再探企業政治連結的價值：企業危機中的政商關係

Abstract

企業的政治連結作為一種非市場策略(non-market strategy)，近年來受到學界與業界的廣泛關注。然而，以往研究多從靜態角度出發，將政治連結視為一經形成便可持續存在、存在便可發揮作用的非市場策略。然而，企業的政治連結即使存在也可能斷裂、持續存在也可能在關鍵時刻並不發揮作用。況且企業與政黨/政治人物的目標本就不一致，更加劇了政治連結的不穩定性。本研究爰從動態角度重新檢視政治連結這一概念。其次，以往研究主要從企業本體出發，視企業為政治連結的建立者和能否持續存在的決定者。然而，若政治連結對象拒絕與企業交換資源，甚至切斷與企業本體資源交換的通道，政治連結顯然無法發揮預期效益。故政治連結不僅要關注企業本體，本研究更專注於政治連結對象之行為模式。更者，以往有關政治連結的橫斷面研究認為，政治連結是企業的資產，但當企業面對危機時，本研究質疑政治連結是否依然為企業的資產？ 本研究運用質性研究方法，在個案研究與批判論述分析的視角下，藉由觀察四家個案公司在危機情境中的政治連結，再探企業政治連結的價值。研究發現，企業發生危機後，政治連結對象出現「鼎力相助」、「默不作聲」、「切割關係」和「落井下石」等從積極到消極等不同行為模式。同一政治連結對象對危機企業的態度並非一成不變：危機爆發期，傾向積極協助危機企業解決危機；在危機延續期，傾向消極應對、甚至落井下石。政治連結對象之所以有不同行為，不僅與企業本體危機管理作為有關，而且與危機事件影響大小、輿論強度、政治連結的正式化程度，以及企業危機爆發時點有關。

A firm’s political ties, as a form of its non-market strategy, has drawn scholarly and practical attention in the recent decade. Most research on corporate political activity (CPA) demonstrates the values of political ties, but overlooks the dynamic nature of political ties which value to the focal company may change over time or across different contexts. Furthermore, previous studies view political ties mainly from the corporate perspective, ignoring the other side of political ties, the connected politicians or political parties, who may not always be a resource provider as expected. In light of the gap of the CPA literature, this thesis aims to inquire into the changing behavioral patterns of corporate political ties when the firm is subject to a crisis. Furthermore, the study is concerned with the dynamic nature of political ties which may turn from an asset to a liability. Using data from 172 newspaper reports upon four Taiwanese companies in crisis, the thesis revisits the value of political ties to the focal company. As a longitudinal study, the thesis firstly identifies the varying behavioral patterns of politicians in the focal ties, including defensiveness, keeping silence, cutting ties and stone-throwing. More specifically, at the beginning period of the corporate crisis, politicians tend to defend the focal company in the early stage of crisis, but choose to keep silent or even cut off the links with troubled companies in the crisis diffusion period. The worst case is that the connected politicians or parties change side and attack the troubled company. The varying behavioral patterns of politicians is explainable not only by the ways of corporate crisis management but also by the impact of the crisis, the intensity of public opinion, formalization of political ties, and the timing of the crisis.