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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 徐學庸 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chih-Chia Chen | en |
dc.contributor.author | 陳治嘉 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T09:05:49Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-01-21 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-01-21 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-01-14 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Gallop, David. Plato Phaedo, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Hackforth, R. Plato’s Phaedo, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955. Nichols, James H. Phaedrus, London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 侯健,《柏拉圖理想國》,臺北:聯經,2014。 徐學庸,《米諾篇、費多篇譯注》,臺北:臺灣商務,2013。 Ahrensdorf, Peter. J. The Death of Socrates and the Life of Philosophy, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. Apolloni, David. “Plato’s Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996: 5-32. Austin, Emily. “Piety and Annihilation in Plato’s Phaedo”, Apeiron, De Gruyter Online, 2019: 1-20. Barnes, Jonathan. “Critical Notice”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 8, 1978: 397-419. Bostock, David. Plato’s Phaedo, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Denyer, Nicholas. “The Phaedo’s Final Argument”, Dominic Scott, ed., Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honor of Myles Burnyeat, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2008: 1-16. Frede, Dorothea. “The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedo 102a-107a”, Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1978: 27-41. Gallop, David. “Plato’s ‘Cyclical Argument’ Recycled”, Phronesis, Vol. 27, No.3, 1982: 207-222. Gosling, Justin. “Similarity in Phaedo 73b seq.”, Phronesis, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1965: 151- 161. Johansen, Kjeller Thomas. “The Seperation of the Soul from Body in Plato’s Phaedo”, Philosophical Inquiry, 41, 2017: 17-28(本文參考版本之網址為: https://www.academia.edu/32684719/The_Separation_of_Soul_from_Body_in_Platos_Phaedo 1-17). Matthews, Gareth B. and Thomas A. Blackson, “Causes in the Phaedo”, Synthese, Vol. 79, No. 3, 1989: 581-591. Miles, Murray. “Plato on Suicide”, Phoenix, Vol. 55, No. 3/4, 2001: 244-258. Nehamas, Alexander. “Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1975: 105-117. Plass, Paul. “Socrates' Method of Hypothesis in the Phaedo”, Phronesis, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1960: 103-115. Sedley, David. “Plato’s Theory of Change at Phaedo 70-71”, Presocratics and Plato: A Festschrift in Honor of Charles H. Kahn, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2012: 147-163. Stern, Paul. Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993. Taylor, Christopher C. W. “The Argument in the Phaedo Concerning the Thesis that the Soul is a Harmonia”, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Vol. 2, 1970: 217- 231. Warren, James. “Socratic Suicide”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 121, 2001: 91-106. White, Nicholas P. “Forms and Sensibles: Phaedo 74b-c”, Philosophical Topics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1987: 197-214. 徐學庸,《靈魂的奧迪賽 柏拉圖《費多篇》》,臺北:長松文化,2004。 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74669 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 在柏拉圖的諸多對話錄中,當屬《費多篇》最為充斥死亡氣息。不論是對話錄結尾描繪主角蘇格拉底從飲鴆到徹底闔眼的詳細過程,亦或開篇對於死亡的探究,中間關於靈魂不朽的論辯及人死後靈魂來世旅程與相關遭遇的故事,全都不離死亡。這其中最特殊的是蘇格拉底面對自身即將死亡所抱持的態度:滿心期待、欣然迎接。但為何蘇格拉底得以如此的態度接受自己的死亡?這是本論文欲探究的議題。希望透過重組《費多篇》的論證結構,及架構各個論述彼此之間的聯繫,最終提出在一個夾心的結構底下,這個疑問可以得到適切回答的論述。
這篇論文主要由三部分構成:首先,在第二章分析了蘇格拉底以靈魂的徹底釋放不同於靈魂的移監,來對這個疑問做初步回應。此外結合死後有一個更廣大的世界,靈魂在其中各有不同的遭遇,進一步豐富、強化他的回應。然而此回應需要穩固的地基,即靈魂不會因為與身體一分離就煙消雲散,故靈魂的不朽需要獲得證成。靈魂不朽論證又分成兩個步驟去論述:第三章裡的論述先定位對話錄當中的循環論證與回憶論證,各賦予它們不可或缺的地位,這個地位也就是提供最終論證在進行推論時所需的材料;其次,在第四章中將相似性論證定位為引路人角色,引導最終論證出場,並以最終論證所持的核心觀點「生命拒絕死亡」為靈魂不朽的論辯畫上句點。四個論證的組合提供靈魂不朽的議題一個完整的論證,而這進一步也讓蘇格拉底何以選擇接受死亡的回答不會虛無縹緲。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Among Plato’s dialogues the Phaedo is mainly concerned with the idea of death. At the end of the dialogue the description of Socrates’s drinking hemlock to end his life, or the inquiry of the idea of death at the start of the dialogue, or the argument on the immortality of the soul, or the journey and experiences of the disembodied soul in the afterlife, all of those issues are related to death. Among them, the most peculiar one is the way how Socrates takes his own death: waiting for death in hope and welcoming it with pleasure. But what is the reason for Socrates to accept his own death with such a serene attitude? This is the issue which I attempt to explore in this thesis. By virtue of reconstructing the structure of argument in the Phaedo and establishing the interrelationship of each issue, hopefully the question could be satisfactorily answered.
The thesis consists mainly of three parts: Firstly, in Chapter 2, the difference between the soul’s complete release from the body and its moving from one body to another will be considered in order to preliminarily respond to the question. In addition, this response will be strengthened by the discussion of the myth of the eschatological journey of the soul and the features of the world at the end of the dialogue. However this response needs a solid foundation, i.e. the disembodied soul will not perish. So the proof of the immortality of the soul is needed. Secondly, the argument in Chapter 3 will discuss two arguments about the immortality of the soul: the Cyclical Argument and the Recollection Argument. Not only will I put emphasis on the fact that they are all indispensable parts for understanding Socrates’s attitude towards death, but also show that their function is to provide the materials needed for bringing out the Final Argument. Finally, in Chapter 4 the Affinity Argument will be considered to pave the way for the entrance of the Final Argument. The argument of the immortality of the soul in this chapter will end with the core idea perspective “life doesn’t admit death”. The combination of the four arguments provides a complete proof for the immortality of the soul, which also makes Socrates’s response to his choice of accepting death more understandable. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T09:05:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-R05124010-1.pdf: 2019879 bytes, checksum: 3b22e55b97f1b111b352ded9992ca7ab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝詞……………………………………………………………………….i
中文摘要…………………………………………………………………ii 英文摘要………………………………………………………………...iii 目錄……………………………………………………………………....v 第一章 導論……………………………………………………………1 第二章 神話、哲學與死亡……………………………………………7 2.1 哲學家與自殺?…………………………………………….........7 2.1.1 哲學家與神聖自殺的宣稱…………………………………..8 2.1.2 期待死亡的基礎─靈魂徹底的毀滅與靈魂不朽.................15 2.1.3 「樂意追隨死亡」與「對自己行兇」………....…………22 2.1.4 小結…………………………………………………………29 2.2 死亡與神話……………………………………………………...30 2.2.1 神話故事在《費多篇》中的定位…………………………30 2.2.2 完整、細緻且面面俱到的神話故事………………………35 2.2.3 小結…………………………………………………………39 第三章 最終論證前的楔子論證……………………………………..41 3.1 作為楔子的循環論證…………………………………………...42 3.1.1 循環論證的前因後果………………………………………43 3.1.2 舊的循環論證─傳統定位……………………...…….…….46 3.1.3 新的循環論證─辯護對反特質…………………...………..50 3.1.4 小結…………………………………………………………57 3.2 作為楔子的回憶論證…………………………………………...58 3.2.1 回憶論證的定位及其困難…………………………………59 3.2.2 回憶論證的必要條件分析…………………………………64 3.2.3 回憶論證的論證目標之爭…………………………………69 3.2.4 小結…………………………………………………………73 第四章 辯護靈魂不朽…………………………………......................74 4.1 相似性論證的定位………………………………………...……74 4.1.1 對於相似性論證的質疑─靈魂相似於理型或身體?…….75 4.1.2 搖擺不定的靈魂分類與相似性論證的兩難………………80 4.1.3 相似性論證的重新定位─引導探討本質………………….84 4.1.4 小結…………………………………………………………87 4.2 辯護最終論證…………………………………………………...89 4.2.1 失敗的盲人摸象與作為生命原因的靈魂…………………89 4.2.2 對於最終論證的質疑與辯護………………………………98 4.2.3 不滅的靈魂?……………………………………………..104 4.2.4 小結………………………………………………………..107 第五章 結論…………………………………....................................109 參考文獻…………………………………............................................115 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 柏拉圖的死亡觀──《費多篇》的論證結構 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Plato on Death: The Structure of Argument in the Phaedo | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 何畫瑰,黃麗綺 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 柏拉圖,《費多篇》,死亡,自殺,靈魂不朽,神話, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Plato,the Phaedo,death,suicide,immortality of the soul,myth, | en |
dc.relation.page | 117 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000096 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-01-15 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 |
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