網路著作權懲罰金研究—賽局方法

Abstract

本研究考慮著作權懲罰性賠償金賠償議題。線上影音平台的蓬勃發展，但盜版行為依然威脅這些平台的發展；而現今法律懲罰機制的設計大多參考其他國家的法律條文設計，或是立法者之主觀判斷。本研究以賽局理論為基礎，考慮著作權的懲罰性賠償金之最佳量值應如何訂定。透過史坦柏格賽局(Stackelberg game) ，以整體社會福利的角度，將政府視為先行者(Leader)、出版商與平台業者等廠商視為追隨者(Follower)，制定懲罰性賠償金的最佳方案，有效地嚇阻不肖業者，充分地保障出版商與合法平台業者的權益。本研究最後提出三種制定賠償金的模型，且政府可採用嚴格或寬容賠償金政策，在盜版高品質與廣告分潤比廣告成本低的情形下，賠償金採嚴格政策確實會增加正版市場，在其他情形無論採用何種社會福利懲罰性賠償金都會採用寬容政策。

This research investigates the issues of punitive damages stated in the copyright law. While over the top platforms prosper in recent years, piracy losses still threaten these services. The punitive damages are typically determined by the subjective judgment of legislators or designed on the basis of existing legal terms in the law in other countries. We take online copyright infringement for instance to concretize the mechanism of punitive damages. In this study, the mechanism to determine the punitive damages is designed to optimize the total social welfare with consideration of human behaviors. The specific objective is to analyze the punitive damages in the legal terms appeared in the law to maximize the total social welfare on the basis of the inverse Stackelberg game, where the government is the leader and firms like publishers and online video platforms are followers. At last we propose three decision models and compare their effects to provide the government with the decision suggestion in different situations. The government can adopt strict or tolerant policy. The former policy increases legal users when piracy quality is high and advertisement revenue is lower than its cost. The latter policy increases legal users in other situations no matter which decision model is accepted.