代議政治與參與式預算之競合─以臺北市參與式預算為例

Abstract

本文的問題意識為探討臺北參與式預算（簡稱PB）與代議政治的競合情形，以及臺北PB在該競合中之發展？在回顧PB制度相關理論及國內外PB主要案例後，嘗試從府會關係、行政與立法權力相對的強弱及議會審查PB的過程予以分析。本文部分補充了現有文獻鮮少針對單一城市實施PB過程中代議政治對PB制度設計及發展的影響。本文係以屬分立政府，且於2015採取行政機關主導由民眾提案編入預算送議會審議的PB模式，而導致行政與立法競逐程度在六都中最強的臺北市為例進行的個案研究。 本文發現競逐面主要為PB易淪為政治工具及弱化代議的影響力，因而對代議帶來新的壓力與考驗。合作面主要為政治甄補、訓練及蒐集民意。本文最後並發現，市府主導推動PB體現了政治承諾的目標導向;然而，不論是議員個人，抑或配合黨團政策予以嚴厲監督使衝突超出市府預期。嗣在市府滾動修正機制以臻完善，以及強勢市長制與尊重民眾提案的態勢下，衝突已趨於緩和。茲因PB規模囿於行政部門的執行能量，以及市府已累積處理衝突的經驗，故爾後衝突應不會再超出市府預期。制度上，PB並沒有影響代議權力；政治運作上，PB有利市長爭取新的選民；政治權力上，行政與立法部門尚處於磨合階段，此為政治社會化的過程，當PB對代議政治的助益顯現時，終將合大於競。 最後本文提出建議以減緩衝突：1.適度法制化，2.法定預算納入公民參與精神，3.建立衡量競合程度的關鍵指標，4.持續修正機制，5.議會主動要求行政機關推動，6.紮根公民參與文化；然而，在代議政治下無法期待完全消弭競逐。就臺北經驗而言，以下可供借鑒：1.首長的決心及政治力量為首要關鍵，2.建立制度及官學合作學校在地陪伴是不可或缺的，3.行政資源的能量是否足夠。4.行政部門應正視競逐並妥處。

This thesis discussed the competition and cooperation between the participatory budget (PB) and representative politics in Taipei, and how Taipei has developed correspondingly. While reviewing the relevant theories and studying notable domestic and global PB systems, we analyzed Executive-Legislative Relations、the relative strength of Executive power and Legislative power, as well as the legislature review of PB. This research complements a knowledge gap in literature that has yet to explore the impact of representative politics on the design and development of PB in a single city. Taipei is a divided government. Since 2015, it has implemented the PB model that, under the direction of the adminstration, accepts private budget proposals to be reviewed by the City Council. The experience made the Taipei city to have the most competition and cooperation between the excutive and legislative power among six special municiplies and most suitable as a case study for this project. The study’s findings are as follows: First, the competition means that PB is often used as a political tool, which weakens the power of representative politics and creates new pressure and challenge. Secondly, cooperation means that there is a need to work together for political recruitment, training and solicitation of public opinions. Last but not the least, adminstrative-driven PB realizes its political commitments.However, councilors of different parties used strict standards in overseeing the implementation of the party policy and thus increased the bipartisan conflicts beyond the expectations of the city government. The conflict has graduated abated with a“rolling correction mechanism”launched by the city government, the perseverance of the mayor, and the emphasis on respecting the public opinions. Because (1) the extent of PB is limited by the administrative capacity of the executive branch, and (2) the city has accumulated experiences in dealing with relevant clashes, the city has a reasonable expectation for future conflicts. From the institutional perspective, PB has little effect on representative politics. From the perspective of political maneuver, PB can bring the mayor new voters. From the view of political power, the executive and legislative branches are still in the process of political socialization, that is, finding their ways to work together. When PB’s positive influence on representative politics emerges, the effect of cooperation will eventually be greater than that of competition. At the end of this study, we have several propositions to reduce the conflict: (1) Establish appropriate legalizations for PB. (2) Incorporate citizen participation in statutory budget process. (3) Establish key indicators to monitor the process of competition and cooperation. (4) Continue to monitor and revise the mechanism of PB as needed. (5) The council to voluntarily call on the executive branch to promote relevant issues. (6) Support a culture of citizen participation. But we cannot expect to completely eliminate the conflicts. Taipei’s experience can offer the following lessons: (1)The determination and political power of the mayor is critical. (2) We need to establish a mechanism for PB and a government-run education center is indispensable. (3) There needs to be sufficient administrative resources. (4) The executive branch need to properly acknowledge and handle the process of competition and compromise of PB.