對時間之宇宙成長理論的辯護

Abstract

在本論文中我為時間之宇宙成長理論辯護，這個理論宣稱只有過去以及現在的東西存在，而時間的流逝是倚靠新的時空切片加入到現在的宇宙中來表現。文獻上有很多攻擊時間之宇宙成長理論的論證，本論文聚焦處理時間旅行問題以及知識論的問題，這兩個攻擊有一個共同點在於他們都認為時間之宇宙成長理論在存有學的預設上是有缺陷的，所以不會是表徵世界最好的理論之一，而我將引入二維時間的概念幫助我回答以上兩個問題。 在第一章，我會用結合二維時間和時間之宇宙成長理論來說明在這樣的世界裡，時間如何流逝？時間為何流逝？時間在哪裡流逝？以及，時間留得多快。在第二章，我將回應在時間旅行的討論中攻擊時間之宇宙成長理論最嚴重的問題，像是葛雷的沒有出發地問題（1999）、斯拉特的未來照片問題（2005），以及瓦薩曼（2018）的不確定性問題。我宣稱如果將原本的時間之宇宙成長理論加上第二維的時間，所有的問題都會自動瓦解。但是，不是所有的哲學家都接受二維時間。瓦薩曼（2018）提出了A-model來解決時間旅行問題但卻不需要承認二維時間的存在，不過我不認為這個理論會在沒有二維時間的狀況下是成功的，因為沒有二維時間A-model就會產生矛盾。在第三章，我將處理來自知識論的問題，這個問題認為沒有人可以在A理論的世界觀中知道自己正存在於現在。但我認為如果我們合併卡麥隆（2015）的可靠論以及布洛德（1923）的生成概念，那麼我們就可以在A理論的世界觀中知道自己正存在於現在。在第一部分我會為卡麥隆回應來自米勒（2017, 2018）的攻擊，第二部分我會說明我的這個合併作法如何使得時間之宇宙成長理論免於知識論的攻擊，也就是說只要滿足我提出的「生成條件」，那麼信念形成機制就會是可靠的且信念也會是安全的。我的結論是：因為這些對時間之宇宙成長理論的攻擊都失效，所以時間之宇宙成長理論成功守住她在分析時間哲學領域中的地位。

This dissertation is a defense of the growing block view of time (GBT). The basic idea of GBT is that past and present entities exist, and the passage of time is in virtue of the addition of new slices. Moreover, ontologically speaking, the present moment in GBT holds a privileged status: the present is represented by the edge of reality, i.e., it is the latest slice of the block. GBT was ignored from the time it was first introduced into the philosophy of time by C.D. Broad (1923), until Michael Tooley (1997) finally brought it back to the battlefield. However, GBT still did not receive the treatment it deserves in the metaphysics of time. It encountered several objections, and since no one provided good responses to them, some philosophers began to refer to GBT as the most infamous theory of time. Within these objections, I think the epistemic problem and the problems from time travel are the most fatal to GBT, but that these can also be overcome. In my thesis, I aim to respond to these fatal objections and argue that GBT is one of the best theories for describing reality. In Chapter One, before I respond to these problems, I introduce the notion of hypertime and combine it with GBT to form a new version of GBT called hypergrowing block theory (HGBT). I posit that this new version of GBT overcomes all fatal objections. There are two motivations to accept hypertime: one is the passage of time, while the other concerns time travel. I illustrate how an HGBTer answers the problem of the passage of time in the second half of Chapter One. In Chapter Two, I explain how to time travel in the GBT (HGBT) view of the world. There are two versions of HGBT; I choose one of them to show how HGBT dismisses problems that arise from time travel. After these two chapters, I hope that philosophers will be convinced by my support of hypertime. In the last chapter, I tackle the epistemic problem from David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). I firstly argue that Ross Cameron’s theory of knowledge (2015) is successful by addressing the criticism from Kristie Miller (2017, 2018). Moreover, I add the A-Entrance principle to strengthen Cameron’s theory. This combination not only makes the belief-forming process reliable, but it also makes beliefs from the process safe. Consequently, GBT is no longer subject to the epistemic problem. In short, I successfully respond to fatal objections to GBT, so that GBT can preserve its rightful place on the stage of the philosophy of time.