of things, the demand for security in the Internet of things is also increasing. Physically unclonable function (PUF) is suitable to be used as a security system for the Internet of things because each die has its own specific random function. Save the challenge response pairs in the cloud server during the registration period. During authentication, the cloud server sends out several challenges to the device to be authenticated and waits for the corresponding value to be returned. The device needs to fill in the corresponding response to all challenges, and the number of errors should be less than the number accepted by the cloud server before the authentication is successful.

PUF is divided into two categories, one is weak PUF, which is mainly used to generate a set of random numbers; the other category is strong PUF, which is mainly used for device authentication. The paper will introduce various existing strong pufs, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each circuit. Introduce the current machine learning attack PUF algorithm.

Finally, we focus on the proposed strong PUF, which is stable enough in different voltage and temperature, and has the ability to prevent machine learning attacks. The proposed strong PUF has the smallest area at present. We use the TSMC 28nm technology to analyze its circuit behavior.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-07-11T15:23:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
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Previous issue date: 2019
en
dc.description.tableofcontents目錄
口試委員會審定書 iii
誌謝v
Acknowledgements vii
摘要ix
Abstract xi
1 緒論1
1.1 研究動機. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 研究貢獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 論文架構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 物理不可複製函數3
2.1 介紹物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 弱物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2.1 靜態隨機存取記憶體之物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2.2 基於兩顆電晶體放大器基礎之物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . 4
2.3 強物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1 仲裁者物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 物理不可複製函數的重要性質7
3.1 唯一性. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 穩定性. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3 均勻性. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4 防禦機器學習之能力. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4 機器學習攻擊11
4.1 概述. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 邏輯回歸. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3 支援向量機. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4 神經網路. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5 整體學習. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6 自適應增強. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 仲裁者物理不可複製函數模型化17
5.1 仲裁者物理不可複製函數之線性組合模型. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6 防機器學習攻擊之物理不可複製函數21
6.1 混淆挑戰位元. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1.1 安全雜湊函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1.2 前饋式物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2 混淆回應位元. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2.1 互斥或閘物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.3 非線性物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3.1 非線性電流鏡物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3.2 非線性電壓轉換特性物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3.3 使用序列依賴性之隨機存取記憶體物理不可複製函數. . . . 30
6.3.4 次臨界電流序列之強物理不可複製函數. . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7 所提出的物理不可複製函數35
7.1 基於兩顆電晶體放大器及次臨界電流序列之強物理不可複製函數. . 35
7.1.1 運作方式. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1.2 架構分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1.3 佈局圖. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1.4 佈局後模擬結果. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8 結論與未來改進的方向43
參考文獻45
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dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject硬體身分驗證zh_TW
dc.subject物理不可複製函數zh_TW
dc.subject物聯網zh_TW
dc.subject晶片識別zh_TW
dc.subject製程變異zh_TW
dc.subjecthardware authenticationen
dc.subjectchip identificationen
dc.subjectInternet of Thingsen
dc.subjectphysical unclonable functionen
dc.subjectprocess variationen
dc.title抗機器學習攻擊之高穩定物理不可被複製函數設計zh_TW
dc.titleHighly Stable Physical Unclonable Function Design with Resiliency to Machine Learning Attacksen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear107-1-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee汪炳穎;呂士濂zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee;;en
dc.subject.keyword晶片識別,硬體身分驗證,物聯網,物理不可複製函數,製程變異,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordchip identification,hardware authentication,Internet of Things,physical unclonable function,process variation,en
dc.relation.page47-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU201900093-
dc.rights.note未授權-
dc.date.accepted2019-01-30-
dc.contributor.author-college電機資訊學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept電子工程學研究所-
dc.date.embargo-lift2024-01-31-
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