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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74723完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾宛如 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kuang-Jung Yin | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 尹廣容 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T09:06:31Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-01-08 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-01-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-01-02 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部份
(一) 書籍 王文宇（2016），公司法論，四版，臺北：元照。 方嘉麟、樓永堅、林進富審定（2011），企業併購個案研究（四），初版，臺北：元照。 曾宛如（2007），公司管理與資本市場法制專論（一），二版，臺北：元照。 曾宛如（2012），證券交易法原理，六版，臺北：元照。 黃朝琮（2019），公司法論文集Ⅱ：特殊交易型態與資訊揭露 ，二版，臺北：新學林。 劉連煜（2016），現代公司法，增訂十二版，臺北：新學林。 (二) 期刊 王文宇（2005），非合意併購的政策與法制—以強制收購與防禦措施為中心，月且法學雜誌，第 125 期，頁 155-175。 王文宇（2008），法律移植的契機與挑戰—以公司法的受託、注意與忠實義務為中心，月旦民商法雜誌，第19期，頁81-91。 林國彬（2007），董事忠誠義務與司法審查標準之研究—以美國德拉瓦州公司法為主要範圍，政大法學評論，第100期，頁135-214。 朱德芳（2016），效率、併購與公司治理以敵意併購法規範為核心，中原財經法學第 17 期，頁 195-259。 邵慶平（2008），董事受託義務內涵與類型的再思考—從監督義務與守法義務的比較研究出發，台北大學法學論叢，第66期，頁1-43。 張心悌（2004），從法律經濟分析觀點探討強制公開收購制度，輔仁法學第 28 期，頁47-97。 曾宛如（2002），董事忠實義務之內涵及適用疑義—評析新修正公司法第二十三條第一項，台灣本土法學雜誌，第 38 期，頁 51-66。 曾宛如（2010），股東會與公司治理，臺大法學論叢，第 39 卷第 3 期，頁109-166。 黃朝琮（2015），受託義務之強化審查標準，臺北大學法學論叢，第 96 期，頁 85-160。 蔡英欣（2010），日本商事案件審理之法庭組織與程序—以東京地方法院商事法庭為例，月旦法學雜誌，第 177 期，頁 48-67。 蔡瑞麟（2015），日月光聲請禁止矽品於特定日期召開臨時股東會之假處分合理嗎？，台灣法學雜誌，第 280 期，頁 21-25。 劉連煜（2007），董事責任與經營判斷法則，月旦民商法雜誌，第17期，頁178-196。 劉連煜（2007），未准延召開之股東會及章程變更效力—公司經營權爭奪的脫序，月旦法學教室，第61 期，頁 22-23。 劉連煜（2012），敵意併購下目標公司董事的受任人(受託)義務—以開發金控敵意併購金鼎證券為例，政大法學論叢，第 125 期，頁 1-53。 (三) 實務見解（判決、函釋） 經濟部 91年 4 月 23 日經商字第 09102066930 號函。 經濟部 97 年 6 月 16 日經商字第 09702324440 號函。 經濟部 100 年 3 月 24 日經商字第 10002406370 號函。 最高法院 42 年臺上字第 865 號判例。 最高法院 79 年台上 1203 號判決。 高雄地方法院 89 年度訴字第 3254 號判決。 臺北地方法院93年度重訴字第144號民事判決。 臺灣高雄地方法院 94 年度訴字第 3146 號民事判決。 臺北地方法院 96 年度全字第 13 號裁定。 臺北高等行政法院 96 年度停字第 46 號 臺灣高等法院 96 年度聲字第 138 號判決。 臺灣高等法院 96 年度重上字第 145 號民事判決。 臺灣高等法院 96 年度抗字第 475 號裁定。 最高法院 96 年度臺抗字第 476 號民事裁定。 最高法院 96 年度台抗字第 504 號裁定。 最高法院 96 年度台上字第 515 號判決。 最高行政法院 96 年度裁字第 01905 號。 臺灣高等法院 104 年度上易字第 1255 號民事判決。 (四) 網路資料及其他 公司法全盤修正修法委員會，第三部分、修法建議，http://www.scocar.org.tw/pdf/section3.pdf。 二、英文部份 (一) 書籍 BERLE, ADOLF A. & MEANS, GARDINER C., THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A. 1932). BRUCE, MARTHA, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF DIRECTORS (Bloomsbury Professional. 2012). CORKERY, JIM F., DIRECTORS’ POWERS AND DUTIES (Longman Cheshire Pty Ltd. 1987). DAVIES, PAUL L. &WORTHINGTON, SARAH, GOWER AND DAVIES: THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (Sweet & Maxwell. 2008). EASTERBROOK, FRANK H. & FISCHEL, DANIEL R., THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (Harvard University Press. 1991). GIRASA, ROY, LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (Palgrave Macmillan. 2013). GOLD ANDREW S. & SMITH, D. GORDON EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2018). GRIFFITH, SEAN, ERICKSON, JESSICA, WEBBER, DAVID H. & WINSHIP, VERITY EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2018). KUMAR, RAJESH, STRATEGIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CASEBOOK (Academic Press. 2016). PAKROO, PERI, THE SMALL BUSINESS START-UP KIT FOR CALIFORNIA (NOLO. 2018). REITER, BARRY J., DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN CANADA (CCH Canadian, Ltd. 2006). SEALY, LEN & WORTHINGTON, SARAH, CASES AND MATERIALS IN COMPANY LAW (Oxford University Press. 2007). (二) 期刊 Allen, William T., Jacobs, Jack B. & Strine, Leo E. Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859 (2001). Allen, William T., Jacobs, Jack B., & Strine, Leo E., Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002). Anand, Anita, The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?, 61 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2015). Arlen, Jennifer & Talley, Eric, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003). Barak, Aharon, Ratification by the General Meeting, 5 ISR. L. REV. 249 (1970). Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982). Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). Bebchuk, Lucian A., Coates, John C. & Subramanian, Guhan, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN L. REV. 885 (2002). Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL J. CORP. L. 911 (1987). Berle, Adolf A., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). Block, Dennis J., Hoff, Jonathan M. & Cochran, H. Esther, Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 623 (1997) Bone, Jeffrey, Corporate Environmental Responsibility in the Wake of the Supreme Court Decision of BCE Inc. and Bell Canada, 27 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. 5 (2009). Bradley, Sarah P., BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders: The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance and Good Corporate Citizenship?, 41 OTTAWA L. REV. 325 (2010). Broome, Lissa L., Conley, John M. & Krawiec, Kimberly D., Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759 (2011). Brown, Ian C. Wildgoose, Hard to Swallow: The Canadian Poison Pill from an American Perspective, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 297 (2012). Canfield, Jon, The Evolution of a More Stringent Business Judgment Rule in Banking — the Minimization of Directors Deference, 6 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 153 (2006). Chadien, Chris, The Law on Corporate Opportunity Transactions by Directors: A Comparative Analysis of Delaware Law and Australian Law, 5 GSTF JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (JLSS) 1 (2016). Cox, James D. & Thomas, Randall S., Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323 (2018). Crespi, Gregory Scott, Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law: The Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 671 (2003). Dan-Cohen, Meir, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Davis, Daniel C., Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare: A Critical Appraisal, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 177 (2007). DeMott, Deborah A., Directors’ Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 517 (1988). Dhir, Aaron A., The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47 (2009). Easterbrook, Frank H. & Fischel, Daniel R., Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. L. 1733 (1981). Eisenberg, Melvin A., An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1271 (1993). Eisenberg, Melvin A., The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). Eisenberg, Melvin A., The Duty of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945 (1990). Eisenberg, Melvin A., The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006). Engel, David L., An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1(1979). Engle, Eric, Green with Envy? Greenmail Is Good! Rational Economic Responses to Greenmail in a Competitive Market for Capital and Managers, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 427 (2007). Friedlander, Joel E., Corporation and Kulturkampf: Time Culture as Illegal Fiction, 29 CONN. L. REV. 31 (1996). Friedlander, Joel E., Overturn Time-Warner Three Different Ways, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 631 (2008). Fuller, Warner, Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of Directors, 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 189 (1941). Garfield, Alan E., Paramount: The Mixed Merits of Mush, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1992). Gatti, Matteo, The Power to Decide on Takeovers: Directors or Shareholders, What Difference Does it Make?, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73 (2014). Gavis, Alexander C., A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities under State Non-shareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1451 (1990). Gerasimchuk, Eleonora, Stretching the Limits of Deal Protection Devices: From Omnicare to Wachovia, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685 (2009). Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten, Kershaw, David & Solinas, Matteo, Is the Board Neutrality Rule Trivial? Amnesia about Corporate Law in European Takeover Regulation, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 559 (2011). Gilson, Ronald J., A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981). Gilson, Ronald J., Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offers Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982). Hill, Claire A. & McDonnell, Brett H., Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007). Holber, Thomas E., Full of Hot Air？Evaluating the Airgas Court’s Reservations About Shareholders’ Short-Term and Long-Term Interests in Takeovers, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 123 (2012). Hurt, Christine, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137 (2016). Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). Johnston, Andrew, Takeover regulation: Historical and theoretical perspectives on the Takeover code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422 (2007). Lafferty, William M., Schmidt, Lisa A. & Wolfe, Donald J. Jr., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837 (2011). Lee, Joseph, The Current Barriers to Corporate Takeovers in Japan: Do the UK Takeover Code and the EU Takeover Directive Offer a Solution?, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 761 (2017). Lee, Suet Lin Joyce, Making a Case for the Duty to Act for Proper Purposes, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (July 2014). Lipton, Martin, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101 (1979). Marsh, Jr. Harold, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966). Mucciarelli, Federico M., White Knights and Black Knights: Does the Search for Competitive Bids Always Benefit the Shareholders of “Target” Companies?, 4 ECFR 408 (2006). Oesterle, Dale Arthur, Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (1986). Okanigbuan, Francis, Corporate Takeovers and Shareholder Protection: UK Takeover Regulation in Perspective, 2 MANCHESTER REV. L. CRIME & ETHICS 267 (2013). Patrone, Michael R., Sour Chocolate? Cadbury/Kraft and the 2011 Proposed Amendments to the U.K. Takeover Code – A Call for Further Research, 8 BYU INT’L L. MGMT. R. 63 (2011). Parker, Richard L., The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV.625 (1990). Peetz, Matthew, Protecting Shareholders from Themselves: How the United Kingdom’s 2011 Takeover Code Amendments Hit their Mark, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 237 (2013). Pugh, William N., Oswald, Sharon L. & Jahera, John S. Jr., The Effect of ESOP Adoptions on Corporate Performance: Are There Really Performance Changes?, 21 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS 167 (2000). Rock, Edward B., Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849 (2012). Sale, Hillary A., Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004). Seretakis, Alexandros, Hostile Takeovers and Defensive Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the United States: A Case Against the United States Regime, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 245 (2013). Siegal, Peter B., Using Appraisal to Protect Net Operating Loss Carryforwards, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 927 (2012). Siegel, Mary, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599 (2013). Simmons, Daniel L., Net Operating Losses and Section 382: Searching for a Limitation on Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045 (1989). Spalding, William R., Golden Parachutes: ExecutiveEmployment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117 (1983). Steinbrink, William H., Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CAS. W. RES. L. REV. 882 (1978). Strine, Leo E. Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919 (2001). Tilden, Robert J., The Fiduciary Duty of Corporation Directors in Massachusetts, 28 B.U. L. REV. 265 (1948). Tyler, John, Negating the Problem of Having 'Two Masters': A Frame work for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117 (2010). Uhlman, Rudolph E., The Legal Status of Corporation Directors, 19 B.U.L. REV. 12 (1939). Varottil, Umakanth, Comparative Takeover Regulation and the Concept of ‘Control’, SING. J.L. S. 208 (2015). Veasey, E. 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Whitehouse v. Carlton Hotel Proprietary Limited, [1987] 162 CLR 285. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Va. 1994). (四) 行政機關決定 Re Aurora Cannabis Inc., 2018 ONSEC 10. Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation, 2010 33 OSCB 11385. Re Lions Gate Entertainment Corp, 2010 BCSECCOM 432. Re Neo Material Technologies, 2009 LNONOSC 638, (2009), 32 OSCB 6941. Re Pulse Data Inc., 2007 ABASC 895. (五) 網路資料及其他 2017 Annual Impact Investor Survey, Global Impact Investing Network. Aga, Saira, A Review and Comparison of Takeover Defenses in the U.S. and U.K. (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1631432 . Gerstein, Mark D., Faris, Bradley C., Campion, Tiffany F. & Drewry, Christopher R., The Resilient Rights Plan: Recent Poison Pill Developments and Trends, Latham & Watkins LLP, April 2011. The Autorité des marchés financiers, An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics (14 March 2013). The Canadian Securities Administrators, CSA Notice of Amendments to Take-Over Bid Regime– Amendments to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids and Changes to National Policy 62-203 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids and Consequential Amendments (February 25, 2016). The Canadian Securities Administrators, Notice and Request for Comment Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, Proposed Companion Policy 62-105CP (14 March 2013). The Official Website of the Government of Canada, Policy on arrangements – Canada Business Corporations Act, section 192, rule 4, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cd-dgc.nsf/eng/cs01073.html. The Takeover Panel Code Committee, Amendments following the Code Committee’s review of the regulation of takeover bids, Instrument 2011/2, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/Instrument-2011-2.pdf. The Panel on Takeover and Mergers Code Committee, Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids, PCP 2010/2, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/PCP201002.pdf. The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers Code Committee, Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids: Proposed amendments to the Takeover Code, PCP 2011/1, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/PCP201101.pdf. The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers Code Committee, Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids: Response Statement by the Code Committee of the Panel Following the Consultation on PCP 2011/1, RS 2011/1, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/RS201101.pdf. The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers Code Committee, Review of the 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code, 2012/8, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012-8.pdf. National Policy 62-202, Takeover Bids-Defensive Tactics, Sec. Policy 65648519006, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62-202_fnp.jsp. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, SEC.gov, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm. Wright, Iain, Publications, The UK Takeover Code: Significant Changes Come into Effect, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS (Sept. 22, 2011), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/the-uk-takeover-code-significant-changes-come-into-effect. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74723 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 2018年台灣併購市場呈現價量齊揚的趨勢，此現象主要受惠於國際資金水位高漲以及企業積極轉型佈局的影響，因此併購市場的熱絡除了因有數起大型跨國併購案件外，亦來自我國國內中小型企業整併數量的增加。投顧報告預估在現行狀態下，近兩年內會有更多中小企業面臨產業整併的挑戰，故而可預期未來在併購領域將會有更多紛爭出現，蓋以併購方式之一的敵意併購為例，這項制度雖可作為公司外部監督之一環，但業界人士多數仍對其抱持負面態度，從過去實務上所發生的多起案例觀之，例如開發金併金鼎證、國巨併大毅，到近期的日月光公開收購矽品等，也確實充斥著爭議。雖然我國商事法近年來經歷數次修法，且政府對於敵意併購也逐漸轉向較為正面之態度，惟因國內過往有關敵意併購之實例相較英美等國仍屬罕見，因此在近期幾次修法中，立法者並未直接回應與敵意併購相關的重要議題，以至相關制度在我國仍未見明確。在此情形下，本文擬透過對英美併購法制的研析，進一步建立我國法對目標公司董事責任的判斷標準。以期予我國成長中的併購市場提供更健全之發展環境，並透過法制化相關制度以降低業界對敵意併購之負面觀感。
由於現階段國內外常見之敵意併購方式仍以公開收購為主，故本文將以此制度為中心，探討目標公司董事面對敵意併購威脅時，所為的各種回應行為是否該當其受任人義務。因此，本文架構係以探討董事與股東間之經營權限劃分開始，進而討論敵意併購時應由何方握有最終決定權，而後就比較法制進行分析，透過對美國德拉瓦州法院判決、英國及加拿大公司法制與相關收購守則立法例的研究，了解目標公司董事所需擔負之義務，同時參酌學說上對上述審查標準之正反意見，尋思其中是否有可作為我國借鏡之處。最後回歸我國法制之探討，除了檢視與企業併購及公開收購之相關法條規範與實務見解外，亦自台航中航併購案與日月光收購矽品案的二項爭議實例中，解析我國現行法制所面臨的問題，並於適當處作建議，以供將來立法和司法實務參考。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In 2018, the rise of deal value and volume of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in Taiwan was mostly attributable to the soaring international capital level and robust transformations among enterprises. In addition to several large-scale international M&A deals, the increase of M&A between Taiwanese small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) have contributed to the thriving M&A market. Investment consulting firms report that in current trends, more SMEs are expected to face M&A challenges within 2 years due to global competitions; consequently, more M&A disputes are likely to arise in the near future. Take hostile takeovers as an example, though this kind of M&A activity can be viewed as an approach to business supervision, most people still hold a negative attitude towards it. From the perspective of previous hostile takeover cases, such as the takeover of Taiwan International Securities by China Development Financial Holdings, that of TA-I Technology by Yageo Corporation, and the recent takeover of Siliconware Precision Industries launched by Advanced Semiconductor Engineering, have also been highly controversial. In recent years, the commercial laws in Taiwan has undergone several amendments, and the government has gradually turned to a more positive attitude toward hostile takeovers. However, because such takeovers are relatively rare in Taiwan compared with the United States and United Kingdom, legislators have not directly responded to essential issues of hostile takeovers; relevant systems are thus imcomplete. Under such circumstances, this study explored the M&A laws and regulations in the United States and United Kingdom to establish legal standards for determining the liabilities of directors in a target company facing a hostile takeover. The findings are expected to provide a sound environment for developing a M&A market and mitigate negative views on hostile takeovers among businesses.
By focusing on takeover bids, a type of hostile takeover that is mainly adopted by companies at home and abroad, this study explored whether the actions taken by directors of a target company under the threat of a hostile takeover, fulfill their fiduciary duties. Therefore, this study would start with the distribution of ownership between directors and shareholders and determined the party entitled with the right to make the final decision in a hostile takeover. Subsequently, through a comparison of M&A law in several countries: the Delaware Courts of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, this study would identify the liabilities of directors. Moreover, the opinions of various scholars on aforesaid legal standards were reviewed to provide a reference for establishing a full-fledged regulatory framework in Taiwan. Finally, the study would turn to Taiwan legal system, in addition to reviewing relevant regulations and cases related to hostile takeover, it would also analyze cases including the takeover deal between Taiwan Navigation and Chinese Maritime Transport, and the takeover of Siliconware Precision launched by Advanced Semiconductor Engineering. It is expected that the results of this study can be served as a reference for legislative and judicial practices in the future. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T09:06:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R03a21097-1.pdf: 2049750 bytes, checksum: 6d81bae28bac21ffc43301be0b8255da (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 I
摘要 III Abstract IV 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究方法 2 第三節 研究範圍 2 第四節 研究架構 3 第二章 敵意併購與防禦措施 5 第一節 公司控制權、敵意併購與防禦措施 5 第一項、公司控制權 5 第二項、敵意併購與防禦策略 6 第二節 敵意併購所涉之特殊問題 7 第一項、當事人間之利害衝突 7 第一款、目標公司管理階層與股東之間 7 第二款、併購方與目標公司股東之間 8 第二項、董事防禦措施決策權之有無 10 第一款、由董事會決策 10 第二款、由董事會與股東會決策 12 第三節 敵意併購之防禦方法 14 第一項、敵意併購產生前之防禦措施 14 第一款、公司法規範 14 第二款、特殊員工契約條款 18 第二項、敵意併購產生後之防禦措施 20 第一款、資本重組 20 第二款、出售公司 21 第三章 美國法就目標公司董事受任義務之審查標準 23 第一節 董事受任義務之一般標準 24 第一項、董事責任之規範模式 24 第二項、董事受任義務之行為標準 26 第一款、注意義務 26 第二款、忠實義務 27 第三款、善意義務 28 第三項、董事受任義務之審查標準 29 第二節 敵意併購時目標公司董事受任義務之特殊標準 32 第一項、未移轉控制權— Unocal Standard 32 第一款、Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 32 第二款、後續發展 34 第二項、移轉控制權—Revlon Rule 36 第一款、Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 36 第二款、後續發展 38 第三項、交易保護措施— Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. 44 第一款、案例事實 44 第二款、法院判決 46 第三款、後續發展 49 第四款、小結 51 第三節 Unocal Standard內涵之演變 52 第一項、合理威脅之認定 52 第一款、適當企業宗旨— eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 52 第二款、激勵短期投資人參與應賣— Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. 59 第二項、合理防禦手段之認定—低門檻股東權利計畫 63 第一款、營業淨損（Net Operating Loss）之意義 63 第二款、NOL 股東權利計畫之意義 64 第三款、Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc. 65 第四款、小結 68 第四節 小結 69 第四章 英國法就目標公司董事受任義務之規範 71 第一節 董事受任義務之一般標準 71 第二節 敵意收購時目標公司董事受任義務之特殊標準 73 第一項、收購守則與董事受任義務 74 第二項、適當目的原則（proper purpose doctrine） 76 第一款、Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. 77 第二款、Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. 78 第三款、Eclairs Group Ltd. v. JKX Oil & Gas Plc. 81 第四款、Criterion Properties plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC 83 第五款、Bamford v. Bamford 85 第三項、董事會中立性 86 第一款、Kraft-Cadbury 併購案 86 第二款、2011 年 Takeover Code 修正法案 87 第三款、2011 年修法後續影響 91 第三節 小結 92 第五章 加拿大法就目標公司董事受任義務之規範 94 第一節 監管模式與法規範 94 第一項、證券監管機關 94 第二項、收購規範 95 第二節 董事受任義務之一般標準 96 第一項、忠實義務 96 第二項、注意義務 97 第三項、經營判斷法則 98 第三節 敵意收購時目標公司董事之受任義務 98 第一項、BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders 98 第一款、本案事實 98 第二款、法院判決 99 第三款、小結 103 第二項、證券監管機關 103 第一款、Re Pulse Data Inc. 104 第二款、Re Neo Material Technologies, Inc. 105 第三款、後續發展 106 第四節 敵意收購制度之變革及其影響 107 第一項、CSA 修正案 108 第二項、Re Aurora Cannabis Inc. 109 第五節 小結 110 第六章 我國現行規範與未來發展建議 111 第一節 反併購權限與防禦措施 111 第一項、反併購權限之歸屬 111 第二項、防禦措施的可行性 113 第一款、董事交錯任期制度 113 第二款、發行新股或特別股 114 第三款、股份交換 115 第四款、股東權益計畫 116 第二節 目標公司董事之受任義務 117 第一項、公司法下董事受任義務之規範 117 第一款、注意義務 117 第二款、忠實義務 118 第二項、公司併購時董事受任義務的內涵 119 第一款、企併法下之注意義務 119 第二款、企併法下之忠實義務 120 第三節 我國爭議案件之處理與解析 122 第一項、台航中航併購案 122 第一款、案例事實 122 第二款、法院判決 124 第三款、本文見解 125 第四款、試析比較法上審查標準 127 第二項、日月光收購矽品案 128 第一款、案件事實 128 第二款、本案法律爭議 130 第四節 修法建議 137 第五節 小結 138 第七章 結論 140 第一節 敵意併購提案決定權應歸屬董事會 140 第二節 外部審查機制應以法院為主體 140 第三節 股東與利害關係人間利害衝突的考量 141 第四節 防禦措施的充實 142 第五節 審查標準的內涵與修法建議 142 參考書目 144 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 敵意併購下目標公司之董事責任 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a Target Company
Facing a Hostile Takeover | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃銘傑,莊永丞 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 企業併購,受任義務,司法審查,經營判斷法則,強化司法審查,適當目的原則,行政管制, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Mergers and Acquisitions,Fiduciary Duty,Judicial Review,Business Judgment Rule,Enhanced Judicial Scrutiny,Proper Purpose Doctrine,Administration Control, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 158 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201904430 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-01-03 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 法律學系 | |
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