權力轉移下崛起國對小國政策探因：前現代東亞案例跨時比較

Abstract

在美中權力轉移的時代關口，崛起國行為具有重要的理論與實務意義。本文的研究問題是：權力轉移下的崛起國會對不同小國施行何種政策，什麽因素决定它的政策？我們從既有文獻中提取了多項可能的影響因素與合理機制，將它們有機地置入理論框架並推導假說，繼而在前現代東亞歷史中選取匈奴vs.兩漢、突厥vs.隋唐、契丹vs.北宋三個權力轉移週期，考察期間崛起國和小國的不對稱關係（兩漢對待南越、西南夷、西羌、西域綠洲和烏孫，隋唐對待高句麗、吐谷渾、高昌和塔里木城邦，北宋對待高麗、西夏與交趾），使用質化案例分析的相符程序與受控比較方法，檢驗各項假說以及理論框架的整體效力。 三個跨時的歷史案例強烈證實大國權力對比的作用，各種最相似或最相異子案例組合支持小國權力與小國地緣位置的效力，而證僞了基於文化親和度的假說。這意味著，在權力轉移週期內，崛起國對小國的政策經由體系層次與單元層次兩重因素决定。在體系層次，大國權力對比决定崛起國的對霸權國的攻守傾向，從而産生崛起國對所有小國的政策基調。在此前提下，崛起國對不同小國的具體政策受該小國的權力和地緣位置影響。小國權力越強，崛起國對其政策越和緩；小國權力越弱，崛起國對其政策越強硬。若小國毗鄰崛起國而遠離霸權國，則崛起國對其政策更強硬；若小國位於戰略斷層線或毗鄰霸權國而遠離崛起國，則崛起國對其政策更和緩。 通過詳盡梳理六百餘年的歷史案例，嚴謹地操作社會科學研究方法，我們建立了一簡明而完整、基本符合現實主義又具有創新之處的中層理論。我們最重要的發現在於大國關係對大小國關係的支配作用，由此突破了傳統的大小國雙邊視角，既可彌補不對稱理論遺留的缺口，又能橋接大國互動理論與不對稱理論，從而開闢了一個富有價值的研究方向，有待後續更深入的探索。

In a world suffering from the incremental pressure caused by the transition of power between the United States and China, the behavior of the rising power is becoming a significant issue both in theory and in practice. This dissertation attempts to explain what policies the rising power implements towards different small countries and why it adopts them. We organically organize the factors stemming from the various perspectives into one framework, then test the hypotheses by analyzing the asymmetric interactions that happened during the power transition periods in Pre-modern East Asia, including Xiongnu vs. the Western and Eastern Hans, Turkic Khanates vs. Sui-Tang, and Khitan (Liao) vs. the Northern Song. The research method we used was the qualitative case study, precisely were the congruence procedure and controlled comparison. Our three trans-temporal cases strongly confirm the role of power balance between the hegemon and the rising power. The most different or most similar sub-cases support the efficacy of the small states’ power and their geo-locations. However, the hypothesis involving cultural affinity is denied. This outcome means that the strategic choices of the rising power towards lesser nations in the power transition depend on two levels of factors. On the system level, the power balance between the two giants determines the rising power’s strategic tendency when facing the hegemon, which then generates the keynote of its policies for treating the small countries. Under this premise, the specific policies towards different lesser nations are influenced by their power and geographic locations (on the unit level). The stronger the target country is, the more moderate the rising power treats it; the weaker the target country is, the tougher the rising power manages it. Additionally, if a small state is next to the rising power and far from the hegemon, the rising power will use harder policies, but if it is located on the strategic fault line or next to the hegemon and far from the rising power, the rising power is more likely to choose softer measures. Through an exhaustive inspection of historical cases spanning more than 600 years and a strict application of social science research methods, we have developed a concise and complete, largely realistic but quite innovative, middle-range theory. Our most important finding is the dominance of the great power relations over the asymmetric relations, which surpasses the traditional bilateral perspective of giant vs. dwarf, fills the gap left by existing Asymmetric Theory literature, bridges the great power theories and Asymmetric Theory, and thus inaugurates a valuable research agenda for further investigation.